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THE WAR IN KOSOVO AND A POSTWAR ANALYSIS

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CONTENTS

THE WAR IN KOSOVO

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Brownback, Thomas, Ashcroft, Frist, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, Boxer, and Torricelli.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Madam Secretary, before we begin, I want it a matter of public record that I have been amazed and I have been grateful for the number of times I know you called me from overseas at 2 in the morning, and I think Senator Biden and I will agree that she has kept this committee advised of everything that she could possibly tell us about, and it has been very helpful.

Now, a great deal of it you have mentioned you hoped we would not say anything about in public, but anyway, it is a pleasure to work with you, and we welcome you to this important hearing to discus the war in Kosovo, a subject which you and I have discussed many times.

As in all of our previous conversations you have been unfailingly honest, and that goes a long way in this town. Certainly it goes a long way with me. I have felt no need to discuss the details of our conversation in the media.

Now, a few of us around this town have had the honor to serve in the Armed Forces at a time when criticizing our country simply did not happen. Senator Thurmond was on board when the World War II death camps were liberated. That was the same war in which I was honored to render totally unglamorous and unimportant naval service. I volunteered on Pearl Harbor afternoon and finally got in despite some hearing difficulty, a war in which this committee's chief of staff, Admiral Nance, was a young naval officer fighting back the Japanese in the Pacific.

Madam Secretary, I am a little emotional about this. My generation believed that when our country is at war we must all measure our words carefully. I never criticized our country during World War II, or Korea, or Vietnam, or Desert Storm, and I am not going to do it now, when our Armed Forces are flying into a distinct possibility of harm's way, and this is no time for political grandstanding or political rhetoric, and so we meet today in the gravest of circumstances, while the Nation is in fact at war, wheth-

er we call it that or not, against a cruel and ruthless and determined enemy.

There will be time later on to examine in detail opportunities, if any, that the United States missed that might have spared us from an extended and violent nightmare of destruction, suffering unquestionable episodes of bad judgment. I do not know. That remains to be seen.

Let it be known that I am, of course, personally horrified that at the end of the 20th century, here we are witness to a display of incredible inhumanity. More than a million Kosovar Albanians have been forced to flee their homes as a result of Milosevic and his brutal policies.

Since launching their crackdown against the Albanian population of Kosovo, Serbian forces have killed thousands of people, including innocent women and children. The same Serbian forces have offered ethnic Albanians the choice of being forcibly deported or murdered. The same Serbian forces have engaged in a campaign of massive destruction of ethnic Albanian villages throughout Kosovo to make certain that these victims will be unable to return to their homes and rebuild their lives.

Now, the administration has defined the U.S. objective in Kosovo as an intent to achieve a durable peace that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government of the people. This is an abstract definition, perhaps, but I hope you will elaborate precisely on what that means, to the extent you are able to do so.

Now, how do NATO air strikes, or the introduction of NATO ground troops contribute to meeting that stated goal? Is the United States still willing to negotiate with Milosevic? Do we support independence for Kosovo? Will we secure peace if and when peace is ever reached, and what and how much are we willing to sacrifice in terms of American blood and treasure to meet these goals?

Madam Secretary, I know that Senator Biden and other members of this committee likewise welcome you and thank you for coming today to meet with us on where we are and where we are trying to go.

I yield to the distinguished ranking member.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the good news is the Secretary keeps in touch. The bad news is, she keeps in touch, in the sense that I know, at least speaking for myself, I cannot pretend not to know what she has been about, and in a sense from my perspective we have the right person and the wrong person before us, the right person before us because she is Secretary of State, and the wrong person before us because I already know what she has been doing and what she thinks on most of these issues, so I am not going to take a lot of time when others who have not had as much opportunity to work with her on this get a chance to question her.

I would like to say at the outset, I just returned with some of my colleagues from a trip, as others have, down to Macedonia and Albania and as well as we visited the troops in Italy, and met with SHAPE and at NATO in Brussels, and one of the things—and met with a number of European ambassadors to NATO, seven in all, I believe.

I came away with several impressions, that the good news is that we have an alliance. The bad new is, we have an alliance, because although I know there are a number of things the Secretary and the President would like to see done if we were pursuing this war alone, some are not getting done because there is an alliance, and the alliance has to stay together.

For example, if this was not a NATO operation, I doubt whether there would be a scintilla of support up here in the Congress for our use of force if we were going it alone, so we are kind of caught between a rock and a hard spot, as the last President, this President, and the next President will be, in prosecuting goals set out by an alliance where members have slightly different perspectives.

I came back, Mr. Chairman, startled that the alliance has stayed together as well as it has so far, and slightly concerned that, as we get down to having to contemplate the loss of American and NATO lives by increasing the risks of operations, that the resolve may not stick, and so I would say to the Secretary that I appreciate her steadfastness here. She has made it clear, and I hope she continues to give everyone involved in this administration and alliance the stick-to-it-iviness and determination that she has about the need to prevail.

One of the things, Madam Secretary, I think is going to be very, very important for you to convince this committee of and the Congress and in turn the American people is what constitutes prevailing—what constitutes prevailing—and as I understand it, it is the removal of paramilitary, police and military forces under the control of Milosevic from Kosovo, the reintroduction of the folks who are displaced persons, approaching three-quarters of a million now, and their guaranteed security with an international NATO-led force in Kosovo until things are squared away.

There are other purposes we have in mind. I agree with Dick Lugar that until there is a democracy in Serbia, nothing is ultimately going to be resolved, and as long as Milosevic is there it is going to be near impossible to achieve—impossible to achieve that, and there is going to be a lot of destabilization in the region, but I think if you can make clear what the objectives of NATO are, it would be helpful, at least to me, and I think to the committee, and second, that if you would remind us all of, as—let me—strike that.

Let me conclude by just saying, I thank Senator Helms for the way in which he has handled this matter, this matter meaning the war in Kosovo. There is a lot of very early second-guessing, a lot of very early decisions made about whether or not the air campaign is a success or a failure. There is a lot of very early handicapping of what is going to happen. I appreciate his patience, and the patience of others in waiting to see whether or not the course we've embarked upon with 18 other nations, whether or not that course can bear the fruit that we think it can.

I for one think, Madam Secretary, and John McCain and I introduced along with Senator Hagel and others a joint congressional resolution today not calling for the use of ground troops, but authorizing the Congress to step up to the ball and tell the President in advance anything he needs, including ground troops, although those words are not mentioned, anything he needs to prosecute this war to a successful conclusion he will have.

I doubt whether we will act on that in the near term, based on the Senate and House leadership, but I do think that Slobodan Milosevic should understand that you are not standing alone in this effort, it is not merely a Presidential decision, and I am not asking you about ground troops, but suggesting to you only that we withhold our fire in a political sense until we give this air campaign the time that is needed, and it has not had sufficient time, and I thank the chairman for having done that.

I yield to the chairman and thank you for being here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your kind words.

Now we will hear from you, Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Biden. Let me also say that, in terms of contacts with this committee, I think we have a really good record. I find it very helpful and useful that all of you in various ways take my phone calls at various times of the day and night, depending upon what time zone we are in, and over the weekends. I think a lot of business takes place that does not wait for Senate hearings, but goes on on an ongoing basis. And I have to say that Admiral Nance's perpetual presence is something that is very important to this Secretary of State because he is also always reachable. So it is a great pleasure to be here again with all of you.

I intend to lay out America's stake in the outcome of the Kosovo crisis today, the events that brought us to this point, the status of our military and diplomatic efforts, and our vision for the future.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, and Senators, the potential dangers of the situation in Kosovo have long been recognized, but our concerns were heightened when early last year Serb President Milosevic initiated a violent campaign of repression. One result was a humanitarian crisis as thousands of Albanians fled their homes, and a second result, unforeseen by him, was the strengthening of the Kosovar Liberation Army, the KLA, which contributed to the unrest by committing provocative acts of its own.

With our allies and partners, the United States sought to end this cycle of violence by diplomatic means, and last October President Milosevic agreed to a cease-fire that would have allowed many of the displaced to return home. It soon became clear, however, that Milosevic had no intention of keeping this agreement. His security forces positioned themselves for a new offensive and then massacred the villagers in Racak. At Rambouillet, Belgrade rejected a plan for peace while preparing a plan for barbarism, a plan for the ethnic cleansing of the entire Kosovo Albanian community.

We have all seen the resulting images of families uprooted and put on trains, children crying for parents they cannot find, refugees recounting how loved ones were led away, and ominous aerial photos of freshly upturned earth.

Behind these images is a reality of people no different in their fundamental rights or humanity than you or me, or children no different than yours or mine, cutoff from their homes and robbed of

their dreams. Make no mistake, this campaign of terror was the cause, not the result of NATO action. It is a Milosevic production.

NATO's decision to use force against the Milosevic regime was necessary and right, and the conditions the Alliance has set for ending its campaign are clear, just, and firm. There must be a verifiable stop to Serb military action against the people of Kosovo. Belgrade's military police and paramilitary forces must leave so that the refugees can return. An international military presence must be permitted to go into Kosovo, and the people of Kosovo must be given the democratic self-government they have long deserved.

As President Clinton has said, as long as Milosevic refuses to accept these conditions, NATO's air campaign will continue, and we will seek to destroy as much of Belgrade's military capabilities as we can. Each day, Milosevic's capacity to conduct repression will diminish.

It is evident that our military efforts are having a significant impact, but we must maintain the pressure until an acceptable outcome is achieved. At the same time, we will continue to help those in the region cope with the humanitarian disaster Milosevic has created.

More than a half million Kosovars have fled Serbia since the latest violence began. Of these, the vast majority are now in Albania and Macedonia, where feverish efforts are underway to build camps and provide services. Thus far, we have contributed $150 million to this effort, and yesterday the President submitted an emergency supplemental request that includes $386 million in additional State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance funds.

Many of the refugees have reported Serb war crimes and crimes against humanity. These abuses include the destruction of entire settlements, the burning of homes, the seizure of civilians for use as human shields, the rape of ethnic Albanian women and girls, and the systematic separation and execution of military-aged men.

There should be no misunderstanding. When it comes to the commission of war crimes, just following orders is no defense. There is no statute of limitations, and the War Crimes Tribunal has rightly indicated that it will follow the evidence wherever it leads. By helping to document refugee accounts, and by compiling and sharing other evidence, the U.S. Government is and will continue to assist the tribunal in its efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.

Mr. Chairman, in dealing with Kosovo prior to the last week of March, we were engaged in diplomacy backed by the threat of force. Since that time, we have used diplomacy to back NATO's military campaign. First, we have worked to ensure that NATO remains united and firm, and today we have been heartened by the broad participation and strong support the military campaign has received.

No country in NATO wanted to have to use force against Serbia, but no country in NATO is willing to stand by and accept in Europe the expulsion of an entire ethnic community from its home. Our second diplomatic objective has been to help leaders in the countries directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis and prevent a wider conflict. The President's supplemental request in-

cludes $150 million in emergency aid to these nations and to democratic Montenegro.

Our third objective is to work constructively with Russia. When I met with Foreign Minister Ivanov last week, he was clear about Russia's opposition to the NATO air campaign, but we agreed on the need for an end to the repression, the withdrawal of Serb forces, and the return of refugees. Where we differ is over the kind of international presence required to achieve these goals.

We believe that after what Milosevic has done in Kosovo, refugees will not be able to return home unless the protective force is credible, which requires that its core must come from NATO. As in Bosnia, however, we think that Russia could and should play an important role in that force, and we would welcome the participation of NATO's other partner countries.

Our fourth diplomatic objective has been to ensure that NATO's message is understood, and we are providing information on a regular basis to nations around the world. We are also trying to pierce the veil of propaganda with which Milosevic has tried to shroud the people of former Yugoslavia.

In the days and weeks to come, we will press ahead with our military, diplomatic, and humanitarian strategies. Our desire is to begin as soon as possible the vital work of returning refugees, reuniting, and rebuilding Kosovo, but we are not interested in a phony settlement based on unverifiable assumptions or on Milosevic's worthless word. The only settlement we can accept is one we have the ability to verify and the capability to enforce.

Even as we respond to the crisis in Kosovo, we must also concern ourselves more broadly with the future of the region. Some say that violence is endemic to the Balkans, and that its people have never and will never get along. I am no prophet, but certainly the scars of the past are still visible, and the wounds opened by the current devastation will take much time to heal. But the evidence is there in the testimony of average people, whether in Zagreb or Tirana, Sarajevo, or Skopje, that they are far more interested in plugging into the world economy than slugging it out with former adversaries.

During the NATO summit, the President and our partners will discuss the need for a coordinated effort to transform the Balkans from the continent's primary source of instability into an integral part of the European mainstream. This will require a commitment from us. It will require the involvement of the European Union and the international financial institutions. It will require a continued willingness on the part of local leaders to work together, and it will require ultimately a change in leadership in Belgrade, so the democratic aspirations of the Serb people may be fulfilled and the isolation of the former Yugoslavia can end.

Mr. Chairman and Senators, I understand that the congressional leadership will be hosting a reception this week for our visitors from the NATO countries, and I hope you will thank them for their effort and stress to them the importance of standing together and standing tall until the current confrontation is settled.

As the President and our military leaders have warned, this struggle may be long. We can expect days of tragedy for us as well as for the people of the region, but we must not falter, and we can-

not fail. By opposing Slobodan Milosevic's murderous rampage, NATO is playing its rightful role as a defender of freedom and security within the Euro-Atlantic region.

Because our cause is just we are united, and because we are united, we are confident that in this confrontation between barbaric killing and necessary force, between vicious intolerance and respect for human rights, between tyranny and democracy, we will prevail. To that essential objective I pledge the full measure of my own efforts and respectfully solicit both your wise counsel and support. I thank you very much, and I am now ready to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and Senators, I am pleased to appear before you concerning U.S. and NATO policy towards the crisis in Kosovo.

My intention is to lay out concisely America's stake in the outcome of this crisis; the events that brought us to this point; the status of our military, diplomatic and humanitarian efforts; and our vision for the future.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the potential dangers of the situation in Kosovo have been recognized throughout this decade. Slobodan Milosevic first vaulted to prominence by exploiting the fears of ethnic Serbs in this province. A decade ago, he catered to those fears by robbing Kosovo Albanians of their cherished autonomy. For years thereafter, the Kosovo Albanians sought to recover their rights by peaceful means. And in 1992, after fighting had broken out elsewhere in the Balkans, President Bush issued a warning against Serb military repression in Kosovo.

Meanwhile, President Milosevic was the primary instigator in three wars, attacking first Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally triggering a devastating and prolonged conflict in Bosnia.

Early last year, he initiated a more extensive and violent campaign of repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. One result was a humanitarian crisis, as tens of thousands of people fled their homes. A second consequence—unforeseen by him—was the strengthening of the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA), which contributed to the unrest by committing provocative acts of its own.

With our allies and partners, including Russia, the United States sought to end this cycle of violence by diplomatic means. Last October, President Milosevic agreed to a ceasefire, to the withdrawal of most of his security forces, and to the entry of a verification mission from the OSCE.

It soon became clear, however, that Milosevic never had any intention of living up to this agreement. Instead of withdrawing, his security forces positioned themselves for a new offensive. Early this year, they perpetrated a massacre in the village of Racak. And at Rambouillet, Belgrade rejected a plan for peace that had been accepted by the Kosovo Albanians, and that included provisions for disarming the KLA, and safeguarding the rights of all Kosovars, including ethnic Serbs.

Even while blocking our diplomatic efforts, Milosevic was preparing a barbaric plan for expelling or forcing the total submission of the Kosovo Albanian community. First, his security forces threatened and then forced the withdrawal of the OSCE mission. Then, a new rampage of terror began.

We have all seen the resulting images of families uprooted and put on trains, children crying for parents they cannot find, refugees recounting how loved ones were separated and led away, and ominous aerial photos of freshly-upturned earth.

Behind these images is a reality of people no different in their fundamental rights or humanity than you or me—of children no different than yours or mine—cut off from their homes, deprived of their families, robbed of their dreams. And make no mistake, this campaign of terror was the cause, not the result, of NATO action. It is a Milosevic production.

Today, our values and principles, our perseverance and our strength, are being tested. We must be united at home and with our Allies overseas.

The stakes are high.

To understand why that is, we need, as President Clinton has repeatedly urged, to consult the map. Kosovo is a small part of a region with large historic importance and a vital role to play in Europe's future.

The region is a crossroads where the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity and the Islamic world meet. It is where World War I began, major battles of

World War II were fought, and the worst fighting in Europe since Hitler's surrender occurred in this decade.

Its stability directly affects the security of our Greek and Turkish allies to the south, and our new allies Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the north. Kosovo itself is surrounded by small and struggling democracies that are being overwhelmed by the flood of refugees Milosevic's ruthless policies are creating.

Today, this region is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical to our own security. And it cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains wracked by conflict.

Further, Belgrade's actions constitute a critical test of NATO, whose strength and credibility have defended freedom and ensured our security for five decades. To paraphrase Senator Chuck Hagel, today, there is a butcher in NATO's backyard, and we have committed ourselves to stopping him. History will judge us harshly if we fail.

For all of these reasons, NATO's decision to use force against the Milosevic regime was necessary and right. And the conditions the Alliance has set for ending its campaign are clear, just and firm.

There must be a verifiable stop to Serb military action against the people of Kosovo. Belgrade's military, police and paramilitary forces must leave so that refugees can return. An international military presence must be permitted. And the people of Kosovo must be given the democratic self-government they have long deserved.

As President Clinton has said, as long as Milosevic refuses to accept these conditions, NATO's air campaign will continue, and we will seek to destroy as much of Belgrade's military capabilities as we can. Each day, Milosevic's capacity to conduct repression will diminish.

It is evident that the efforts of our courageous military forces are having a significant impact on Milosevic's options and abilities. But that impact is not yet sufficient. We must maintain the pressure until an acceptable outcome is achieved.

At the same time, we will continue to help those in the region cope with the humanitarian disaster Milosevic has created.

We do not know with any certainty how many people are now homeless inside Kosovo, but officials estimate as many as 800,000. Belgrade has made a terrible situation worse by interfering with efforts to provide food and other basic necessities. We are exploring every possible option for helping these people before it is too late. And we welcome efforts by Greek NGO's and the International Committee of the Red Cross to open up a relief lifeline, which we hope will move desperately needed supplies to the population at risk.

In addition to the internally displaced, more than half a million Kosovars have fled the region since the latest violence began. Of these, the vast majority are now in Albania and Macedonia, where the terrain is rugged, the weather harsh and the infrastructure limited. Feverish efforts are underway to build camps and provide services. With local officials, the UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF, our allies and partners, and nongovernmental organizations, we are struggling to save lives, maintain health and restore hope.

Thus far, we have contributed $150 million to this effort. Yesterday, the President submitted an emergency supplemental request that includes $386 million in additional State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance funds, and $335 million in Defense Department humanitarian assistance. Last week, NATO approved Operation Allied Harbor, under which 8,000 troops will work with relief agencies in Albania to establish camps, deliver aid and ensure security. The U.S. Information Agency is participating in an effort to provide internal communications facilities at refugee camps in order to help reunify families.

Many of the refugees streaming out of Kosovo have reported Serb war crimes and crimes against humanity. These reported abuses include the widespread and systematic destruction of entire settlements, the burning of homes, the seizure of civilians for use as human shields and human blood banks, the rape of ethnic Albanian women and girls, and the systematic separation and execution of military-aged men.

For example, there have been reports of the killing of 60 men in Kacanik; and of the burial of 24 people at Glavnik, 30 in Lapastica, 150 in Drenica, 34 in Malisevo, 100 in Pristina; and other suspected mass burials at Pusto Selo and Izbica, where refugees reported that victims were first tortured and then burned to death.

There should be no misunderstanding. When it comes to the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity, "just following orders" is no defense. In the prosecution of such crimes, there is no statute of limitations. And the international war

crimes tribunal has rightly indicated that it will follow the evidence no matter where it leads.

The tribunal has already put Milosevic and 12 other FRY or Serbian officials on notice that forces under their command have committed war crimes, and that failure to prosecute those responsible can give rise to criminal charges against them. The United States has publicly identified nine military commanders whose forces may have been involved in the commission of such crimes.

By helping to document refugee accounts, and by compiling and sharing other evidence, we are and will continue to assist the tribunal in its effort to hold perpetrators accountable.

Mr. Chairman, in dealing with Kosovo prior to the last week of March, we were engaged in diplomacy backed by the threat of force. Since that time, we have used diplomacy to back NATO's military campaign.

Our diplomacy has several objectives. The first is to ensure that NATO remains united and firm. To this end, I met with Alliance foreign ministers in Brussels last week. And the President will meet with his counterparts here in Washington at the NATO Summit on Friday and Saturday. To date, we have been heartened by the broad participation and strong support the military campaign has received. In one way or another, every Ally is contributing.

Our unity has been strengthened by the knowledge that Milosevic refused a diplomatic settlement and by revulsion at his campaign of ethnic cleansing. No country in NATO wanted to have to use force against Serbia. But no country in NATO is willing to stand by and accept in Europe the expulsion of an entire ethnic community from its home.

Our second diplomatic objective has been to help leaders in the countries directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis, and to prevent a wider conflict. To this end, I have been in regular contact with my counterparts from the region. Their leaders will participate as partners in the NATO Summit. And the President's supplemental request includes $150 million in emergency and project assistance to these nations and to democratic Montenegro.

Our third objective is to work constructively with Russia. We want to continue to make progress in other areas of our relationship, and to bring Russia back into the mainstream of international opinion on Kosovo.

When I met with Foreign Minister Ivanov last week, he was clear about Russia's opposition to the NATO air campaign. But we did agree on the need for an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo; the withdrawal of Serb forces; the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid.

Where we continue to have differences is over the kind of international presence required to achieve these objectives. As I told Foreign Minister Ivanov, after Milosevic's depredations in Kosovo, refugees will not be able to return home unless the protective force is credible, which requires that its core must come from NATO. As in Bosnia, however, we think that Russia could and should play an important role in that force, and we would welcome the participation of NATO's other partner countries, as well.

Our fourth diplomatic objective has been to ensure that NATO's message is understood around the world. We are engaged in a vigorous program of public diplomacy, and have provided information on a regular basis to nations everywhere.

We have been encouraged by strong statements from the European Union and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and by the participation in relief efforts of diverse countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Ukraine.

Moreover, last week, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva voted 44 to 1 to condemn Belgrade's campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and called upon Serb authorities to accept a peace agreement. Supporters of this Resolution came from every continent.

We have also tried to pierce the veil of propaganda and ignorance with which Milosevic has tried to shroud the people of former Yugoslavia. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and other broadcasts are reaching the country 24 hours a day. As President Clinton and other NATO leaders have made clear, our actions are directed against Belgrade's policies, not against the region's people. And our effort to broadcast the truth is designed to counteract Belgrade's Big Lie that the refugees from Kosovo are fleeing NATO and not the Serb forces.

In the days and weeks to come, we will press ahead with our military, diplomatic and humanitarian strategies. Our purpose will be to steadily bring home to Milosevic the reality that this confrontation must end on the terms we have stated.

Our desire is to begin as soon as possible the vital work of returning, reuniting and rebuilding in Kosovo. But we are not interested in a phony settlement based

on unverifiable assumptions or Milosevic's worthless word. The only settlement we can accept is one we have the ability to verify and the capability to enforce.

Even as we respond to the crisis in Kosovo, we must also concern ourselves more broadly with the future of the region. The peaceful integration of Europe's north, west and center is well advanced or on track. But, as I said earlier, the continent cannot be whole and free until its southeast corner is also stable.

Some say violence is endemic to this region, and that its people have never and will never get along. Others say that stability is only possible under the crushing weight of a dominant empire such as the Ottoman, Hapsburg and Communist regimes that once held sway.

I am no prophet. Certainly, the scars of the past are still visible. Certainly, the wounds opened by the current devastation will take much time to heal. But the evidence is there in the testimony of average people whether in Zagreb or Tirana, Sarajevo or Skopje, that they are far more interested in plugging into the world economy than in slugging it out with former adversaries.

If you look at the region today, you will see Greeks and Turks operating side by side as NATO Allies; you will see Macedonians and Albanians and Montenegrins answering the humanitarian call. You will see Christians and Muslims and Jews united in their condemnation of the atrocities being committed.

In Bosnia, NATO and its partners are working with ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks to implement the Dayton Accords.

And through our own Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, you will see leaders and citizens from throughout the region engaged in joint efforts and cooperative planning.

The problems that have plagued the Balkans—of competition for resources, ethnic rivalry and religious intolerance—are by no means restricted to that part of the world. Nor does the region lack the potential to rise above them.

During the NATO Summit, the President and our partners will discuss the need for a coordinated effort to consolidate democracy in Southeast Europe, promote economic integration and provide moral and material support to those striving to build societies based on law and respect for the rights and dignity of all.

Our explicit goal should be to transform the Balkans from the continent's primary source of instability into an integral part of the European mainstream. We do not want the current conflict to be the prelude to others; we want to build a solid foundation for a new generation of peace—so that future wars are prevented, economies grow, democratic institutions are strengthened and the rights of all are preserved.

This will require a commitment from us. It will require the involvement of the European Union and the international financial institutions. It will require a continued willingness on the part of local leaders to work together on behalf of the common good. And it will require, ultimately, a change in leadership in Belgrade so the democratic aspirations of the Serb people may be fulfilled and the isolation of the former Yugoslavia can come to an end.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add just a few words about the crisis in Kosovo and the future of NATO. For the challenge we currently face has dramatized the need for precisely the kind of adaptations the Alliance has already initiated, and which we will take to a new level at the Summit here in Washington later this week.

In Kosovo, we are responding to a post-Cold War threat to Alliance interests and values. We are seeing the need for military forces that are mobile, flexible, precise and inter-operable. We are seeing the value to the Alliance of its new members and partners. And we are reaffirming the unshakable strength of the trans-Atlantic bond.

Having said that, I want to emphasize that although we are focused now on Kosovo, the future of NATO is a much larger issue.

The current fighting notwithstanding, NATO's core mission remains collective self-defense. NATO's relationship to Russia is a key to Europe's future security and will be determined by many factors in addition to Kosovo. The Alliance must be ready to respond to the full spectrum of missions it may face, including the perils posed by weapons of mass destruction. And the United States will continue to welcome efforts to strengthen the European pillar of our Alliance in a way that bolsters overall effectiveness and unity.

I know that your Subcommittee on Europe will be conducting a hearing on these and related issues tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure that Assistant Secretary Grossman and his counterpart from the Department of Defense will discuss them in greater depth than I have had the opportunity to do in my remarks this afternoon.

I also understand that the Congressional leadership will host a reception this week for our visitors from NATO countries. I hope that you will thank them for

their efforts and stress to them the importance of standing together and standing tall until the current confrontation is settled.

As the President and our military leaders have made clear, this struggle may be long. We can expect days of tragedy for us as well as for the people of the region. But we must not falter and we cannot fail.

By opposing Solobodan Milosevic's murderous rampage, NATO is playing its rightful role as a defender of freedom and security within the Euro-Atlantic region.

Because our cause is just, we are united. And because we are united, we are confident that in this confrontation between barbaric killing and necessary force; between vicious intolerance and respect for human rights; between tyranny and democracy; we will prevail.

To that essential objective, I pledge the full measure of my own efforts, and respectfully solicit both your wise counsel and support.

Thank you very much, and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We have no automatic green, amber, and red lights, and so I suppose the chairman is going to have to try to impose a 5-minute limit, and I will try not to be too disruptive when 4 minutes have been spent, so it will be a 5-minute limit.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, where are the lights?

The CHAIRMAN. None exist.

Senator BIDEN. I am sorry, I misunderstood. I was not listening. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. So I will begin. Tell me, Madam Secretary, what will the administration consider a victory in its military operation against Serbia?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We will consider a victory if we can meet those objectives we spoke about, which is that there needs to be a cease-fire and the end of the killing and violence, that the Serb forces, the paramilitary, military, and special forces will be withdrawn, that all of the refugees will be able to go back, and that they will be there protected by an international security force which will allow them to be able to rebuild their lives and with the aim that they can have a democratically elected Government, a self-Government for the people of Kosovo. Those are our military objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. All of them.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. All of them, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All of them must be met before you consider any victory?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Correct, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Given the brutal policies and forced degradation and murder of ethnic Albanians by Mr. Milosevic, do you think the U.S. Government will ever again negotiate with him?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that if negotiate is the word, I personally do not believe we can negotiate with him. I think that he is someone who obviously does not keep his word, who is responsible for this ethnic cleansing and the violence and the hideous stories we all hear, and so we are saying that it would be very important for the Serb people with whom we are not at war to have a democratically elected Government and let them come back into the international community.

Now, I do need to say the following, that if at the end of this military action somebody has to sign something that shows that this is over, and if he is that person, then we would accept that,

though there are others that could sign for it, but from my perspective we cannot negotiate with him.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot of these questions have been raised because you can imagine the number of telephone calls that I have personally had from people in North Carolina, a great many of them from close friends who are bewildered because they are not accustomed to the kind of brutality that they are seeing on the television every night.

One question that was asked me is, does the United States support independence for Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we have not supported independence for Kosovo because we believe that the possibility of their having a high degree of self-government would allow them to have the respect for their cultural language, education, et cetera. We believe that independence at this stage is something that would be disruptive to the entire region, because of the way that it might spread into the other countries. But we do think that they have the right to self-government.

The question here also is—and that is why I have made some points in my opening remarks about the importance of us looking at a long-range plan for the Balkans—there are a number of small countries and regions there that I believe would ultimately benefit from cooperating with each other, and basically sharing in a variety of economic programs, having more roads built together. It is not necessarily the independence of a country that should be the long-range goal, but perhaps a cooperative way for the people of the region to live together. But we do believe that the Kosovars are entitled to a high degree of self-government, and that their dreams can be realized in some other form than independence.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you see any set of circumstances under which Kosovar Albanians and Serbs can once again live side by side in Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that it is very difficult to see those right now, given the amount of killing, but I would imagine that eventually they could. But the reason that we are stating that it is important to have an international security force there would be, in fact, to make sure that the Kosovars are able to engage in their legitimate rights without the interference of Belgrade.

I think things have changed, Mr. Chairman, since for instance Rambouillet, where we had worked out a rather interesting and complicated autonomy regime for them. It is very hard to imagine that Belgrade specifically should have control over the Albanian majority, and that is why at this moment we think that having a protective force with some kind of an internationally protective regime—we are exploring different mechanisms—is the way to have the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbians living side by side and cooperating.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, I find it somewhat interesting that in one sense, absent Milosevic, this is a more soluble problem than Bosnia was. Only 7 percent of the Kosovar population was Serb prior to this mass ethnic cleansing that has taken place, and so the ability to put Humpty Dumpty back together again absent—absent—para-

military forces, absent the VJ, absent the special police, I think quite frankly is easier in Kosovo than it is in Bosnia, as bizarre as that may sound, since you are talking about integrating not 7 percent of the Serbian population in Kosovo with 93 percent of the Albanian population. We are not talking about a 60–40 split here, which makes it a lot more complicated.

The second point I would make is, this weekend I found it interesting in the meetings with the ambassadors to NATO from NATO countries, a question was raised by one of the members on the delegation whether this could ever be done, and why democratization in Serbia ultimately, as Senator Lugar and others and myself have been talking about, is the answer why that would work, and he pointed out that over 100,000 Bulgarian Turks were expelled in the last spasms of communism in the mid-eighties, a massive, massive attempt at their version of ethnic cleansing.

As Bulgaria became democratized and the Communist Party lost its way, there is no longer—there is always a problem, but that is not the problem any longer, and so for those who say nothing could ever take place in the Balkans, that is positive, I would offer Bulgaria as some small example of how it can be done if there is enough perseverance.

But my question to you is this. I am going to ask my staff to put out two maps, map 1—which are very difficult to read from a distance. These are maps from the Defense Department that are a week old, and if you take a look at all of the yellow dots on that map, they are the towns and villages that have been either totally destroyed or have been damaged significantly by the Serb forces, and the green is the original concentration of internally displaced persons as of a week ago, and the red are possible new mass graves.

But the point I want to focus on, and I apologize, I should have given every Member small copies of this. I thought they had it. If you notice, as you know full well, on the lower right-hand corner of the map, below Pristina to the border of Albania and parts of Montenegro there has hardly been any activity.

Now, if you look at map 2, that is by the Serb military, and they are fully capable of doing the same thing in the lower right-hand quadrant. There is nothing that would stop them from doing the same thing that they did in the rest of the area.

If you look at map number 2, you will notice that the crosses on that map represent sites of Serbian orthodoxy, and shrines and areas that are very important to the Serbs, and if you look at the other symbols on there, they represent mineral deposits that are of value, that are of value to Serbia and to Kosovo. Again, you will find a strange correlation between the areas ethnically cleansed and the location of the orthodox sites and the minerals, and the things that are of value, significantly, to Mr. Milosevic.

Now, there is notable exceptions. There are three or four areas south of Pristina that are valuable mineral sites of bauxite and in the lower right-hand corner there is a very important shrine—and I am a Roman Catholic. Maybe shrine is not the right word, but a very important seat of orthodoxy in the Serbian religion, but by and large the rest is an area that seems to be—to have no mineral deposits and no important religious significance.

This leads to my question. I have been of the view, and hopefully wrongly, for the last month that Milosevic's objective was, he is absolutely certain he cannot maintain Kosovo. He knew that a month ago. At the end of the day, a year, a month, 6 months, 6 years from now, Kosovo is not going to be in the same status it was before.

I think it is all about partitioning. I think he is going to come to the European Community and sue for peace with the Russian initiative that basically says, here's the deal. We will annex all of—and by the way, the white is where the 7 percent of the Serbs basically live in Kosovo, that he is going to come and say to our European friends, I have got such a deal for you, led by the Russians, that you in fact—I will give independence. I do not even care whether they affiliate or tie up with Albania, but the lower right quadrant of that map will be Kosovo Albanians, free for Albanians. The rest of that map I want to be an integral part of Serbia, in total control by my forces and troops. (a) Am I way off-base, and (b), assume for a moment I am not. What is—do you have any concern that the Europeans may sign on to such a deal? I would like your input.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. There are ideas floating around about whether partition is an answer. Let me say clearly that we are opposed to partition, because that has not been our policy. We do think that actually Kosovo could be a multiethnic area. You have raised a lot of questions about populations there. You know, the Serbs have not even allowed a census to be taken, because I think it would show the predominance of the Albanians up in the 90 percent category, whereas some recent numbers that I have seen show now, thanks to their ethnic reengineering, those numbers are dropping very rapidly—I cannot be certain on this—to somewhere around half of the Kosovo population.

There also are a number of other minorities within Kosovo, some Turks and gypsies and various other minorities, and the Serbs are now acting as if they are protecting those minorities, which is a little hard to believe.

In addition to the various areas that you have pointed out, I have an even smaller map here which basically shows the extent to which religious and historic sites are actually scattered all over. When people talk about partition, I think in people's heads they just see the upper, that white quadrant, and they say, aha, well, you could have partition.

The truth is, there is no way to partition, even if you are for it, which we are not. I believe that it is a nonstarter, because these various places that are "important to the Serbs," in addition to the mineral areas, are not in any kind of logically separate areas.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, I would respectfully suggest, you see 90 percent of the sites are within the area that has been cleansed, and that is why I raise the issue.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. But when they talk about partition, they basically just talk, I think in European circles, about the little part on top and not what you are saying, which is——

Senator BIDEN. I see. We are going for the big enchilada here.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do think there are those who might see that as an answer. We do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Madam Secretary, I have two questions. I will ask them and then allow you to use the time to respond.

The objectives you have given for victory in response to Senator Helms and Senator Biden are clear, namely, the Serbs out, the Kosovars back, rehabilitation of the country, a discussion of the future constitution of Kosovo, with protection of international force, but it would appear that the military means to obtain those objectives simply are not there presently.

Now, I question where, on the experience of the first 4 weeks—do you agree with that, or do you disagreeing? If you find there is some gap between the means necessary for this to be achieved, try to fill in for this committee's understanding what new means are likely to be involved. I say this because it appears that two different wars are being fought, one from the air over Serbia where certain targets are being hit that might ultimately lead to degradation of the Serbian forces, but the other war in Kosovo itself on the ground where the refugees are more numerous, the number of people displaced greater, and without severe losses by the Serbian forces and apparently with full replenishment there. This seems to me to be a disproportionate situation, and unlikely to lead to victory.

My second question is, are you encouraging a Russian role in this in your talks with the foreign minister of Russia, or in other talks by the administration. Are we encouraging the Russians to assist in negotiating a settlement, or, to state the more bleak situation, do we have any recognition that the Russians are permitting so-called volunteers to come from Russia into the area, or arms, or in some way allowing what seems to be popular support in Russia for the Serbians? Can you give us some idea currently of the Russian relationship?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you. Yes. First of all, let me say that I believe that the military strategy, the air campaign, is essential in doing what we believe needs to be done, which is to systematically weaken Milosevic while allowing us to become stronger and the Kosovar Albanians to return.

The battle damage assessment shows that we have been able to hit his command and control centers, airfields, oil refineries, various MUP and military headquarters, supply lines, armored vehicles, ammunition caches as well as the production of ammunition, and so I believe, on the basis of the information I have been given by the military, that the NATO alliance is systematically doing what it has got to do, which is to degrade his ability to respond and also to loosen his grip on Kosovo.

I think that all of us understood that this was a campaign that is going to take some time, and that it requires patience and determination. In my conversations with our allies, which have been numerous, in person and on the phone, there is a common determination to prevail and an understanding that the air campaign as it moves forward will be able to do that. Obviously there will be additions of the Apaches and an increasing movement toward taking this to their forces in the field.

On the Russian question, I have spent also a lot of time with the Russians. I have talked to Foreign Minister Ivanov practically every day, and we met last week in Oslo. We believe that it would

be important for the Russians to be part of the solution for a number of reasons. They have influence on the Serbs. They have been very helpful in the Contact Group. Their role ultimately in Bosnia was very important, so their role can be important here.

However, there is no point in encouraging them to take a role that is not in line with our objectives. I think a number of you, either in this meeting or various meetings that we have had, have asked: What does this do to our relations with the Russians? Are the Russians being isolated?

We do think that our relations with the Russians in the medium, short and long term are very important on other issues, and so we are working with them. We are working now to get the Russians on the side of the rest of the allies in pressing Belgrade.

If I might just take one more minute, we agree on all the principles that I listed earlier except one, and that is on the international security force. They are pressing for just "an international force" which might be something like OSCE without weapons. That is a nonstarter. We are saying the force has to have NATO at its core so that our command structure is in place, and so that the KLA will disarm. They will not disarm if NATO and the U.S. are not a part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. I want to address a point that you touched on, but briefly, in your statement about piercing the veil of propaganda and ignorance with which Milosevic has tried to shroud the people of the former Yugoslavia.

After all, the Serbian people resisted the Nazis in World War II in a very courageous way, and they have got this leader who is giving them a view of what is happening that is totally contrary to the facts. How do we do that? I know you say, "well, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty," but most people here will tell you it is the television that reaches people, not the radio, and is there anything we can do about that? How do we get across the real story so the Serbian people realize that what Milosevic is telling them is a warped and perverted view of the real situation?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Senator, we—first of all, he does have a very tight propaganda machine, and when I met with the front line states last week in Brussels they described, since they had been former communist countries themselves, how sophisticated the propaganda machinery is, so we are trying to pierce it.

Senator SARBANES. Let me just add, if they encounter internal opposition, then they go out and murder them as they did this independent publisher in Belgrade only a few days ago——

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Clearly, this is one of our most serious problems, and there are ways that we are trying to use modern methods with a variety of ways to get in there. I have tried, I do not think too successfully, to broadcast in Serbian. I am not very popular there, so I am not sure that that helps, and we are trying—as you saw, there were leaflets being dropped, and we are working a number of methods.

Again, I think that this is very important. I know Chairman Helms introduced some legislation on this subject. I think we need

to keep working in our most sophisticated methods to try to pierce it, but it is difficult because he does manage to kill the dissidents, and we are, without going into too many details here, trying to really work any number of angles of trying to get the message in, but it is difficult, because he has very tight control.

Senator SARBANES. Is it possible to transmit TV messages into the country from outside?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that they have managed to jam a lot of what we have tried to do from some of the transmitters in the neighboring countries. We are trying to work on all that. I do not think it is very useful to go into full detail.

Senator SARBANES. Fine. I think it is very important. Otherwise, the people of Serbia are being fed a certain story, and they are presumably making their judgments on the basis of that story, which is contrary to the facts. Somehow we need to remedy the situation if we are going to establish this important distinction, which I think we are seeking to make, between Milosevic and the Serbian people. You have underscored this today which the President has repeatedly stated in his various statements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Madam Secretary.

Madam Secretary, is the President prepared to come to the Congress and ask for a declaration of war?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Senator, I think that the President certainly welcomes support for his actions and has written and had asked for support in terms of the air campaign. It is his belief that he does not need a declaration of war. Since 1941 there has not been a declaration of war. It is very useful, though, to have your support generally for what we are doing.

But we do strongly oppose a resolution which would call for a declaration of war because we do not consider ourselves "at war" with Yugoslavia or its people. NATO is acting to deter unlawful violence in Kosovo, and is upholding the will of the international community. We think that a declaration of war could have serious negative effects on NATO cohesion, regional stability, and our relations with Russia.

Senator HAGEL. If we are to get at some of the supply lines, for example, that a number of our military leaders have talked about, boycotts, embargoes, shut off supply routes, one of the excuses that I have heard the administration use is, well, that would mean that we would be at war. Good grief.

First, I think we are at war, and we can dance around the technicalities and the niceties of it, Madam Secretary, but we are at war, and if we are to win this, which I understand is the commitment of the President and your administration, then it seems to me you are going to have to do what it takes to win this war.

I do not know if a declaration of war is the appropriate thing, but it seems to me that there is a limited amount of sustainability here not just within this country but within the political constituencies of the 18 NATO countries as to how long we can go, how long we can have an antiseptic bombing campaign and at the same time Milosevic really controls the deal. He continues to push people

out. He controls Kosovo. He hides his tanks, which are very difficult for our military people to get to for a lot of reasons, and other military issues as you talked about.

And so I think we may well have to see some acceleration here, Madam Secretary, of how do we win this, and the President is going to need the American public and the Congress on his side here in order to do this, and that then gets into other issues, like why have we been restricted in some of the military targets, and I understand the consensus of NATO dominates that, but at some point the window is going to close, I suspect, Madam Secretary, and we are going to be on the losing end of this because we have lost prestige, we have lost commitment, we have lost will, and that measurement could be taken not just in Kosovo but, as you know better than anybody, others around the world who wish us ill.

So if you would take any piece of that and comment, I would appreciate it.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all let me say that I do think that the unity of NATO has been remarkable. Each of the countries, democracies, have their public opinion and their parliaments, and they are working their way through how to get support.

Interestingly enough—I am in touch with them daily, one or the other of them—they do not have a different approach to whether there should be a declaration of war or not. It is a subject that we talk about, and many of them believe that they have the support of their public opinion as they move forward.

Now, some of them would like to see additional political initiatives, and we believe that this is not the time, that the diplomatic channels are open, but on the whole there is general support for a long-term air campaign.

We just had a discussion, and there seems to be a disconnect between our bombing oil refineries and our allowing oil to come in by ship into Yugoslavia. So the allies now are understanding the disconnect in those two policies and talking about how to interdict oil coming into Yugoslavia, and we are looking at various ways of doing things.

What I find interesting, Senator, is that, as you know, NATO has never fought a war, and it is I think doing remarkably well in its coordination of activities involving 19 countries, allowing the militaries to make the decisions, and trying to get political backup from the rest of us. So while not everything may be moving as rapidly as it would unilaterally, I think as was said here previously, the American people probably would not support a unilateral action here. As NATO is moving forward as an alliance, I think we are united, and we are trying to deal in a systematic way with some of the questions as to how we all coordinate ourselves.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Secretary, welcome, and let me just say very briefly at the outset how much I respect the work that you and Sandy Berger and Wes Clark and General Shelton, Secretary Cohen and others are doing in a very difficult situation, but I think you are handling it well, and I am one who supports very much what the administration is trying to achieve.

Earlier today you may know that Senator McCain and Senator Biden and I think Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel and myself and Senator Lieberman and Senator Cochran, as well as Senator Kerry, sponsored a resolution which—a joint resolution which authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means in concert with U.S. allies to accomplish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives.

I say that as a preface to you because I think if you are going to engage in this action and you are going to prove successful, you have got to be in a position to use whatever means you can to achieve those results.

Having said that to you, and I want to—and also I will raise at a different time if I can my concern about the front line States, and the amount of support and help we can give these countries, who are absorbing a tremendous blow by having this wave of humanity wash up on their shores in Albania and Macedonia, and to a lesser extent Montenegro, is something that I think we have got to include in a substantial way in our emergency supplemental.

But I want to get to the issue of the KLA if I can. Let me just say at the outset my concerns. I am very sympathetic to the desires of the KLA to be able to get back into their country, but I am deeply concerned about whether or not we ought to be in the position of arming yet another group in the Balkans, knowing what that could mean.

Now, I am told the Washington Post reports today that the Albanian Government has requested that the United States and other NATO governments provide military assistance and training to the KLA. What I want to know is whether or not a request has been made, what is our official response to that request, if, in fact, it has been made, and would arming the KLA violate the U.N. embargo to Yugoslavia if that is the case? What do our NATO allies think about such a proposal? What are the implications of it, and putting aside the question of whether a request has been made, what is the position of the United States and our administration on this issue?

Again, this is very sympathetic to their desires here, but I am deeply concerned that you would—even if we were able to resolve the present situation, that by adding yet another large element of arms in the region, that it would make it very, very difficult to achieve the kind of results, at least the stated results and goals we have in mind.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Senator Dodd, let me just quickly say we are very cognizant of the difficulties that the front line states are encountering, and as a part of our supplemental we are asking for $150 million in economic assistance for them. I also had a very good meeting with them in Brussels, and we really talked a lot about how they could help each other and how we could help them, and the difficulties that they are experiencing.

On the issue of the KLA, first of all, let me say that I have met with representatives of the KLA at Rambouillet, and I met with one recently in Brussels, and clearly they would like to get home and they would like to be able to defend themselves.

Second, we oppose the arming of the KLA because we think it would be a violation of the U.N. arms embargo, which then would allow there to be violations by others to support Serbia. Adding

arms in this kind of endless way to the region is not a way to try to get peace. Also, I can tell you the Europeans would definitely be opposed to the arming of the KLA. The disarming of the KLA was one of the important aspects of the Rambouillet agreement, which they signed, and I believe it was important to get the Albanians to sign. So adding arms to the region we do not believe is the solution to this. We believe the air campaign is the best way to proceed.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I believe you know that I am a supporter of NATO and I look forward to this celebration, but frankly I must tell you I have never been more fearful about NATO's future, because I fear if the present trend continues that a belief will arise in the Congress and among the American people that but for NATO we would not be in this fight, and that because of NATO we cannot win this fight, and I plead with the administration to win this fight.

You have laid out the terms, but I do not frankly see the means or the unity on what it takes to get the job done.

Now, tomorrow I am going to hold in the European Affairs Subcommittee a hearing on the strategic concept. All these leaders from Europe are coming here to negotiate the strategic concept that will govern NATO's future. I think it is clear that NATO is evolving, but as it evolves, I hope we will hold back on pourings of cement on how this will work by frankly stepping back and saying, how did we do, because I am very concerned about what I hear operationally about NATO's conduct of this conflict.

I would appreciate your thoughts and your comments.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say to your first point that we would not be in this if it were not for NATO; I totally disagree.

Senator SMITH. I did not say I believed that, but I think the American people soon will, and I believe many in Congress are coming to that belief.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say that I think that the struggle in Kosovo is the last struggle of the 20th century which has been marked by more blood and guts than others—blood and guts spilled over ethnic conflicts while people try to divide up countries and others do not stand up for what they believe in.

I think that as we look at this century, with Europe divided and subdivided and under control of Communists, and the amount that has been done in the last 10 years that people thought never would happen; with the end of the Berlin Wall, Germany not only reunited, but central to Europe, central to Eastern Europe; where people had given up hope on countries that have lived under communism but some are now new members of NATO; the last piece left is to have a Europe that is united and democratic and prosperous and secure is the Balkan peninsula. What is going on there is contrary to the values and interests of Europe and the United States, and I think that by having NATO as an instrument to deal with this, we have multiplied our own strength and also shown the validity of the strategic concept.

You know, all of us, Senator Smith, as we sat around at the NATO Summit thought, goodness, we are supposed to have this celebration and instead we are in the middle of this Kosovo issue. We have been having meetings with the President and we have been briefing on this. The truth is that what is going on in Kosovo proves the validity of what we have been doing, the importance of taking an alliance that worked very well for 50 years—never fought a war, deterred the Soviet Union, and now has a new mission, which is to deal with the chaos created by the ethnic conflicts and potential of weapons of mass destruction—and creating an alliance that is honed to do its work at the end of this century and the beginning of the 21st.

So I am glad you are having the strategic concept hearing, because as we were getting it ready, it was clearer and clearer to me that we were on the right track. NATO is the right instrument for Kosovo, and while it has never fought a war, it is doing a pretty darned good job doing it. We need to hone it, but we are on the right track.

Senator SMITH. Madam Secretary, if I could just followup, I hope that we as the administration will not cast in concrete the finals of the strategic concept, because I think we are learning as we are going forward. We have not fought a war, but we are fighting one now, no matter what we call it, and I think we need to be able to have some time to step back and answer the question, when this is over, how did we do, and what do we need to put in the strategic concept.

Thank you.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I would hope that we would not delve into that, though, Senator, because nothing is ever cast in stone, but I think we need to seize what we have and then obviously in the years ahead we will be able to relook at things.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you for being with us today.

Just as a matter of personal nostalgia, I would share with my colleagues that this is the anniversary of 30 years ago to this month that I returned from Vietnam, and 28 years ago to this week that I appeared before this committee talking about the ways in which we had lost our way, in my judgment, in the prosecution of a war in Southeast Asia.

That has obviously had a profound impact on our judgment about war and conflict over the last years, and I say that only for one reason, because I made a promise to myself about defining objectives and making certain that if we commit young men to harm's way again we are going to make certain that those objectives are clear and that we can achieve them.

I believe in the objectives that you have set out, that the President has set out, and that this country is trying to achieve. I am troubled about the issue of means, as other colleagues have stated, and troubled about perhaps a conflict of the way in which the objectives are being structured.

Let me be very specific. We say that we do not support independence for Kosovoand I agree that that is the appropriate posture. We say we are opposed to partition, and I agree, except to the degree

that if you invaded and had a total victory you might wind up doing that as a victor, but it is clearly not an acceptable component of a negotiation.

No. 3, we say we want the Serbs and the Kosovars to live together again as they did previously—status quo ante is the objective—but we know that the Serbs have historical and religious ties to the region which make it inescapable that they must be party to a settlement.

But you have also said today in your testimony and in answer to a question, that we will not negotiate with Mr. Slobodan Milosevic. Now, it is not one of our objectives to remove him, and I do not think it should be, personally. Therefore, my question is, barring a total victory by air alone, let us assume that in 6 or 8 weeks there is nobody left in Kosovo, only his troops hunkered down, and we are still waging an air campaign.

What, then, is the structure of "a negotiation" that gets Serbs and Kosovars to live again together without negotiating with Milosevic or someone in a region where the only way you could ever have peace is to recognize the historical and religious connection of the Serbs to the area? I do not understand that.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think, Senator, there clearly are a number of very difficult aspects to this, and I think I was asked if I see the Serbs and Kosovars living side by side together now, and I said I found that difficult to envision. What we would envision—this is a work in progress and I think Prime Minister Blair talked about this and others in Europe are talking about this—is some kind of a region that would be internationally protected for a period of time in which the Kosovars would live with their various rights and those of other minorities are guaranteed.

I think there are a variety of ways to do that. I think there are also ways the Serb holy places can be protected. There are a number of ways we have dealt with this in other countries where we tried to develop solutions like that.

Senator KERRY. But don't we have to negotiate with someone to do that?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think the question is whether one accedes to some of the unreasonable demands of President Milosevic. Clearly, there needs to be somebody on the Serb side with whom one talks, but I think many of us have been asked, Can you visualize having a negotiation with someone like President Milosevic? I find it difficult to visualize that, but I do not find it difficult to visualize that there are settlements that can be made with others and clearly there will have to be discussions. I do not think, however, that we need to put ourselves in a position where we are giving in to illegitimate demands.

Senator KERRY. I agree with that, but all I was saying, supposing in a week or two, as a result of the air campaign, he were to say to us, I am prepared to move my troops out. I am prepared to return to the status quo ante, but I insist on a different force, and I insist on a different handling of the issue of independence that has to be more squarely off the table, and he has to have significant Russian presence, maybe non-NATO, significantly reduced American, or no American, but if that were the equation, would you not negotiate that out?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that there would be ways of having those kinds of discussions. Some of the points you have raised are nonstarters, however, because of a variety of things we have talked about. Under what circumstances would Americans participate in a force? We would not participate in a force where we did not feel that our command structure was able to exist.

So would we have Russians in it? Yes. We had them when we set Bosnia up. So there are any number of issues, but I think that there are ways to have talks with Serbs—some Serbs—about this subject.

I do think that Americans should be very wary of having negotiations with Milosevic, especially since he did not live up to the agreements that we have had and we now believe that he is politically responsible for the ethnic cleansing. But I just want to make clear that we deal with people that we do not like and that we have defeated, that we are trying to come to an agreement with, but that is very different from negotiating terms with them.

Senator KERRY. I understand. Thank you for the clarification.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas.

Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Let me ask a couple of questions I was asked during this last weekend. What is the comparison between the number of people that were killed or driven out before the bombing began, as compared to the number that have been killed or driven out of Kosovo since the bombing began?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. There have been, I think, probably larger numbers of people driven out since the bombing began. I know where your question is going.

Senator THOMAS. Well, the fact is, there are substantially larger—tell me, then, there are 19 nations, I think, in NATO, are there not?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator THOMAS. What is our share—for instance, if there is 1,000 airplanes there, how many do we have?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We have the largest proportion of planes there, but I will get you the exact number.

Senator THOMAS. We have many more than all the rest put together, right?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. Many countries have contributed aircraft, and these aircraft include 135 fighters and bombers, 41 support aircraft, and 14 reconnaissance aircraft, for a total of 190. Our allies have provided a very large proportion, but the U.S. has contributed 227 fighters and bombers, 219 support aircraft, and 17 reconnaissance aircraft, for a total of 463. We are the largest, most powerful country in the world. Our proportion of this, as was stated even before we went into it, was going to be the largest.

Senator THOMAS. But what will our proportion be of bringing back the refugees and resettling them in Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Excuse me?

Senator THOMAS. What will our proportion be of resettling the refugees in Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. The allies are taking the largest proportion of the burden of resettling the refugees.

Senator THOMAS. You are talking about bringing them back to Kosovo.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. The European Commission has already announced it will put aside 250 million Euros, which is about $275 million, for economic and humanitarian assistance to the neighboring States. They have also said that they wanted to take the lead in the reconstruction of Kosovo.

Senator THOMAS. President Clinton said the mission was to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course. Obviously, that has not been done. To deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo, that has not been done. If necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military capacity to harm the people of Kosovo. How much have we done on that, in terms of damage?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say that I think we all recognize the appalling horrors that have been committed against the people of Kosovo and the pushing out of now almost a half million refugees. I think the thing, however, to remember is that we have for the last year-and-a-half been trying through diplomatic means to avoid what we saw coming, which is that he was amassing his forces inside, on the borders of Kosovo, and sending tanks in preparing for a huge onslaught into Kosovo, and we have hoped through diplomacy with the threat of force to avoid that happening.

If one talks about it in terms of a video tape, Milosevic put it on fast forward and all of the things he had in mind he effected much more rapidly.

Senator THOMAS. I think the point is that if those indeed were the missions, and if you measure them now, and they have not been accomplished, then is it not necessary to alter that mission, or to change what we are doing to accomplish the mission?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, we believe that the air campaign is accomplishing a great deal of the mission. As I stated earlier, the kinds of damage that has already been done through I think excellent bombing sorties—where the various headquarters and command and control have been destroyed, where ammunition has been destroyed, fuel storage facilities have been destroyed, airfields, his airplanes, armored personnel carriers, and tanks have been destroyed. It is my sense from reading the battle damage assessment that systematically we are degrading seriously his military machine.

Senator THOMAS. Well, I hope so. The things you see publicly from the Pentagon and so on would say on a scale of 1 to 10 the damage has been about a 3 or a 4.

So thank you.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think they have said, and we have said, the weather interfered early, but they do also say that they are doing serious damage.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I have been critical of some of the decisions made getting into this policy, so let me take this opportunity to publicly thank you for your devotion and effort with regard to this. I am sure it is incredibly difficult, and I thank you for it.

In light of what has happened, are there any circumstances under which the administration would support an independent Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that we do not consider it a useful end to this because of the additional problems that would cause within the region, where we see it as potentially destabilizing Albania and Macedonia. Then if Macedonia were to fall apart, there is a whole—I do not want to predict all the dire things, but I think it basically is a destabilizing effect for the region, and it is not our position to support independence.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I am still thinking it through as well, but I do hope the administration will at least keep an open mind with regard to whether that is not the way things should end up, and this relates as well to Senator Dodd's comments. I take a little different tack, at least potentially with regard to the issue of arming the Kosovo Albanians. I think one of the reasons we ended up having to send ground troops to Bosnia was the failure of the United States to lift the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims when we could have, and I notice we were there many years and many dollars longer than we intended to be.

I recognize your comment about the arms embargo that is in place. At the same time, I wonder about our legal status in terms of bombing a nation with regard to a question having to do with an area we consider part of that nation. In terms of international law, I am wondering why on the one instance we are so concerned about international arms embargo, but we are not particularly concerned about the issues of international law that apply to a situation where we regard Kosovo as a part of Serbia.

So what I am interested in is, what would be the practical effect on the ground of arming the Kosovar Albanians?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first the practical effect is that their numbers are not sufficient so that they can defend themselves. Two, and this goes to why we abide by one legal regime and not another, there is a practical issue, which is that in both the Bosnia case and here, the minute that you break an arms embargo, that means that the other side is entitled to be supplied also. I think that we have great concern about breaking the arms embargo, because the Serbs would definitely be supplied.

I think there is also the issue that we are part of an alliance. This is in Europe, and the Europeans are very much opposed, as are we, to the arming of the KLA, and to independence.

Senator FEINGOLD. Madam Secretary, with regard to Bosnia, I believe at least one of the facts that helped us leading up to Dayton was the ability of the Bosnian Muslims through different means to get arms, and I am not at all convinced this situation would not be assisted. In fact, listening to one of the NATO briefings the other day, I think there was a specific reference to some of the resistance the Kosovar Albanians were able to put up as helpful with regard to fighting the Serbian troops, and so I would ask that that be kept on the table.

Finally, I notice that Congressman Campbell in the House has introduced two separate resolutions, one to declare war, and the other to demand an immediate retreat. I am glad that the Senators who have talked early today have introduced a resolution in the

Senate with regard to our involvement, and I am wondering, in light of your answer to Senator Hagel's question, whether we are really at war.

You seem to have indicated we are not at this point. What criteria would need to be met in order for you to agree with those who believe that our action in Kosovo amounts to a war, or could amount to a war in the near future?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that a lot of those are legal questions. I think that politically, though, there are a number of reasons why a declaration of war is not helpful in terms of how we operate in the region and with our allies, and so we are opposed to a declaration of war.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, just to followup on Senator Kerry's question a little bit, you said that the Russians agreed with the primary goals, now, that you have stated, a halt to the atrocities, Serb forces withdrawn, the refugees returned, et cetera.

The main sticking point I think you mentioned was the peacekeeping force and the makeup of that. Has there been a determination of what that force could be, or are we talking about NATO peacekeepers, or could it be maybe some of the other European countries not involved, or a different makeup that could produce the same results?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, our position is that we believe that such a force needs to have NATO at its core, because we believe that the U.S. needs to participate, primarily because of our role within NATO but also because the Albanians have made it quite clear that they need us as a part of it. If NATO is at the core, with our command structure totally in place so that our military feels comfortable, then there are other ways that other countries could become a part of it.

We do not, however, believe that this should be a U.N. force. We believe it needs to be one where NATO is at its core. There are a number of diagrams that one could draw out that would allow other countries to participate, but from the perspective of the United States, such a force must have a NATO core.

Senator GRAMS. Madam Secretary, NATO and the United States have always consistently opposed independence for Kosovo. You have talked about one of the goals is self-government for Kosovo. What is the difference?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that the differences have to do with the issues of sovereignty—whether you control your own military, you have your own currency—a number of points that are basically to do with the independence of the country. Self-government allows the people to elect their leaders, whether they be the President or a national assembly or local leaders. There are various components of this. It also allows them to make determinations about their budget.

Rambouillet has been overtaken by events, but this was very carefully designated as to what this kind of a high degree of self-government involved in terms of the possibilities of people to run

their daily lives but not necessarily be in control of all of the elements of statehood.

Senator GRAMS. Evidently the Serbs have not agreed to that, and they look at it as nearly one and the same, do they not?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, they have not agreed to it, I think, because they were not prepared to grant this amount of autonomy. Their main problem was not with that part of the document. Their main problem was with having an implementation force such as the one I have described.

Senator GRAMS. Do you have any information that would indicate Russia is providing military support, or significant information to Belgrade? Have we given assurances to Russia that NATO will not send in ground combat troops into Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. The Russians have stated at the highest levels that they have no intention of being drawn into this conflict militarily, and that they are not providing volunteers, although as we know they have a ship in the region. I think there are some volunteers, but the Government itself has said that they do not wish to be drawn in militarily. We have made no such representation to the Russians or to anybody else.

Senator GRAMS. And finally, Madam Secretary, last year the Clinton administration's then Special Envoy to Kosovo, Robert Gelbard, declared the Kosovo Liberation Army, known by its Albanian initials, UCK, it was stated that it is a terrorist group, he stated, we contend very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK is without any question a terrorist group.

Now, is that still the administration's view, and is there any indication that weapons or funds are being provided to the KLA by any government similar to the Iranian arms pipeline that went to the Bosnian Muslims? So how do we view the UCK, or the KLA today and where they are getting their support? Are we still considering them as a "terrorist group"?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We do not consider them a terrorist group.

Senator GRAMS. What has changed the opinion?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I never called them a terrorist group.

Senator GRAMS. The administration's Special Envoy did.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I cannot speak to what he said. We consider them the military arm of the Albanians. They have a number of aspects to them. They came to Rambouillet united with Dr. Rugova, a delegation of about 15 people, some of whom were KLA and some of whom were members of Dr. Rugova's group. They have committed themselves to disarm under the Rambouillet agreement, and clearly, as I stated in my opening remarks, there was a period that we felt they undertook provocative action.

Frankly, President Milosevic is the best recruiter that the KLA has, because the Serbs go in and torch villages. The Kosovars have received outside assistance. They do have some arms, as we know, and we have not approved of all the actions that they have taken, but they have pledged themselves in the agreement that they signed to disarm. That is a part of the overall agreement.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wellstone.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you.

Madam Secretary, first of all, very briefly, because I want to make one statement and put two quick questions to you in the time that I have, I have been told that the German leadership feels very strongly about our involvement, has said that they ask their parents, where were you, and they did not want to be asked by their children, where were you when this slaughter took place, and I appreciate what we are trying to do.

I said on the floor today when this resolution was introduced that, however, when I see a resolution that calls for all necessary force and means with the authority for that, for a President, it is too open-ended. It is too broad and it is too open-ended, and I said on the floor of the Senate that I would not support such a resolution, and I want to say that today, because that is yet a different question.

Second of all, you said that the Russians will play an important part, and hopefully a part of the solution. I agree with you. I believe there should be more of a focus on diplomacy, and surely we are not just asking the Russians to sign on to a particular notion that we have about what this international force should look like. Surely there will be room for some give-and-take on that, because I believe that diplomacy along with air strikes is critically important. I would like to see more focus on that, and I am glad that you restated what you meant by negotiations.

My questions. I am focused right now on internally displaced refugees. If our goal is to stop the slaughter, what about these people? Why not air drops of humanitarian assistance to these people? I understand the risks, but if you want to talk about something that we ought to be thinking about, why are we not doing that?

I mean, to me it was all about stopping the slaughter. We were not able to do what we wanted to do, but now we have these people, why are we not seeing drops of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons?

Second of all, why are we not seeing more air strikes in Kosovo? I do not understand this in terms of—you know, everybody is talking about ground troops. I thought that—in fact I stayed up nights, without trying to sound melodramatic. I did, because I thought we were going to have to fly low, we would lose pilots, have I voted for the right thing. The decision I made is, if one of my children was doing this and they lost their life, I would feel like they were doing it for the right reason. That is why I voted for this.

But I do not understand why we do not—because the more it is Belgrade and the cities, as you run out of targets, the more likelihood innocent people are going to be killed there. Why are we not focusing—why not the humanitarian air drops to people, and No. 2, why not more air strikes in Kosovo?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We are very concerned about the internally displaced people and have been trying to figure out different ways that assistance can be gotten to them through the International Red Cross and some NGO's that are still able to get in there.

Believe me, we have all asked the same question about the air drops. I ask it on a daily basis, and the answer is that at this stage they are difficult to effectuate because they cannot get in low enough to make the air drops. We had the experience also of Bos-

nia. It is not all as simple as it looks. The drops go into the wrong areas——

Senator WELLSTONE. Excuse me if I can interrupt, half of it gets to the Serbs and the other half gets to the people who are starving. I am all for half of it getting to the people who are starving.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. But I think there is a technical problem, Senator, and believe me, it is one that I ask on a regular basis and have been told by the military that they cannot do on target. I really do not feel that we should talk about this here.

But I can tell you that there are significant air strikes in Kosovo. Those that are taking place in Serbia have to do with the other part of the mission, which is to damage and degrade Milosevic's ability to control the forces that are going on that are in Kosovo on the ground—the MUP headquarters, the various command and control operations, the oil refineries which permit him to have enough fuel to send the military into Kosovo. But believe me, there have been air strikes in Kosovo, and they will continue, without going into any detail on the targets.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Frist.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, thank you for all you are doing and have done in this difficult time. A couple of issues that my colleagues raised that I would like to pick up on. One actually is a point that you made, that NATO has not carried out and conducted a war to date, and this is the first time that NATO has been involved in such a fashion, and you expressed overall satisfaction, I believe, with the way that this is evolving.

A second point is that at one, and my questions really, are these two to be linked in any way?

We have seen press reports that General Clark's specific targeting request, or roster of targets have been limited, not clearly who it has been limited by, but can you tell us whether General Clark's or any other commander's target request or targeting decisions have been constrained by the NATO decisionmaking process, or in any way by the administration?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Senator, I believe that General Clark has a plan and he is able to carry it out. I do not think it is appropriate for me to discuss the extent to which the process is limiting or not. I do think that NATO has been able to carry this out effectively, that the air campaign is producing the kinds of results that we want, and I admire General Clark and all the people, especially the pilots, who are carrying all this out.

I believe that General Clark, as far as the U.S. administration is concerned, has received what he needs.

Senator FRIST. Let me move to a second question, then. As part of the President's request to Congress for supplemental funding, $700 million in humanitarian assistance was included. This is obviously a considerable sum, and far in excess of the normal operating budget or yearly allotment to USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Additionally, the commitment of the United States to add up to 300 new military aircraft is a large portion of our deployable air assets.

I mentioned all of these figures and these facts because they do raise at least in people's minds across the State of Tennessee the possibility that our ability to fulfill humanitarian missions and other military missions may be in some way compromised in the future.

In fact, many of the humanitarian groups operating in southern Sudan are under the distinct impression that the levels of commitment from USAID is declining as a result of our commitments to Hurricane Mitch relief efforts in Central America.

I mention all of this because of the competing resources and the perception of competing resources. What sort of guarantees can you give us that our growing military and humanitarian commitments to the war in Kosovo will not undermine our effectiveness all the way from the no-fly zones over Iraq to the humanitarian efforts in Sudan, or those in Central America?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, you are quite right that we have a lot of competing demands. What we are asking for, though, for Kosovo is supplemental, non-offset funds, and I think one way to make sure that Kosovo does not hurt any of our regular programs is to make sure that we are not asked to do offsets, because our budget is not that large in the first place.

I am sorry Senator Sarbanes is not here any more. I have this new saying that we are robbing Peter to pay Paul and we are now robbing Paul, too, because we cannot keep taking money away from the programs that are already very important to deal with. Certainly Hurricane Mitch was a natural disaster emergency, and this is a genuine emergency. Whenever there is an offset, then it does, in fact, hurt our normal programs.

Senator FRIST. Again, speaking with my fellow Tennesseans, I guess the understanding and interest in the nature of the humanitarian issues in Kosovo is sound. The second issue, the geopolitical context of a potentially explosive situation in Southern Europe, as the President has explained it, seems to be understood and appreciated, and third, even what is at stake with NATO and its future seems to be of real concern to people, but it is really the confluence or the coming together of these very discrete concerns together and how we put them together into a formula to determine where and how much to involve militarily that seems to pull back and escape people when I talk to them.

I think the real challenge—and I see my time is up—but to take these three compelling concerns, each which you can explain separately, and combine them into a clearly understood determination of why this is in our national interest is a challenge that we have, and again, I know my time is up, but I will continue to struggle to address that, as we all will.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I just wish to say that is the difficult aspect of all of our jobs, to try to put the pieces together, and to not decide that one group of people or one part of the world is not as important as another. But there are strategic concerns that we have, and there is a combination of these various concerns that have come together in Kosovo—the humanitarian aspects, the strategic importance of the region, and a larger overall policy of moving to get a united Europe. Those are the various parts that have come together. But I just would like to assure everybody here that because

we are so focused on one place does not mean that we are not carrying on in the others. We are concerned about how to move diplomacy forward in those areas, and we are focused on all of those also.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I cannot thank you enough, because it is so important and timely, and it is answering a lot of questions for me that my constituents from California want to have answered, and Madam Secretary, bless you for all you are trying to do to save the world from what I think is something I hope I never see again.

Let me just say where I find myself on this issue, just to make it complicated, is between those who say do nothing and those who say any and all means, so I am really in between those two, which means that I basically am supporting the President at this time.

I have a number of questions. One of the good things of being on the end, you get to hear everybody, and a lot of them are answered, but I have a number. Let me go quickly and give you time to answer them.

Members express fears about arming the KLA. I have two questions. Does Congress have to vote before the KLA could be armed? Second, didn't the KLA sign an agreement to disarm at Rambouillet, and if you trusted them then, would you not trust them to disarm at a later date when there was an international peace force in the region?

Next, my greatest concern, I share some of what Paul said, Paul Wellstone, the condition of the refugees in the camps, and I want your opinion on those conditions as candidly as you can tell us, and perhaps more urgent to me, the condition of the people stuck inside Kosovo without the KLA to defend them, with no airlifts coming in of food. This issue was brought to my attention by Senator Schumer, and he is trying to work on this issue.

I do not know if you heard National Public Radio this morning, but it was a young man who was stuck in Pristina, if I said that right—I am not sure exactly how to say it—and he says in the family, the only one who could go out on the street, his mother can go get milk and bread. There is nothing else to buy. He is a prisoner.

I went to the commemoration of the liberation of the concentration camps, Mr. Chairman, just the other day at the Capitol, and I have this horrible vision in my mind of us finding that those people died in their homes of starvation, not in concentration camps but in their homes. I am so concerned about that. Can you say anything that could calm my fears about that, or underscore my fears about that?

So that does get to Paul's point about dropping some supplies to those people, some food to those people.

Now, the other question is one of history. How did the Kosovars—haven't the Kosovars had self-rule since 1974, until Milosevic took it away, and even did they not have some autonomy granted to them in 1945, because there are those who say this is civil war. I do not see it that way, because as I understand it, they

had self-rule and autonomy all through, since 1945. I hope you are writing these down.

What is the status of the oil embargo? You touched on it only to say there was disagreement, but where do we stand on that situation?

And the last very important question, every one of these questions is very important to me, the status of the POW's. Is there any news there? Can we swap now that we have a POW?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you. Let me say in terms of the arming of the KLA I think that we have a general sense, certainly even supported by the Europeans, that adding arms to all of this is not the answer, that it just creates additional fighting, and does not lead to a useful end.

Whether they would disarm afterwards having once said that they would, I think, is a fair question, and if they got what they wanted, perhaps they would. But from our perspective I think there are two basic problems with arming them. One is that it does add arms to a region that already has a lot of arms and will not resolve the situation.

Senator BOXER. With all due respect, we are dropping so many bombs on people, and these people are stuck in their homes with no one to defend them, and so I find—I can appreciate the issue of being against arming the KLA, but to say we are worried about arms in the region when we are in a war there, it just strikes me——

Secretary ALBRIGHT. But there is this second part of it, the fact that then everybody would feel free to arm the Serbs. I do think that that is an argument.

On the camps themselves, I think that the situation is improving, clearly. It took a while, although not very long, 2 or 3 days to get set up, but I think on the whole the camps are under pretty good control. It is not simple, because there are huge numbers, and UNHCR and the various organizations that are trying to take care of them are operating as best they can. The problem is that there is an overflow, and whether we can keep up building the camps in order to deal with it.

There is also the secondary question that as a matter of policy we are trying to keep the refugees within the region so that they can go back sooner rather than later. In the meantime, we are trying to get other countries to take these refugees temporarily. But the further they get away from the region the more we are undercutting our general policy, which is that we want them to be in the region in order to be able to get back. The United States itself has offered to take 20,000 to alleviate this, but of course we are even further away.

The condition of the internally displaced persons is of great concern to us. I met last week with two Kosovar women, one who ran a camp for women that had been raped, and another a journalist, and they described the most horrendous conditions. When I talked to the representative of the KLA in Brussels, he described terrible conditions, and I think we are all working very hard to get assistance to them.

I am very glad you asked about the air drops again, but as it is always explained to me, they are hard to do. The pilots have to fly

in lower, and then there is a greater risk to them. So there is a tradeoff. But believe me, I have raised this subject and will make it very clear that you both have specifically asked about that.

On the autonomy issue, this is the real problem. Kosovo did have a substantial amount of autonomy under their previous constitution. This whole thing started in 1989 when Milosevic took it away from them. This was his ticket to greatness from his perspective, playing the nationalist card. So in many ways Kosovo is the crucible of the whole problem. This was his way of showing his power. We had really wanted them to have a higher degree of self-rule than they had under that constitution, but they do not have anything. He systematically took away their schools and various things.

On the oil embargo, I think there is a general realization among the other countries, as I said, that it does not make much sense to be bombing oil refineries and letting oil in. All I can tell you is that it is a subject of discussion among all of us. I think people are agreed something needs to be done, and they are looking at how to make it happen.

On the prisoners, we have not heard anything more from them. They had not had access to the ICRC. They have not had access to them, whereas those that have been captured by the KLA have, in fact, had all the proper procedures. I do not want to go into any further details, but we are very concerned about getting them back, but not about negotiating for them.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Madam Secretary. It is always a pleasure to have you here, and our prayers are with you. You have got a tough situation that you are dealing with.

If I could ask you to just back up for a second from the current situation, though, and just ask, will this event lead us to a new doctrine, to where we will be willing to get involved in sovereign nations' disputes when there is ethnic cleansing that is taking place? It strikes me that we have crossed over a threshold into a new type of doctrine that would impel us to get involved in places like Rwanda in the past, or Sudan currently, when you are looking at pretty similar types of situations as what we have taking place in Serbia and Kosovo.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think it is always very hard for people to speak about something they are doing as doctrine. That usually is something that people assign to it later. Clearly, there has been a growing concern about desperate humanitarian situations, in particular countries. There are discussions about humanitarian interventions in previous ones, and some more successful than others.

You basically try to find the tool that enables you to take action, whether it is a United Nations, or some other regional organization.

I think that what we have seen in Kosovo is not only some of the most vile ethnic cleansing, but also there was and is a functioning organization, NATO, that has the will to do something about it.

I do think that the American people, as I have always said, the most generous and humanitarian people in the world, are concerned about these kinds of humanitarian horrors. When people are asked if dealing with humanitarian issues is in your national interest, for many Americans this is not just international social work, but a national interest, and I think it is something that we need to discuss, because it is a departure, I think, from other ways that business was done previously.

Senator BROWNBACK. It strikes me it is, and it is an important one that we should have a very long and involved policy discussion about, because I look at, say, the situation in the Sudan today. They have 2 million people that have been killed over the last 10 years, 4 million displaced in the southern Sudan, persecuted by the Sudanese Government that is terrorist by our definition of a Government.

Last year, we had 100,000 people killed in southern Sudan by a man-induced famine, and I ask, what is the difference between this and what is taking place in Kosovo and Serbia? You state that NATO is there, and it is not in Africa, for one, but still you had said earlier to a question we would be in Kosovo and Serbia even if it was not for NATO, that this is a U.S. decision to do this, and I do not particularly see the differences here, other than one is in Africa, and the other is in Europe. I would hate to think that we simply do not deem one situation to be meritorious of our effort and we deem the other one not to be because of where it is located, or the ethnic mix of the people that are involved.

I think that is a tough question for us to answer if we try to be consistent and stop oppression in places around the world.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think, Senator, you have asked a very deep and troubling question, because as one asks it there is a tendency to think that we are choosing among different peoples for reasons that are not the reason, frankly.

But I think that as you look at where there are terrible things going on in many parts of the world—and I think we try through whatever means we have to alleviate them where we can—the choices are not made on the basis of what kinds of people are there, or even the location, but on a combination of factors that would indicate that this is something that can be done by the application of American power, or other things that can be done by the support of America or some other method.

But this is a basic discussion that we all need to have. For those people who believe that we should be in other places, we get accused of being the global cop, or being in places where we do not need to be. On the other hand, there is a whole other argument. If you cannot do everything, do not do anything.

So I do think that it is much easier to describe what were strategically important areas during the cold war, and I think we need to have this kind of a discussion. Your list might be different from mine, but I do not think that it is a matter of choosing in a way that has any kind of hidden agendas or malevolent thinking behind it.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think it would help our people if we would have that sort of policy discussion at a time a little more re-

moved from the present so that we really can set out a clear situation.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I agree with that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Torricelli.

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I thank you for holding this hearing and, Madam Secretary, it is a pleasure to be with you.

Last evening, which I suppose is a statement both of my intense interest in this issue and the current quality of my life, I was listening to the replay on CNN of the Serbian television. I was drifting off to sleep when all of a sudden I heard an announcement that Senator Torricelli today called for the complete American withdrawal from the Balkans. I assume there was something lost in the translation. I assume the Serbs intended to accurately portray this, but actually my statement was, we must at all cost ensure that we are not defeated in the Balkans. It is a testament to the current level of information the people of Serbia are receiving, thanks to Mr. Milosevic.

I wanted, Madam Secretary, to share with you that I think there are few more selfless acts in history than the willingness of the United States to engage in a military confrontation for which there is no geopolitical advantage, territory to be gained, or opportunity to be enriched. The American commitment in Kosovo is based entirely on a commitment to an idea.

We believe in respecting the human rights of other people, and a limit to sovereignty if the rights of people are to be offended. In this I think every American can take extraordinary pride. We are a unique people at a unique moment in history. That, however, as you know, does not mean that I have not had my reservations about this operation. I am concerned less about the American commitment, of which I am proud, than whether at every opportunity the policy has been pursued with the degree of precision and reason that I believe the American people have a right to expect.

This leads me to want to revisit several moments as this crisis was escalating, not because I think it is time entirely to rewrite its history, but because, to regain confidence before we come to the next major decision, and that is my extraordinary distress that we find ourselves with this refugee crisis, in spite of the fact that Mr. Tenet in the CIA hearings predicted that there would be a Serb offensive that would lead to massive refugees.

And second, I would like your assessment of whether or not this belief that an air campaign will bring a change in Serbian policy actually reflects the unambiguous military advice that you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, let me say how much I associate myself with your opening remarks, because I do think that there is something so lofty about America's principles here and our goal that I hope they translate that for Serbian TV. I think, as Shimon Perez said when he came here once, "When history is written, nobody will ever understand this country. You have so much power, and you have never tried to dominate everybody. You have so much wealth, and you do not overwhelm everybody, and what you do is

on behalf of a greater good." I am very proud to represent this country.

Second, on the issue of the refugee crisis, I think that we were all made aware of the fact that there would be a huge refugee crisis and we, in fact, prepositioned vast amounts of food for a long period for many people. I think it is fair to say that we were all appalled by the extent, by the depth and breadth of it, because no one could imagine the barbarity of Milosevic. So obviously initially not everything was there, but I am very proud of the way that everybody stepped up to deal with the issue rapidly in putting these camps together. There were predictions, but the numbers were larger than predicted.

On the air campaign, the military advice that I heard was all unanimous.

Senator TORRICELLI. Madam Secretary, it is my own judgment that the only thing that separates the NATO alliance from an eventual introduction of ground forces may be the chance of a political settlement that results in a partition of Kosovo. I recognize that it is also an American ideal that heterogenous communities can form nations. That, indeed, has been the American experience.

The Balkan experience has been that the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and now the self-separation of the various communities within Bosnia has led to some stability. The United States made a genuine effort to have Kosovo remain within the Serbian nation, with a limited autonomy. It had noble purposes. It failed.

Asking the people of Kosovo to ever now live under Serbian administration appears to me to be similar to asking Jews in 1945 to remain in Germany rather than having a homeland in Israel. What was a good policy a month ago may no longer be plausible, and it appears to me that the only opportunity to avoid a ground war may be through the intervention of the Russians, potentially with the introduction of their forces, or Greek forces, or others, to allow at least for a period of time a partition, so the people of Kosovo could return within at least areas of their homeland, and Serbs could accept areas with which they have a stronger and more traditional bond.

I recognize the sensitivity of the suggestion. I am perfectly happy to have you respond to it, though I would understand if you did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, I am going to allow you to respond as you wish on this. We are running over, and I am not going to be able to make the 4:30 time that I promised your people, but we have done the best we could.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. If I could just briefly respond. I think, Senator, we are all trying to look at various models that would allow for the three objectives that have to be carried out: Serb forces out, refugees back, international force. We are looking at various packages that this could go into, envelopes of some kind.

The problem, and I state this more as a professor, if I might, is that the issue of partition in this region would have deleterious effects in terms of what it would signal to Bosnia, and generally to Macedonia and other countries that are multiethnic. While I think

it is possible to try to figure out some ways where certain Serb equities could be respected in Kosovo, I think we have to be very careful not to, in order to solve one problem, create additional ones.

But I do think creative thinking is required here. I think we need to stick within those three very clear objectives, and clearly there are some different ways that those can be defined, but they are very clear.

Senator TORRICELLI. I simply wanted to say I find that there is a real opportunity for the Russians to play a constructive role, and that if Milosevic understands the reality of his military situation, there are means of settlement, but that time is undoubtedly quickly moving away.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I want to revisit this issue of oil supplies to Serbian forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you are last on the list, we are going to forebear.

Senator TORRICELLI. I am sorry, I did not see the light go off.

The CHAIRMAN. It burned itself out.

Senator TORRICELLI. Does that translate into unlimited time, or simply another question?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator TORRICELLI. Madam Secretary, I want to remind you of something that I think is self-evident. It would be very hard to explain to an American family that their son or daughter is being fired upon by Serbian forces who are arriving at the battle with oil supplies that are freely flowing into Serbia.

In my belief, 6,000 air strikes on hundreds of targets in Serbia is an act of war. Blockading ports would be no more, and considerably less egregious in my mind, but it is not a legal technicality that I would want to explain to any American family.

As long as Serb forces are firing upon American airmen and threatening their lives, stop that oil. We do it within NATO if possible. We do it unilaterally if necessary. It cannot be allowed to continue if it facilitates Serbian resistance and endangers the lives of American airmen, period.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do not think we are looking at it at all in terms of legal niceties. I think it is something we want to have happen.

As I said, I have now spent a lot of time talking with the allies about it. Obviously, limiting or stopping of oil going in there is more effective if it is done multilaterally than unilaterally. We are working on it.

Thank you.

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We are very glad to have you on the committee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, you have been questioned by all but one member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and that absentee Senator had a commitment that he absolutely could not break, and I will not call his name, but he wants me to explain to you that he wanted to come most of all.

I am bound to tell you that I had five Senators, all but one of them gentlemen, to say such things as, you are a living doll, you answer questions honestly, and so forth, and I maybe ought not to

give the exact quote, but you are greatly admired and respected by this committee.

Now, in the housekeeping, we are going to keep the record open for a couple of days in order to accept any follow-up questions that Senators may have, including the one absentee Senator, and just on a personal note, I appreciate your coming and, as I said at the outset, I appreciate the calls you make to me from overseas at what must be late hours your time, where you are. You are working hard as a Secretary of State, and I am very proud of you.

If there be no further business——

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having this hearing. I think it was a very good one, but it also shows the amount of informal work we are able to do on a daily basis because we have gone through so many of these issues together and with other members of the committee, and it is my honor to be here with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. If there be no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

RESPONSES OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question 1. Is there any organization carrying out systematic interviews of refugees in camps in Albania and Macedonia which would provide documentation of alleged war crimes or human rights abuses and violations so that such documentation can be transmitted to the Hague and used to indict the accused perpetrators of these crimes?

Answer. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), and the U.S. members of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (US KDOM) are actively carrying out investigations into alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed in Kosovo. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are interviewing refugees on their own or in conjunction with a U.S.-led effort to standardize the refugee screening process. Among the most active NGOs are Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Amnesty International, the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative, and No Peace Without Justice. The Administration understands that all of these organizations and groups will share their information with the ICTY.

Question 2. How has the general lack of security in Northern Albania been addressed by either the government of Albania, or the international community? How is security inside the camps handled? Have there been any more incursions across the border by Serbian weapons fire?

Answer. The government of Albania has taken a number of steps to increase security on its border with Kosovo, including troop reinforcements and extra border police. This has not included, however, extra measures to remedy or reinforce the internal security situation. Given the intensity of the shelling in the border regions and the poor internal security, the international community has not been able to operate effectively in the region.

Security in the camps has been handled by a combination of the UNHCR, the sponsoring country and the local Albanian officials. This arrangement has resulted in varying degrees of effectiveness.

Serbian shelling continues across the border with Albania on a sporadic basis. Albania has suffered some casualties on its territory and several villages in Albania have been severely damaged. Albania has generally heeded U.S. and NATO calls not to respond to the Serb weapons fire.

U.S. KOSOVO DIPLOMACY: FEBRUARY 1998–MARCH 1999

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H. Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Smith and Biden.

Senator SMITH. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We will call to order this hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee. We are continuing our examination of the United States policy regarding Kosovo. This hearing is part of a series that we are holding to look at all aspects of our Kosovo policy.

Today our subject is the diplomatic efforts made by the Clinton administration from February 1998, when the Serbian paramilitary forces began the assault against ethnic Albanian Kosovo from March 1999, when the NATO alliance found itself at war for the first time in its history. Next week, we will discuss the way in which the war itself was conducted.

We are fortunate to have testifying on our first panel Senator Bob Dole, who is—who was and is one of the leading voices for assertive action in Kosovo, not just in the months after the conflict first erupted, but since he took his first trip to Kosovo in 1990. The second panel will consist of Mr. Ivo Daalder, from the Brookings Institution, and Mr. Bob Kagan from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also a contributing editor at The Weekly Standard. I thank all of these witnesses for being with us this afternoon.

The preface to their remarks, let me just say that after Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic first dispatched the Serbian Army and special police units against the Kosovar Albanians in February 1998, senior administration officials issued strong words of shock and dismay. Secretary Albright declared in March 1999 that, "The time to stop the killing is now before it spreads, and that moral condemnation and symbolic gestures of concern alone will get us nowhere."

But in practice, United States policy was based on empty threats that did nothing to hinder Milosevic's ability or incentive to continue his brutal butchery of innocent Albanian citizens in Kosovo. Contact Group meetings and U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning the violence and ordering Milosevic to stop the assaults may have made the U.S. and Europeans feel better, but they did

nothing to stop the killing. In fact, while we talked, argued, hesitated, and issued hollow threats, Serbian units killed thousands of Albanians, burned hundreds of villages, and dispatched tens of thousands of Albanians from their homes.

This administration claimed to have learned something from the experience in Bosnia. Specifically, that acting early and forcefully will prevent future atrocities and reduce the eventual need for an endless international presence on the ground. Yet once again, the United States and Europe stood by, ringing their hands while innocent people were indiscriminately killed based on their ethnic origin.

There were consequences to our delay, not just to the Kosovar Albanians who were victimized and brutalized by the Serbian onslaught for far too long, not just to U.S. credibility which was damaged and which certainly emboldened our enemies in Iran and Iraq, but the administration's reluctant to pursue a policy that had an opportunity to stop the conflict while at the same time threatening, "the most dire consequences imaginable," for Milosevic if he went on killing made a peaceful solution much more difficult to bring about.

Much has been said by Members of Congress, by our three witnesses today, and by representatives of the media about the degree to which the administration relied upon Milosevic to solve the problems with Kosovo that he, himself had created. Senator Dole may have stated it best when he wrote over a year ago that, "Once again the victims are being asked to negotiate with those who are attacking them, and once again, Milosevic is being courted, cajoled, and bribed to end the suffering that he wrought.

The deal negotiated by Ambassador Holbrooke with Mr. Milosevic last October, which the Serbs immediately began to violate, may have saved the lives of tens of thousands of Albanians hiding in the hills with winter approaching, but I believe we never should have been in that position at all. Had the administration pursued available policy options in the months immediately following the outbreak of violence in Kosovo, I believe we would not have been faced with a humanitarian disaster in the making and would not have been forced to count on Milosevic's good will.

The administration has claimed that it was unable to act more forcefully in Kosovo sooner than it did because of reluctant European allies and less than enthusiastic support from Congress, but I contend that the Europeans sensed our ambivalence and were simply looking for leadership which was in short supply for far too long. And here in Congress, I believe that if the administration had laid out a convincing case for use of force in Serbia and had shown the resolve to see it through, it would have received support for its policy.

The debate in the Senate on the use of all necessary force during the war certainly indicated there were members prepared to support a more vigorous policy, even when it was against the wishes of the administration. In sum, the effort to avoid war in Kosovo for a full year after the conflict began left the United States with no choice but to go to war this past spring.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I believe Senator Biden will be with us shortly, and it is always a great pleasure to

see Senator Dole and to welcome him back to this body that he knows so well and served so long and so capably and, Senator, we thank you for being our first witness as we try to understand from what happened and draw the lessons for the future so that it might not happen again. Senator, the mike is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB DOLE, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator DOLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you said, Senator Biden will be here briefly. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is something that Senator Biden and I worked on for years before you arrived in the Senate and I appreciate your leadership since then. It has always seemed to me that the Senate's work on this issue has been a bipartisan effort, and I think, for most of the time, we were out ahead of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration. One can argue whether the United States had any business in that part of the world at all, but having made that decision, we followed through on it. Following on the comments you made, I'd like to make a few remarks.

By way of introduction, I would first make the point that, during the war in Bosnia, before the conflict in Kosovo, until the Senate was finally able to muster 69 votes to lift the arms embargo, the United States did not have a policy. As a result of our work, the administration changed its policy. Again, this came about due to a bipartisan effort by Republicans and Democrats who thought if, we could lift the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians to defend themselves, we could avoid any military involvement by the United States or even NATO. We thought the right to defend yourself was a basic right which is guaranteed in the U.N. charter and elsewhere under international law, and we thought it was good policy and made a great deal of sense. Working with Senator Biden, Senator Lieberman, and others on both sides of the aisle, we finally were able to get the 69 votes, which was enough to override a veto, and then we seemed to see a change in policy.

It is good to be back in the Senate. I do not come here often, but I certainly have great respect for the institution and for the people who work here—Senators and members of their staffs and everyone else who makes this place operate.

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to take a U.S. actions and policies and to offer any recommendations that I might have. First, let me point out that the experts, who will speak on the second panel, are seated behind me. I am not a foreign policy expert. I am someone who has learned a lot about this area simply through being in the Senate and having the opportunity to travel to the region, as you said, nearly 10 years ago. When we traveled to Kosovo, we found that approximately 30,000 Kosovars had turned out to greet us, only to be driven away by Serbian forces with water cannons and clubs.

It was evident to us even then, when Serbian authorities closed down Kosova's legislature and schools and would not let the Kosovar Albanians practice medicine, that their rights were being stripped away. I never could find any document that gave Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic the power to rule the "greater Serbia," that he envisioned, yet it took many years before the United States

acted against him. For this reason, I have described U.S. policy toward the former Yugoslavia as a litany of missed opportunities.

As you, Mr. Chairman, have indicated in your statement, time and time again, the United States had the opportunity to stop Milosevic, but failed to act. Even when it ultimately confronted Milosevic in both Bosnia and Kosovo, it did so with half measures that left Bosnia divided and politically and economically impoverished, Kosovo on an uncertain path, and Serbia still firmly in the grips of the most backward and repressive regime in Europe.

I do not think it had to be this way. It seems to me that we could have taken swift and decisive action. The United States and its allies could have ended the brutal treatment of non-Serbs under Milosevic's control a long time ago.

As I said, I first traveled to the region with a congressional delegation, in 1990. Even though the crowds that gathered to see us were driven away. We succeeded in having meetings with both Serbs and Kosovars, and we brought a clear message back to Washington. That was during the Bush administration. And I must say that administration officials did not see any urgency in the situation; in fact, they were still calling for a "united Yugoslavia," which seemed to me was simply not going to happening. It was clear that Croatia and Slovenia were already breaking away. And, of course, with our 1997 Presidential elections approaching, I do not think the White House wanted any involvement, and so we did not have much effort by those in the Bush administration.

Nevertheless, when Milosevic's forces were busy turning eastern Bosnia into a giant killing field—where 250,000 innocent civilians, primarily women, children and other vulnerable groups lost their lives, President Bush did make a very firm "Christmas warning" to Milosevic: that if such action was taken in Kosovo, the United States was prepared to use force. In 1993, President Clinton repeated that very same message. So you had a Republican President and a Democratic President both making the statement—one in 1992, and the other in early 1993.

The irony, of course, is that when Milosevic was getting his way in Bosnia, we warned him not to cross the line in Kosovo. When he started to get his way in Kosovo, we warned him not to cross the line in Montenegro. Regardless of whether he generally respected our threat or had his bloody hands full elsewhere, Milosevic did indeed heed these warnings. The brutal oppression, the beatings, the random murders—all of these things continued, but Milosevic refrained from the massive purges that had decimated the Muslim population of eastern Bosnia.

The next major opportunity to save Kosovo came more than 2 years later. The United States hosted a big summit in Dayton, Ohio, where the Clinton administration welcomed Milosevic and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The administration billed the talks as "a comprehensive Balkan peace process." Yet somehow the issue of Kosovo never made it on the table. It was never discussed. It was never mentioned.

When Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, the Prime Minister in Kosovo's Albanian government-in-exile arrived to raise the issue, he was turned away at the gates. Dr. Bukoshi knew what would happen when the

United States and its allies declined to derail Milosevic's anti-Albanian train at Dayton, just as Dr. Haris Silajdzic, then the Foreign Minister of Bosnia, knew when he sat in my office years before and described to me in detail precisely what was going to happen in Bosnia. And he had it right on target. There would be a partition, or a de facto partition of Bosnia. And all this was going to happen if we did not stop Milosevic.

So, only 2 years after the Dayton settlement, Milosevic moved on Kosovo, and, for more than half a year, the administration did little to stop the killing of Albanian civilians at the hand of Serbian forces, even though the United States had issued "Christmas warning" from Presidents Bush and Clinton. Milosevic took advantage of this inaction.

What happened next, after the attacks in Kosova had begun, is, in my view, one of the most remarkable climb-downs by the West in the history of its dealings with the Belgrade regime. First, President Clinton steadfastly refused to repeat the Christmas warning, and the silence surely was not lost on Belgrade. Then, just as support was building for a forceful NATO response to Serbia's attacks, the administration sent Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to cut another deal—the one that you, Mr. Chairman, just suggested gave Milosevic more time. Why the United States would continue to deal with this man who had started a war in Croatia and started a war in Bosnia and was about to start a third war has always been a mystery to me, because the Holbrooke deal allowed Milosevic to keep 20,000 troops in Kosovo. In addition, the only means of verifying his compliance with the agreement in deterring further attacks on the ground was the presence of an unarmed pool of verifiers drawn largely from the diplomatic corps and the staff of international organizations—a presence which Ambassador Holbrooke referred to as a "civilian army."

Now, why would we give Milosevic another chance? I have never understood this. Many of my Senate colleagues and I always looked at this not as a partisan issue; instead we looked at it from a straightforward perspective and asked, "Who is this man? What has he done? Has he kept his word?" The answer is no. I have had the opportunity to meet with Milosevic as Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons, and one particular incident indicates to me to that Milosevic is not a very sensitive person. Our commission always meets with the mothers of victims in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnian. These are largely peasant women who have lost their sons—some as many as four or five sons who have been killed, or, in the case of Bosnia, taken from their homes and tortured, starved, executed and dumped in mass graves.

I remember being urged by the Serbian mothers to ask Milosevic if he would please meet with them. It would have meant a great deal for the mothers to have the Serbian leader meet with them and express his concern and sympathy. He has never done it, even though he promised me that he would. To me, this was a clear indication of what little sensitivity he had not only toward the Bosnians and the Kosovars, the Croats, and the Slovene, but also to his own people. He could not care less. It was all about power—about keeping his own power. So, it defies logic why the United dtates would give this person another chance, but we did.

The results of this illogical decision quickly became clear. Milosevic wasted no time in escalating his attacks in Kosovo. Less than 4 months after the Holbrooke agreement, the administration launched a full court diplomatic press in peace talks at Rambouillet, France. At first, the Serbs and the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) rejected an agreement, but the KLA eventually signed on. If I may add, my own view is that the KLA made a big mistake in not signing Rambouillet in the first instance. By not signing immediately, it gave Milosevic an additional 30 to 45 days to move more troops into Kosovo. I mentioned this to Hashim Thaqi and other KLA leaders—their stubbornness or reluctance to sign—and I share the view expressed by Secretary of State Albright, who I think did a terrific job and did the best that she could, that the KLA should have signed the agreement at Rambouillet.

The KLA did sign the agreement later, and at long last, as everybody knows, NATO started its bombing campaign, but, as I said at the time, it was a political bombing rather than a military bombing. As more information is revealed, we are finding that this campaign may not have been the great success that NATO claimed. Maybe we did not hit as many targets as we thought; maybe there was a lot of hype on both sides. Perhaps what we were doing there was calculated, merely to bring Milosevic to the bargaining or negotiating table, not to drive his forces from Kosovo or to bomb him, his military and his capital into submission. There is strong evidence of this in the administration's refusal to change tactics even after Milosevic's forces began their genocidal sweep through the cities, towns and villages of Kosovo.

In the end, the results were enough to persuade Milosevic to accept the West's fundamental demands. This is not surprising when you make a simple comparison and I add up the number of people who live in NATO countries—millions and millions and millions—versus the number of people who live in Serbia. About eight million Serbs, plus Albanians and some Hungarians. There was never much question about who was going to win this contest. Yet we found ourselves hoping that NATO would be strong enough to defeat Serbia and then thinking that it was a great, remarkable victory when 19 countries defeated this little country of Serbia.

A lot of problems have resulted from the way in which we did this. I was back in Kosova in July. We flew over southern, central, and western Kosova by helicopter. They were excited and euphoric to see Americans there, and they were pleased with the commitment that had been made on their behalf. I supported that commitment by NATO and supported President Clinton in their effort to drive Serbian forces out of Kosova. Today, however, approximately three-fifths of the housing and 45 percent of their schools have been damaged. Eighty percent of property records had been stolen or destroyed, and identity documents and records have suffered a similar fate.

There can no longer be any doubt about what Milosevic had in mind, and that was to drive out the Kosovars and eradicate their history and culture. He intended to win the war and create a new Albanian-free Kosovo for the Serbs. His forces did remarkable little damage to Kosovo's infrastructure indigenous assets, and natural resources. The multi-billion dollar reconstruction projects that

many had envisioned are therefore not necessary. That does not provide much consolation for those who had their homes destroyed, but here I come to the more negative part of my assessment.

In recent weeks, the news has been filled with ominous reports of power grabs, town hall occupations, murderous reprisals, black marketing, extortion, violent intimidation of Albanians and Serbs alike, and property confiscation by self-appointed mayors, Governors, and commisars—many apparently with ties to the KLA.

After being invited by the State Department to speak on September 15 at Lansdowne, Virginia where they convened a meeting of Kosovar Albanians, and I tried to make it very clear to the people assembled there that it was their responsibility to create a civil society in Kosova. I told them that, if they were going to have independence, which I support—the administration may not be able to do so, but I support it and believe that Kosova will ultimately be independent—they have this responsibility. If I may quote from my remarks to them, I said, "Every political and civil right that Milosevic and his proxies denied you for a decade must be extended to every single one of your citizens—Albanian, Serb and Gypsy. When it benefits this common good to forgive, you must forgive. When justice is to be done, you must ensure that it is pure and blind justice, untainted by prejudice or revenge.

"When there is opportunity for great profit, that profit must be directed to benefit Kosovo, not just individuals. When the children of Kosovo are educated, they must learn facts, not the history of the victor or revisionists. When the people of Kosovo are informed, they must know the truth, not propaganda. And when the citizens of Kosovo are led, they must be guided by men and women who have set self-interest aside and are dedicated to establishing a government of the people, by the people, and for the people of Kosovo."

I went on to say that I know that Kosova is not the United States, and that the last thing the Albanians need is for people in Washington or any other country to preach to them. Nevertheless, I felt that I knew enough about what had happened over the years to have some credibility in suggesting to them that, if they are not committed to democratic principles, there will be major problems. They will lose support. They will lose the support of Congress, they will lose support of other countries, and they will lose support of the Albanian people.

Let me just conclude by saying that I also told them in a very positive way that, if they would make this commitment to democratic principles, they would enjoy a democratic future and realize their dreams of economic prosperity and independence. But, as I said, it is ultimately up to the Kosovar Albanians. We in the West can furnish the tools. Indeed, it is in our interest to ensure that NATO carries out its full mandate in every corner of Kosovo, and that the United Nations assumes full authority for civic administration and then eventually holds free and fair elections and withdraws. We should not have a permanent U.S. military presence there.

From all of this, there are lessons that should be learned. We need to learn the lessons of our past failures in the former Yugoslavia. First, early intervention was far less costly and often just as effective as belated intervention this is particularly true when

you try continuously to cut deals with the a person such as Milosevic, who violates his trust every time. We must have policies set by our interests and objectives—in this case, in preventing genocide and further instability in the Balkans, rather than one triggered by a master threshold related to how many are killed before something should be done.

Second, half measures yield half results. Our political bombing campaigns succeeded in driving the Serbian forces from Kosovo, but they have not solved the Milosevic problem. On the issue of independence or any other political status for Kosovo, they have merely kicked the can down the road. They appear also to have increased the killing in Kosovo. When we wage war, we must do it to win and win decisively. Here, there were to many people trying to call the shots. When you have a NATO operation with different Presidents and prime ministers picking out the targets, to me, it is not a very effective operation—for example when somebody in France is saying you cannot bomb this target or when somebody else is saying you cannot bomb that target. I am not certain what General Wesley Clark really thought about all this, but it could not have been a very happy time for him.

Third, by merely halting the fighting is not enough to guarantee success. This is a lesson we still have not learned from Bosnia. When the international troop presence ends in Bosnia, my view is the situation will be what it was right before the war. In Kosovo, we could have done more earlier to encourage the ethnic Albanian leadership and discourage hard-liners. And I must say, Dr. Rugova needs to come forward and provide some leadership. He did not attend the Lansdowne conference, and he was absent from Kosovo when the refugees returned. It seems to me that he is lacking in some leadership qualities. You cannot have absentee leadership.

We could have also probably done more to ensure that the United Nations and NATO forces acted quickly to carry out their mandates. We can still solve this problem. Having set the chain in motion for the Kosovar Albanians to live safely and securely, free from Serbian oppression, we must now help them with the next, equally difficult steps toward democracy and economic prosperity.

In conclusion, Milosevic's rule in the former Yugoslavia has been a long nightmare—one that began in 1989. For a number of reasons, nobody really paid much attention to the problem in its early stages.

Whether we should have done something much more quickly is a question that needs to be answered. There are many Republicans and many Democrats in America, and many people who are not in politics who think we have no business doing anything in the Balkans at any time. This is not in our interest, they say. What difference does it make? they ask.

I happen to share the view expressed by the majority of Republicans and Democrats in the Congress that, having made a commitment, and having made statements of policy, we did have a responsibility to act. I therefore hope that when the next problem arises, we will have a different, more coherent and pro-active approach. I would ask that my statement be made a part of the record, along with my statement to the Kosova Albanian leadership at the Lansdowne conference.

Senator SMITH. Without objection, we will include it in the record.

[The prepared statements of Senator Dole follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB DOLE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman It is a privilege for me to be back in the Senate today and to be able to share a few observations with you regarding Kosova. Specifically, I have been asked to look back at the recent history of official U.S. policy toward the region, to provide an assessment of where things stand now, and offer some thoughts on where we go from here.

In the past, I have described the Kosova policy of the United States and its allies as a "litany of missed opportunities." Time and time again, when we have had the chance to stop Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, we have failed. Even today, after confronting Milosevic in both Bosnia and Kosova, we have done so with half-measures that have left Bosnia divided and politically and economically impoverished, Kosova on an uncertain path, and Serbia still firmly in the grips of the most backward and repressive regime in Europe.

It did not have to be this way. When I first came to this issue, it was with horror at what Milosevic was doing to Yugoslavia, but also with hope that, through swift and decisive action, the United States and its allies could end Belgrade's brutal treatment of the Kosovar Albanians. In 1990, I took a Congressional delegation to Pristina, where we learned firsthand of Milosevic's brutality and political disenfranchisement of the Albanian people. Approximately 30,000 people turned out to greet us, but Milosevic's forces tried to turn them away with water cannon and truncheons. We succeeded in having our meetings anyway and took back a clear message to Washington: The situation in Kosova is dire, it is deterioriating, and the United States should act quickly to contain Milosevic.

The Bush Administration did not see the urgency. Eventually, however, in 1992, when Milosevic's forces were busy turning eastern Bosnia into a giant killing field, the Administration issued its famous Christmas warning to Milosevic: If you attack or create unrest in Kosova, the United States is prepared to use force against you. In 1993, President Clinton sent Milosevic the very same message.

In retrospect, I wonder about these warnings: When Milosevic was getting his way in Bosnia, we warned him not to cross the line in Kosova. When he started to get his way in Kosova, we warned him not to cross the line in Montenegro.

Regardless of whether he genuinely respected our threat or had his bloody hands full elsewhere, Milosevic did heed these warnings. The brutal oppression, the beatings, the random murders—all of these things continued, but Milosevic refrained from the massive purges that had decimated the Muslim population of eastern Bosnia.

The next major opportunity to save Kosova came more than two years later, at Dayton. When Clinton Administration welcomed Milosevic, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to Dayton, they billed the talks as a "comprehensive Balkan peace process." Somehow, however, the issue of Kosova never made it to the table. When Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, the "prime minister" in Kosova's Albanian government-in-exile, arrived to raise the issue, he was turned away at the gates.

Dr. Bukoshi knew what would happen when the United States and its allies declined to derail Milosevic's anti-Albanian train at Dayton, just as Dr. Haris Silajdzic, at that time Bosnia's foreign minister, had sat in my office three years earlier and warned me what would happen if we didn't stop Milosevic in his country.

Two years after Dayton, Milosevic turned again to Kosova. For more than half a year, the Clinton Administration did little to stop the killing of Albanian civilians at the hands of Serbian forces. Soon, these forces were purging entire villages. What happened next is, in my view, one of the most remarkable climb-downs by the West in the history of its dealings with the Belgrade regime: First, President Clinton steadfastly refused to repeat the Christmas warnings—an omission that surely was not lost on Belgrade. Then, just as support was building for a forceful NATO response to Serbia's attacks, it sent Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to cut another deal with Milosevic.

This deal was a lifeline for Milosevic. First, it flew in the face of an ultimatum and threat of NATO action. Second, it allowed Milosevic to keep approximately 20,000 troops in Kosova. Third, the only means of verifying Milosevic's compliance with the agreement and deterring further attacks on the ground was the presence of an unarmed pool of verifiers, drawn largely from the diplomatic corps and the

staff of international organizations. Ambassador Holbrooke called these people a "civilian army."

Why we would give Slobodan Milosevic another chance, knowing what we knew by then, defies a logical answer. Milosevic had started two wars—in Croatia and Bosnia—against civilian populations, and he was in the early stages of a third.

In any case, the results of he West's illogical decision quickly became clear: Milosevic wasted no time in escalating his attacks. Less than four months after the Holbrooke agreement, the Administration launched a full-court diplomatic press at Rambouillet. The Serbs and the Kosova Liberation Army rejected it, but the KLA eventually signed on. Serbian forces escalated yet again, and at long last the United States and its NATO allies launched a bombing campaign to stop them.

Much has been written about that campaign—some of it by me. I continue to believe that it was a political, rather than a military bombing. Just as in Bosnia, it appeared to be calculated merely to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table, not to drive his forces from Kosova or to bomb him, his military, and his capital into submission. There is strong evidence of this in the Administration's refusal to change tactics, even after Milosevic's forces began their genocidal sweep through the cities, towns, and villages of Kosova. In the end, the results were sufficient to persuade Milosevic to accept the West's fundamental demands, but they also created housing reconstruction work, missing persons tasks, and a Serbian displacement problem that would have been far smaller if we had gone to Belgrade from the start and shut down the Serbian Army's operational capabilities.

I had a chance to see some of the results of the bombing and the attacks by Serbian forces when I traveled to Kosova in July in my capacity as Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons. I spent a day in Pristina, a day in Peja, and also had a chance to fly by helicopter over Kosova's southern, western, and central regions. I came away with a mixed assessment. Ethnic Albanian residential housing, property, schools, and businesses seem to have been badly hit. Three-fifths of Kosova's housing and 45 percent of its schools were damaged. Eighty percent of property records have been stolen or destroyed. Identity documents and records have suffered a similar fate. There can no longer be any doubt as to the nature of Milosevic's genocidal campaign: Serbian forces set out to drive the Albanians out of Kosova, and eradicate their history and culture.

There can also no longer be any doubt that Milosevic intended to win the war and create a new, Albanian-free Kosova for the Serbs: His forces did remarkably little damage to Kosova's infrastructure indigenous assets, and natural resources. The multi-billion dollar reconstruction projects that many had envisioned will therefore not be necessary.

Of course, this provides little consolation for the many thousands of families whose houses and livelihoods were destroyed and who have no shelter for the coming winter. The United States and its allies have a responsibility to ensure that these vital humanitarian needs are met, and are met quickly.

The plight of the homeless brings me to the more negative part of my assessment: In recent weeks, the news has been filled with ominous reports of power grabs, town-hall occupations, murderous reprisals, black marketeering, extortion, violent intimidation of Albanians and Serbs alike, and property confiscation by self-appointed mayors, governors, and commissars—many, apparently, with ties to the KLA.

Part of this happened due to the "power vacuum" that was created because, after NATO's victory, its ground forces and U.N. officials were slow to arrive or act in certain areas. The division of the town of Mitrovica is the most glaring example of this. But part of it happened because it appears that some of Kosova's would-be leaders are not committed to democratic principles.

Today, the ethnic Albanian leadership remains bitterly divided. As for the Serbs, many Serbian civilians have fled. Some have been murdered. Of those who remain, it is difficult to imagine that they feel safe. No one expected the return of the Albanian people to Kosova to be without some pain for all, or without particular difficulties for the Serbian civilian population. Bu no one expected this kind of behavior, either. There was certainly no precedent for it among the Bosnian Muslims, who provide the most recent example in the minds of most Americans.

This kind of behavior should give all of us pause. And it was something that I raised when I met—at Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's request—with approximately 40 Kosovar Albanians political, economic, and civil leaders earlier this month. I told them that, if they do not commit firmly and resolutely to full cooperation with NATO and the United Nations, as well as to democracy and the rule of law, Kosova could lose the support of the West, become another "black hole" of Europe, and conceivably risk a return to Serbian control.

I also told them that, if they would make this commitment, I was convinced that Kosova would not only enjoy a democratic future, but also be able to realize its dreams of independence and economic prosperity.

Ultimately, the responsibility for building a democratic Kosova lies with the Kosovar Albanians. But we in the West have a duty to give them the tools to do it. It is in our interest to ensure that NAT0 carries out its full mandate in every corner of Kosova, than the United Nations assumes full authority for civic administration, and that Kosovar Albanian leaders hew to a democratic course. In short, it would be a grave political, economic, and moral tragedy for the United States, its allies, NATO, and the people of Kosova if their homeland, finally freed from Serbian oppression, now finds itself under the brutal thumb of self-serving Abanians.

Instead, we must seize the opportunity to steer Kosova from its current crossroads toward democracy. It will not be easy. All of us who have supported freedom and liberty in the Balkans will have to work relentlessly and wholeheartedly for the common good of the people of Kosova.

We will also need to lean the lessons of our past failures in Kosova: First, early intervention is far less costly, and often just as effective, as belated intervention. We could and should have acted against Milosevic much earlier. We must have policies set by our interests and objectives—in this case, preventing genocide and further instability in the Balkans—rather than one triggered by a "massacre threshold."

Second, half-measures yield half-results. Our political bombing campaign succeeded in driving the Serbian forces from Kosova, but it has not solved the Milosevic problem, and, on the issue of independence or any other final political status for Kosova, it has merely kicked the can down the road. It appears also to have increased the killing in Kosova. When we wage war, we must do so to win, and win decisively.

Third, halting the fighting is not enough to guarantee success. Tbis is a lesson that we still have not learned from Bosnia. In Kosova, we could have done more earlier to unite the Albanian leadership and discourage hardliners. We also could have done more to ensure that the United Nations and NATO forces acted quickly to carry out their mandates. We can still solve this problem: Having set the chain in motion for the Kosovar Albanians to live safely and securely, freed from Serbian oppression, we must now help them with the next, equally difficult steps, toward democracy and, ultimately, economic prosperity. The Emperor Justinian once said, "Peace should cost as much as war." Peace should also command as much effort as war. The battle in Kosova has only just begun.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REMARKS BY SENATOR BOB DOLE—KOSOVAR ALBANIAN CONFERENCE—LANSDOWNE, VIRGINIA, SEPTEMBER 13, 1999

Thank you, Ambassador Crocker. When Secretary Albright asked me to talk with you here, I was immediately reminded of her request that I go to Skopje last March to obtain final support for the Rambouillet agreement. Last time, I couldn't find Mr. Thaqi, and this time I can't find President Rugova! But, seriously, both missions are important. If all of you who participated in the talks in France last February had not accepted the Rambouillet agreement, Kosova would still be firmly in Milosevic's control.

Today, if all of you at Lansdowne do not commit firmly and resolutely to full cooperation with NATO and the United Nations, as well as to democracy and the rule of law, Kosova could lose the support of the West, become another "black hole" of Europe, and conceivably risk a return to Serbian control. If you do make this commitment, however, I am convinced that Kosova will not only enjoy a democratic future, but also be able to realize its dreams of independence and economic prosperity.

I know that independence is not a goal that the U.S. government shares with you officially, but, as a private citizen, I do. And I hate to see that goal—not to mention any other legitimate Kosovar Albanian aspiration—thwarted.

You know better than any outsider how things currently stand in Kosova. But, among the outsiders, I am probably as qualified as anyone else to offer a Western perspective on current developments. Based on my trip to Pristina, Peja, and other regions in July, and on what I've been able to ascertain since then, my assessment is mixed. Albanian residential housing, property, schools, and businesses seem to have been badly hit. Three-fifths of Kosova's housing and 45 percent of its schools were damaged. Eighty percent of property records have been stolen or destroyed. Identity documents and records have suffered a similar fate. There can no longer

be any doubt as to the nature of Milosevic's genocidal campaign: Serbian forces set out to drive you out of Kosova, and eradicate your history and culture.

There can also no longer be any doubt that Milosevic intended to win the war and create a new, Albanian-free Kosova for the Serbs: His forces did remarkably little damage to Kosova's infrastructure, indigenous assets, and natural resources. The multi-billion dollar reconstruction projects that many had envisioned will not be necessary.

Of course, this provides little consolation for the many thousands of families whose houses and livelihoods were destroyed and who have no shelter for the coming winter. The United States and its allies have a responsibility to ensure that these vital humanitarian needs are met, and are met quickly.

The plight of the homeless brings me to the more negative part of my assessment: In recent weeks, the news has been filled with ominous reports of power grabs, town-hall occupations, murderous reprisals, black marketeering, extortion, violent intimidation of Albanians and Serbs alike, and property confiscation by self-appointed mayors, governors, and commissars.

No one expected the return of your people to your homeland to be without *some* pain for all, or without particular difficulties for the Serbian civilian population. But no one expected this kind of behavior, either. There was certainly no precedent for it among the Bosnian Muslims, who are the most recent example in the minds of most Americans.

What I said to many of you in Pristina a few weeks ago is still true today: If this pattern of criminality and brutality continues, it will quickly turn the euphoria of the Albanian people into despair. It will also cost you the support of those who are now in the best position to help you.

First, NATO: Only the alliance can provide the security necessary to build a genuine and sustainable peace. Today, KFOR is serving not only as a bulwark against further aggression from Belgrade but also as a facilitator of the development of an autonomous, if not independent Kosova. In the face of opposition and criminality, however, it could become an occupying force that serves no purpose other than to separate the parties and prevent a return to all-out warfare.

Second, donor nations: The European Union, the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and other countries have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild Kosova. Lawlessness, new self-proclaimed governments, and other attempts to usurp the authority of NATO and the United Nations will alarm these donors, reduce financial assistance, and thus hinder economic recovery. In addition, this assistance will be given only if donors are certain that their funds and materials will not be used to line the pockets of corrupt political leaders.

Third, the Albanian diaspora: Albanian communities in the United States and Europe have provided extraordinary political and financial support to Kosova. They gave this aid with the hope that democracy and a free market would eventually come to Kosova. Unless Kosova develops democratically, that aid will dry up, and these friends—your most likely foreign investors—will look elsewhere.

In short, it would be a grave political, economic, and moral tragedy for Kosova to finally be freed from Serbian oppression, only to find itself under the brutal thumb of self-serving Albanians. Instead we must seize the opportunity to steer Kosova from its current crossroads toward democracy.

Each of you has played a positive role in bringing Kosova to this crossroads: the political dissidents in the 1960s 70s, and 80s; the academics, doctors, journalists, lawyers, and other professionals who founded the LDK and then governed Kosova from underground and in exile through the 1990s; the brave KLA men who fought on the battlefield this year and last; and everyone else who has served the cause of freedom and liberty. Your service, and each stage in Kosova's development was necessary to bring your nation to where it now stands. All of you have therefore earned the right to play a role in Kosova's future, and all of you should be proud. I myself am proud to be associated with your cause.

I hope that, in the critical months ahead, all of you will remain true to that cause. It will not be easy. The Emperor Justinian once said, "Peace should cost as much as war." Peace should also command as much effort as war. You, and all of us in the West who support you, will have to work relentlessly and wholeheartedly for the common good of the people of Kosova.

Every political right and civil liberty that Milosevic and his proxies denied to you for a decade must be extended to every single one of your citizens: Albanian, Serb, and Gypsy. When it benefits that common good to forgive, you must forgive. When justice is to be done, you must ensure that it is a pure and blind justice, untainted by prejudice or revenge. When there is opportunity for great profit, that profit must be directed to benefit Kosova, not just individuals. When the children of Kosova are educated, they must learn facts, not the history of the victor or the revisionist.

When the people of Kosova are informed, they must know the truth, not propaganda. And when the citizens of Kosova are led, they must be guided by men and women who have set self-interest aside, and who are dedicated to establishing a government of the people, by the people, and for the people of Kosova.

I say this even though we all know that Kosova is not the United States: The last thing you need is a bunch of Americans locking you away outside of Washington and telling you about Thomas Jefferson, and expecting you to respond as though you were Alexander Hamilton. (Particularly when the food is not quite as good as Rambouillet.) You cannot build a flourishing democracy overnight.

But Kosova is not Serbia, either. There is no reason for it to join Belgrade at the political, economic, and moral bottom of Europe. There is no reason for it to be mired in corruption, cronyism, and criminality.

If, instead, you follow the principles ofjustice and democracy and grant the political, economic, and social rights to your people that Serbia denied them for so long, you will, brick by brick, build the foundations of a civil society. And, in my view, the house that you will have erected will turn out to be a secure and freestanding one. And, in the eyes of some—and I hope *enough*—Western governments, you will have earned the formal right to nationhood.

I wish you every success. God bless America, and God bless Kosova.

Senator SMITH. Senator Dole, is it not fair to say that when you first went to the former Yugoslavia in 1990, that Americans at this end of the decade may not remember the kind of feelings that were present when the wall had just fallen and all of these Eastern European countries were frankly crying out, reaching out to the West, and because we had spent nearly 50 years fighting the Communist ideology, we felt a duty to be there, a duty to be concerned. Is it not fair to say that strategic reasons were part of why you went and President Bush and others said yes, these do involve our interests?

Senator DOLE. There is no question about it. Like many others in the beginning, I had to look to find Kosovo on a map. I hadn't thought much about Kosovo before we decided to make that trip, and I think my other colleagues in the Senate—Senators Nichols and Mack, for example, would agree that we learned a lot from the trip. Our eyes were open. We saw firsthand what was happening, and it did not take a rocket scientist or foreign policy expert to figure it out.

Senator SMITH. Is it not true that the genocide on top of what we perceived then and still as a strategic interest in the United States of NATO, the genocide only magnifies our desire to do something or at least our right to do something. Is that a fair statement?

Senator DOLE. Well, I think it is. I think some people would disagree and believe that we shouldn't act militarily beyond our borders. I believe, however, that if you destabilize part of the Balkans, you risk greater instability in the region and in Europe, and you risk having to involve the United States directly in an even greater way later, so I supported the conclusion that we had an interest in intervening, as both President Bush and President Clinton did. In my view, however, after the United States made that determination, it should have enacted stronger policies.

Senator SMITH. Do you feel like had we not done something in Kosovo, in other words, within view of our troops in Bosnia, that Mr. Milosevic could keep us pinned down in Bosnia and other places in the Balkans for an indefinite period of time? Is that likely?

Senator DOLE. I think that is true. I also think, as we have learned in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians have great respect for America. If American troops had not been a part of the peacekeeping force, I think it would have been hard to obtain Albanian support for the peace settlement. Once the United States agreed to become part of the international force, the Kosovar Albanians could deal with their other objections to the settlement, including the presence of Russian and French troops, who ahve performed questionably from time to time.

My view is that we have certain responsibilities. Serving in this force is one of them, and it should be carried out properly.

Senator SMITH. Senator, what do you see going forward? Rambouillet was predicated upon autonomy, not independence. What ought to be our U.S. policy toward that now on the issue of—it affects Macedonia?

Senator DOLE. Right. I know that the administration cannot support independence publicly but I believe that Kosova will be independent—if the KLA and other Albanian leaders subscribe to democratic principles, hold free elections, and move toward this economic prosperity.

Senator SMITH. How about Montenegro? These are all issues of their self-determination? Should that be our policy?

Senator DOLE. Well, that would be my policy. I do not belong to any organized group anymore. I am a Republican.

Senator SMITH. And as a Republican, you share my view that it was OK to stand up to Adolf Hitler.

Senator DOLE. Yes. I thought World War II was a fairly noble cause.

Senator SMITH. I share that conclusion.

Senator DOLE. I have not read anyone's book so I cannot really comment on it.

Senator SMITH. I have not read it either, but I do not like what I have read of it.

Senator DOLE. I do not want to buy it.

Senator SMITH. Senator Dole, you have been very generous with your time, and your views are as wise as ever. We thank you for honoring this committee by participating with us today, and we wish you well in your travels to New York.

Senator DOLE. Before I go, I do want to put in a good word for Secretary Albright. I know she has had her ups and downs, as we all do in this business. But I must say in my dealings as chairman of International Commission on Missing Persons, and in dealing with some of the KLA figures, I have found her to be forthright. She has been very helpful in getting these things done because she has a great deal of credibility. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. We thank you, sir.

It is now our pleasure to welcome our second panel, Mr. Daalder and Mr. Kagan. You are invited to come forward.

Mr. Daalder, we thank you for coming, and invite your testimony. We'll start with yours.

STATEMENT OF IVO H. DAALDER, SENIOR FELLOW AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. DAALDER. Thanks very much for inviting me and thanks for holding these hearings which I think are important, if only to get the historical record right. And also to learn the lessons that can be learned from this case, or perhaps to start unlearning some of the lessons we already learned.

Let me start with my bottom line conclusion. Although NATO did in the end succeed in creating the secure environment necessary for Albanians to live in safety and security, a different strategy prior to the war might have succeeded in achieving this result at less cost. In particular, if we take it that Milosevic's regime was at fault in Kosovo, as I think it was, and if we believe that it was strategically undesirable to have an independent Kosovo, for which I think a case could arguably be made, then the logic of our position was that we should have imposed a solution by force. But we could not do that just by bombing. We would have to have done that by the use of ground forces, and that probably would have involved more, rather than less ground forces and American troops playing a significant part. In the year prior to the war and even during the war itself, the absence of a willingness to deploy ground forces and if necessary to use them in a nonpermissive environment made the outcome we had inevitable.

That said, let's stress that the outcome was indeed a success. In fact, one has to start off with an examination of this whole history by acknowledging that things did turn out well, in fact, much better than many of us, including myself, thought was likely with the means that we were using at the time.

For the average Kosovar today, life is much better, and the future is more promising than at any time since autonomy was stripped away from them a decade ago. Clear evidence of this is found in the fact that 750,000 refugees returned within just 1 month after the end of the war. Today, all Kosovars who wanted to come back are back. That is a remarkable testament to the success of U.S. and NATO policy, and it stands in marked contrast to the fears of all of us just a very few months ago, fears of permanent exile of nearly a million people, fears of starvation for many hundreds of thousands, and fears of deaths and rape affecting many tens and thousands.

Of course, daily life in Kosovo today is not yet normal. There has been a large exodus of Serbs. Some 300 Serbs and Albanians have been killed, but however tragic these developments are, we ought to put this in perspective. The killings after the war occurred at a rate that is still no different than the murder rate in many U.S. cities, and while many Serbs have left precipitously, some in fact are coming back. More importantly, it is wrong morally and otherwise to compare this to the systematic forced expulsion of nearly a million people from Kosovo. All and all, it is therefore impossible to escape the conclusion that the development inside Kosovo after the war are powerful evidence of NATO's achievement.

Nevertheless, I would maintain that that accomplishment came with a price tag. Ten thousand Albanians have been killed, according to the best estimates that we have. Tragedy has befallen every single Albanian. They were killed, they were raped, and they were

forced from their country. Their houses were burned, their livelihoods were taken away. It is no surprise that hatred and revenge still run deep in the territory and that this is a country that is increasingly monoethnic in nature. So this raises a question. When violence started in March 1998 in Kosovo, would a different policy have avoided this high price? My answer is yes, though I hasten to add that we cannot possibly know.

From the outset of the Kosovo conflict, the Clinton administration based its policies on three assumptions. First, developments in Kosovo were of fundamental interest to the United States. Second, at the heart of this conflict was Milosevic's nationalistic policies and only pressure on Milosevic would likely be effective in achieving solution; and third, that the preferred solution to this conflict had to be self-government for the Kosovars that fell well short of independence. I fully accept the validity of the first of these assumptions; namely, that what was happening in Kosovo on both moral and strategic grounds was important to the United States. However, the second and the third of these assumptions were and still are contradictory. Since the solution sought by the administration and its European allies was much closer to what Mr. Milosevic wanted than what the Kosovars wanted, pressure on Belgrade was unlikely to achieve the effect we sought, which was self-government but not independence. Indeed, the more pressure we placed on Milosevic, the less likely the Albanians were to accept anything less than independence.

So we had a choice between three policy options—in theory, at least. One, we could have acquiesced in what Milosevic was doing. Second, we could have supported Kosovar's independence and supported the KLA. Or, third, we could have imposed a solution on the conflict in order to avoid the first option and in order to prevent the second option.

Over time, the Clinton administration and its allies came to accept, however reluctantly, that imposing a solution was the only way that they could end this conflict, and that indeed was what the Rambouillet conference was all about. Yet not only did we come to this conclusion very, very late—10 months after the conflict had been started and only after half a million had been forced from their homes—but we never really prepared for what was necessary to impose the solution. To impose a solution would have meant putting forces on the ground in Kosovo and given the security environment inside Kosovo, it would have meant more forces rather than less and a significant American presence if not actually an American lead. In the end, the Clinton administration came to accept the need for such troops only last February, and even then, the administration ruled out the deployment in anything but a permissive environment right through the end of the war.

The administration argued then and still argues now that there were three reasons why it was reluctant to deploy ground forces. First, there was no support in Congress or in the country for deploying yet more troops to the Balkans and to the extent that that judgment was correct, Congress bears a significant part of the responsibility. Indeed, while I recognize as Senator Smith said in his opening comments that the administration never made a persua-

sive case for ground troops, I wonder whether if it had the reception would have been any different up here.

The second reason for the reluctance to push the issue of ground forces was the belief that there would be major fissures within the NATO alliance, particularly because countries such as Germany, Italy and Greece were not supportive of deploying ground forces. I believe, however, that had the American administration together with its British allies—which did commit to ground forces in a very early stage—led rather than waited for a consensus to emerge, a consensus could have been found sooner rather than later.

A third reason why the administration hesitated had to do with Russia. The administration has to be applauded and lauded for its constant attempt to keep Russia on board as it was dealing with the Kosovo issue. In the end, the administration decided that bombing was preferable than deferring to Moscow's wishes, a decision that I think was right. In the end, I would have argued that if we had deployed ground forces, the Russians would have remained with us because they had no other place to go.

Let me end here with some lessons. What can we learn from these mistakes? From this history? Clearly one is this. Once you decide to engage in the conflict, you cannot do so halfheartedly. You need clear objectives, a clear and achievable strategy to meet those objectives, and the determination to succeed. Prior to the war United States and allied policies were characterized by muddled objectives, by contradictory strategy, and by hope at least that the least of its bad options would work in order to avoid the worst. It was only late April that incoherence and muddling finally were discarded in favor of a clear strategy designed for victory. The bombing intensified inflicting real damage on leaders of power in Belgrade. Diplomacy accelerated to close off any thought that Milosevic might have had that Russia was ready to pull his head out of the ring, and NATO planning for ground forces intensified in order to convince Milosevic that he had no way out even militarily. That finally led to success to the United States, for NATO, and above all for the Kosovar who now lives in this region. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daalder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IVO H. DAALDER

U.S. DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE KOSOVO WAR

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear here before you today to discuss what lessons we might learn from the way the U.S. conducted diplomacy before the Kosovo War. I would also like to take this opportunity to commend the Committee for taking a look at the Kosovo War and the lessons that have and can be learned—this is worthwhile enterprise, particularly since many in and outside government appear to be learning some wrong lessons.

Let me start with my bottom-line conclusion. Although NATO did, in the end, succeed in creating a secure environment for ethnic Albanians inside Kosovo by forcing Serb security forces out and deploying 50,000 troops inside the territory, a different strategy prior to the war might have achieved this result at less cost. In particular, if Milosevic's regime was the fundamental cause of the conflict and if Kosovo's independence was strategic undesirable as the U.S. and its allies rightly argued since the conflict started early last year, then the only logical solution to the conflict was one imposed by force. That required a willingness to use ground forces—more rather than less and with American troops playing a significant part. Absent a willingness to deploy and, if necessary, use ground forces, the current outcome is probably the bcst we could have achieved.

NATO's Success

It is important to begin any assessment of U.S. policy toward Kosovo by acknowledging that, in the end, turned out well—to a degree that many, including myself, doubted would ever occur with the means that had been chosen to achieve it. For the average Kosovar, life today is better and the future more promising than at any time since Belgrade stripped Kosovo's autonomy away a decade ago. Clear evidence for this can be found in the fact that within one month of NATO forces entering Kosovo, 750,000 refugees had returned to the territory. Today, all Kosovar Albanians who wanted to return have come home. That is a remarkable testament to the success of U.S. and NATO policy. It stands in marked contrast to the fears all of us had just a very few months ago—fears of permanent exile for nearly a million people, of starvation and death through exposure to a brutal winter for many hundreds of thousands, and of many tens of thousands of victims of rape and murder.

Of course, daily life in Kosovo is not yet normal. As expected, there has been a large exodus of Serbs, and in the chaos and confusion that accompanied the end of the war some 300 Serbs and Albanians have been killed. Though tragic, it is important to put these developments in perspective. The killings after the war occurred at a rate that is still differs well below the murder rate in many U.S. cities. And while many Serbs left precipitously in fear of returning Albanians, this should not be compared to the systematic and forced expulsion of the Albanian population prior to and during the war. All in all, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that developments inside Kosovo after the war are powerful evidence of NATO's achievement.

Nevertheless, this accomplishment came with a significant price-tag. According to best estimates, 10,000 Albanians were systematically killed by Serb forces. Tragedy befell nearly every ethnic Albanian inside Kosovo—some were killed, more were wounded, raped, and mutilated, and almost all were hounded from their homes and their country. It is not surprising that in today's Kosovo, hatred and revenge still run deep and that the territory is increasingly monoethnic in its makeup.

A Different Policy?

This raises an important question: When violence started in March 1998 would a different policy have avoided this high price? I believe the answer is "yes," although I hasten to add that we will of course never know.

From the outset of the Kosovo conflict, the Clinton Administration based its policy on three assumptions.

- First, developments in Kosovo were of important interest to the United States and its European allies not only because of a general and commendable concern with human and minority rights in this part of the world but also because a violent flare-up there could prove unsettling for the Bosnian peace achieved in Dayton and stability within southeast Europe as a whole.
- Second, at the heart of the conflict was Milosevic's nationalistic policies and only pressure on Belgrade would succeed in effecting a solution to the conflict.
- Third, the preferred solution to the conflict involved increased self-government for the Kosovar Albanians that would fall short of the territory's independence, let alone its partition.

Of these three assumptions. I fully accept the validity of the first—on both moral and strategic grounds, developments in Kosovo were and remain of interest to the United States. However, the second and third assumptions were (and still are) contradictory, the more so as pressure moved from diplomacy and considerations of economic sanctions to considering the threat and actual use of force. Since the solution sought by the administration and its European allies was closer to Milosevic's position than to that of the Kosovars, pressure on Belgrade was unlikely to end in an agreement acceptable to both sides. Indeed, the more we pressed Milosevic, the less likely the Albanians were to accept anything less than independence.

U.S. Policy Options

From the outset of the conflict, there were three basic options: we could have acquiesced in what Milosevic was doing, supported Kosovo's independence and assisted the KLA, or we could have imposed a solution in order to prevent both the inevitable violence caused by the first option and the destabilizing outcome of the second.

Over time, the Clinton Administration and its allies in Europe reluctantly came to accept that only the third of these options was acceptable. That, indeed, was what Rambouillet was supposed to be about. Yet, not only did we come to this conclusion very late—ten months into the conflict and only after nearly half a million people had been forced from their homes—but we were never really prepared to do what was necessary to impose a solution. That meant putting troops on the ground in Kosovo. And given the security environment inside Kosovo, it would have required

more rather than less troops and a significant American presence, if not actually a U.S. lead. In the end, the Clinton Administration came to accept the need for some troops only last February. Even then the administration ruled out their deployment in anything but a permissive environment right through the end of the war.

Administration officials contend that there were three reasons for their reluctance to deploy ground forces in Kosovo. First, there was no support in Congress or the country for deploying yet more troops to the Balkans. To the extent that judgment was correct, Congress bears a significant part of the responsibility. While I recognize that the administration never made its case, I wonder whether the reception up here would have been any different if it had.

Second, the prospect of ground forces would have created major fissures within the NATO alliance and posed particular problems for key allies like Germany and Italy, both of which were facing a transition in government. In contrast, Britain had concluded as far back as August 1998 that ground forces were needed in Kosovo. But American hesitation was hardly the way to garner an allied consensus, however difficult that task would have been.

Third, Russia had opposed the use of force under any circumstances and would have gone completely off the reservation if U.S. and NATO troops entered Yugoslavia without Belgrade's consent. Indeed, the administration had worked assiduously to keep Moscow on board, and a ground force decision would inevitably have led to further strains in the relationship. But as subsequent events were to show, what was Russia going to do? In the end, Moscow had no option but to work hard to convince Milosevic to accept NATO's basic terms.

Lessons

If there is a lesson to be learned from this history, it is this: once you decide to engage in a conflict, you cannot do so half-heartedly. You need clear objectives, a clear and achievable strategy to meet these objectives, and the determination to succeed. Prior to the war, U.S. and allied policies was characterized by muddled objectives in favoring neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo for Kosovo; by a contradictory strategy that consisted of inconsequential sticks that were insufficient to persuade Belgrade but sufficient to give the Kosovars hope for eventual success; and by a hope that the least bad option would succeed rather than a determination that the worst would not occur.

In late April, incoherence and muddling through were discarded in favor of a clear strategy designed for victory. The bombing intensified, inflicting real damage on key levers of Milosevic's power, diplomacy accelerated to close off any thought Milosevic might have that there was still a diplomatic escape, and NATO planning for a ground invasion was stepped up to make sure Milosevic had no hope of escaping military defeat. That, finally, led to success—for the United States, for NATO, for stability in the region, and, above all, for the average Kosovar who could now return home in safety.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

We are joined by Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize for being late. I chair a subcommittee in the Judiciary Committee on Juvenile Justice, and there was a group of witnesses I had invited. So that is why I was late.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DIRECTOR, U.S. LEADERSHIP PROJECT

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate the opportunity to come up and speak to you. And I also want to congratulate the committee and the Chairman for holding these hearings.

There have—out in the press over the past weeks and months—been after-action reports about the way the war was waged and what was ultimately successful in bringing Slobodan Milosevic to heel, but, as always, there has been far less attention paid before the war and discussion of whether this war could in fact have been

avoided or at least fought at lower cost. This is generally true, I think. We do focus a great deal more attention on how we wage war and far less attention on how war can be deterred. I think that is a general truism about American foreign policy. And therefore, I think it is very important that we engage in this kind of discussion, because I believe I am quite confident in fact that the main task of United States foreign policy over the coming decades is going to be to deter conflict.

And frankly, it does not matter whether we are determining humanitarian catastrophe or war for what people might consider to be more vital strategic interests. The concepts of deterrence are going to be roughly the same, and I do believe in the next decade even we will be increasingly consumed in deterring conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean peninsula, in South Asia and in the Persian Gulf, areas where we would not have time to have a debate over the purposes of humanitarian intervention.

Unfortunately, our track record in recent years does not give optimism, reason for optimism that we are going to be successful in deterring conflicts. The story of the 1990's is mostly one of failures of deterrence. I want to emphasize this is not something unique to the Clinton administration. The Persian Gulf war, which we all correctly remember as a great victory, was nevertheless preceded by a failure of deterrence. We watched as Saddam Hussein masked forces on the border. Intelligence forces said he was not going to attack. We hoped to persuade him not to attack Kuwait, and ultimately deterrence failed, and that is why we had to fight a war in the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the Balkans under the Bush administration, so this is decidedly not a partisan issue. It is an endemic policy in American foreign policy.

In that respect, I think that as we look at the history of the Kosovo conflict, we need not for partisan purposes, but for serious purposes in history, but also to lessons for the future to take a hard look at what could have been done differently that could have been prevented the horrors that we all had to witness just this past thing. I will quickly state some of the lessons I think we learned. I am hesitant to do so because whenever you draw out the general lessons of any conflict, you are in danger of saying something that is almost immediately provable to be wrong, but I will do so nevertheless. I can think of at least four lessons that we ought to have learned in Kosovo.

One is the need to identify an important interest before it is under attack. Two is the need to put together a prepared and implementable military plan that can succeed if diplomacy fails, and I want to emphasize this does not mean a military plan that is merely an adjunct to diplomacy. We need to be able to use or credibly threaten military force in the early stages of a crisis before a potential adversary has completed preparations for the attack that they intend to carry out. And fourth, and in some ways for our purposes most importantly, we need to prepare the American people and American allies for the possibility of war before the need for war becomes obvious to viewers of CNN. This inevitably requires the expenditure of the President's political capital for it means he will be by definition well out in front of the popular con-

sensus and will not necessarily find support in the polls or in Congress for his proposed course of action.

It seems to me the Clinton administration failed on at least three of these tests or failed to abide these lessons. They recognized, I think, or at least many of them did that a serious interest was at stake in Kosovo, although there was some disagreement about the level of interest that was at stake, but then the President and his advisors did not prepare to implement the determination to carry out a plan if diplomacy failed. Diplomacy did fail. The administration did not use or credibly threaten military action in the early stages of the crisis before President Milosevic had en massed his forces capable of carrying out his offenses against the Albanians beginning in March. The President did not begin to prepare the Nation for war until war was imminent. He was unwilling to expend political capital for war before war became obvious.

I'll try to be brief. Ivo has covered this in a broad sense. I want to focus on the issues of surrounding of the deal that was struck by Ambassador Holbrooke in October. I want to emphasize that this is not a matter of blaming Ambassador Holbrooke for that deal. This was forces that were beyond Ambassador Holbrooke's control, but nevertheless, I think it is worth focusing on it. I think it was very much on that basis that Ambassador Holbrooke went to Belgrade to negotiate an agreement with President Milosevic.

I want to emphasize, however, that there were two, it seems to me, serious flaws in the way that negotiation went about. It seems to me that that was the time—and this is very easy to say in historical retrospect, a lot easier to say at the time, but that is what we are engaged in. We are engaged in retrospective so that we can learn for the future.

It seems to me in October was the time to deliver the final ultimatum to Milosevic to remove his forces from Kosovo and to accept an autonomy agreement, negotiated autonomy agreement, with the Kosovar Albanians. At that time, although we had substantial forces in Kosovo, it seems to me fairly clear from looking at subsequent events that he did not yet have the forces in place to carry out the full extent of Operation Horseshoe, which he later carried out beginning in March.

Between the October deal and the March offensive, I think he added in the order of 20,000 additional troops and significantly greater tanks and hardware to carry out that offensive, and therefore, it seems to me as we now know in retrospect that that was a moment when in fact the administration's preferred strategy of a limited air campaign to force compliance with those two key terms, the withdrawal of all forces and the settlement of an autonomy agreement, that is the time in fact when an air campaign alone might have worked because he was not yet in the position to carry out the offensive that he later carried out in March. Unfortunately——

Senator SMITH. I am just really—you are making such an excellent point.

Mr. KAGAN. But I'm going too long.

Senator SMITH. No, no, I want you to go longer, but what I want to ask you is while this was going on and we could have and I believe should have been doing that, Joe and I were just saying it is

funny how an impeachment trial gets in the way. Can you speak to your comment with that overlay, because I mean, every time the President did anything, it was sort of an accusation wagging the dog.

Mr. KAGAN. No. And in fact, there were two things going on at the time, one was impeachment and one was Iraq because we were also in a confrontation with Iraq in which the administration was threatening to use—to go bombing. You know, at a certain point, foreign policy theory falls down and you are dealing with real people, and I would say the impeachment trial was clearly on people's minds, and so was the fact that, well, how many places were we going to bomb at the same time.

Senator SMITH. Do you think Milosevic was taking advantage of the President's domestic situation in the way he was responding to what had been worked out in October?

Mr. KAGAN. Well, I think he was taking advantage of what he perceived as the entire situation both in the United States and in NATO as reflected in the way the United States advanced toward him in negotiations. I think it was clear to him that there was reluctance in allied capitals and in Washington to use force. I do not want to try to climb into his mind and ask whether he had impeachment specifically on the brain at that time.

Senator SMITH. I am just saying I think your points are well taken. It just is so important to have it in context of everything that was going on.

Mr. KAGAN. I agree.

Senator SMITH. I think Joe has a point about that. Then we want you to keep going.

Senator BIDEN. I think here, as the kids say, you are right on. Keep in mind from the context of when we start questioning, you are talking to two of the four people here—and I mean four people, I do not mean 14, I do not mean 24, I do not mean 44. Four. And you are talking to one, the one person who said in June we should go to the European capitals and just say we are going in. OK? So, I agree with you, and I have the scars to prove it. And I was as close as I could ever say—I have never said this before in my 27 years. I was as close to inside a President's head on this as I have ever been in my entire career. I mean two, three, four times a week.

And I, at some point, when we get into questioning, I want us to really review the context as well because the underlying assumption you are making is that the military plan failed. You said we have a plan that worked. Bombing did not work. It seems to me bombing worked and even though Mr. Thaqi tells me as I met with him for several hours how he did anything—that is a bunch of crap. The incremental impact of the KLA on this process was just that, incremental. No evidence, none. You may be talking about 1,500 fighters, not 10,000. Mr. Thaqi asked me, he said, you are 29, like I am, when you took office. Do you have any advice? I said, well, if you are asking, I am happy to tell you, although very different circumstances. He said, what is your advice? I said No. 1, do not take yourself so seriously and, No. 2, understand that I know that you know you do not control the KLA.

There is no KLA like we talked about here. We are talking somewhere between 500 and 2,000 people. And so it seems to me the underlying assumption that both of you are saying is that if we just had a military plan that worked. It may have been one that worked better. I happen to think—John McCain and I tried to get ground forces in, OK. Maybe I think it would have worked better and quicker, but this seemed to have. How do you deal with this issue of what worked? I mean is what ended up—did it work?

Mr. KAGAN. I am not addressing that particular question because my view is that this was a great success ultimately. I am only addressing the question of whether the success had to come at the cost it did. I have not allowed myself for the purposes of this hearing to get to the end of the war. I am supposed to go up to the beginning of the war.

Senator BIDEN. OK, fine. I'm sorry. I thought you had said, and this is what confused me, because I agree with everything you said thus far, but I thought when I took notes that you said that if we could have had a military plan that worked is one of the lessons to learn, and I thought the implication of that was you concluded that what we did do did not work. That's the only reason that I——

Mr. KAGAN. Not only do I not feel that, but I have my own self in print to prove that I thought it worked at the time. Actually, I wanted to make a different but related point.

The point I wanted to make is that the military plan that the administration had seized on, which was a limited air campaign to force Milosevic to back down, which was the military plan that they embarked on in March when the campaign began, when the campaign started, and which had to be adjusted along the way because that limited air campaign proved clearly insufficient, did not solve the problem of the offensive against the Kosovar Albanians and by itself if it had not been significantly ratcheted up over the course of that war, could not have, I think, brought Milosevic to heel.

But what I want to say is that if you look back to October, that plan might have worked, and the problem that we faced occurred between the October agreement and the initiation of hostilities in March because the bottom line is Milosevic changed the equation. When he amassed the forces that he did, not only violating the agreement by not reducing the forces in Kosovo as Holbrooke had negotiated, but in addition to that augmenting the forces in Kosovo and conducting a major buildup across the border in Serbia for preparation for Operation Horseshoe, that fundamentally changed the situation, and the limited air campaign that the administration had in mind back in October and which might have worked in October, Milosevic had defeated that strategy.

Senator BIDEN. I'm sorry, I misunderstood you.

Mr. KAGAN. Milosevic had defeated that strategy already. And when people said why did not the administration know that he was going to do this, why did they start with this limited air campaign, I just think it is important to get in the head of policymakers.

I think to a very large extent the Clinton administration still had its head back in October. They were still thinking of a time when limited air strikes might have indeed put him in a position where he had to back down. Unfortunately, he had changed circumstances

by building up that force. He had defeated their strategy, and at that point a limited air campaign was no longer going to be successful. The adjustment just was not quick enough. That is my basic view of the military campaign.

All of which—again, I do not want to overstay my welcome, but all of which leads me to conclude it is a classic instance of a failure to act early enough at a time when your opponent is not really ready to confront you. You can possibly succeed at a lower level of military conflict, but the challenge then is how do you get your Nation, your Congress, and your allies to do what is a relatively large thing, conduct an aerial campaign against another nation before the need to do so has become absolutely necessary, before there was slaughter going on? How do you get what is a fairly high-level action in response to what still appears to be a relatively low-level threat?

This challenge is going to confront the United States again and again and again over the coming decades. As I said, it is going to confront us in Taiwan, it is going to confront us in the Korean peninsula. It is the need to get out in front of events, but in the United States and democracy, that means pulling everybody along with you, and the only thing I just want to support what Ivo said and what Senator Dole said, this was not a problem that was unique to the Clinton administration by any means. I wish I could say that Members of Congress had a cleaner insight, present few excepted. I wish that Congress itself had been willing to push in that direction rather than be something the administration was afraid to go to to take the necessary measures. And I just hope as we move to the inevitable next crisis, that we will learn these particular lessons of Kosovo.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN

THE LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE

There have in recent weeks and months been numerous after-action reports on how the war in Kosovo was conducted. There has been much discussion of whether the air campaign was successful, whether it was waged correctly from the beginning, and whether planning for a ground war was the decisive factor in Milosevic's eventual capitulation.

But there has been almost no discussion of whether the war itself could have been avoided or whether the objectives could have been achieved with less force and, above all, without the frightful toll in human life that occurred when Serbia launched its offensive against the Kosovo Albanian population.

I want to congratulate this committee for focusing today on this latter question. Much attention is paid to how we wage war. Far too little attention is paid to the question of how to deter it.

There is perhaps no more important topic for the American foreign policy community, for the Congress and for future administrations. And let us be clear. The question is not merely how to prevent humanitarian disasters like those which occurred in Kosovo, in Rwanda a few years ago, and in East Timor most recently. As was true in the case of Kosovo, there often are more than humanitarian issues at stake in such crises. In the future, too, interests and morality will often intersect, and the United States and its allies will have to act both to save innocent victims from slaughter and to defend vital interests in important regions of the world.

The main task of the United States in the coming decades is going to be to deter conflict, and the requirements of deterrence are pretty much the same regardless of whether the goal is the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe or the defense of vital national interests. In recent years we have focused on deterring conflict in the Balkans. Over the next decade, I predict we will be increasingly consumed with deterring conflict across the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean peninsula, in South Asia,

and in the Persian Gulf, areas of unmistakably vital strategic significance to the United States.

Unfortunately, our track record in recent years does not give reason for optimism that we will be successful. The story of the 1990s is mostly one of failures of deterrence. Nor is the Clinton administration alone culpable in this respect. The Persian Gulf War, which we all remember, correctly, as a great victory, was nevertheless preceded by a failure of deterrence. And this failure was similar in many respects to the Clinton administration's failure in Kosovo. Thus American officials misread Saddam's intentions, believed they could deter his aggression by blandishments more effectively than by threats, and even when he massed troops on the border of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 failed to predict his invasion of Kuwait and failed to take effective steps to deter it. In the Balkans, meanwhile, the failure to deter Milosevic began with the Bush administration and continued through the Clinton years.

We must do a better job deterring conflicts in the future, when the stakes are likely to be even higher than they have been this past decade. And to deter these conflicts, we will have to learn the lessons of Kosovo.

What are those lessons? I can think of at least four, though there are no doubt many others.

- The need to identify an important interest before it is under attack.
- The need to put together and prepare to implement a military plan that can succeed if diplomacy fails. This does not mean a military plan that is merely an adjunct to diplomacy.
- The need to use or credibly threaten military force in the early stages of a crisis, before a potential adversary has completed preparations for attack.
- The need to prepare the American people, and American allies, for the possibility of war before the need for war becomes obvious to viewers of CNN. This inevitably requires the expenditure of the President's political capital, for it means he will by definition be well out in front of the popular consensus and will not necessarily find support in the polls or in Congress for his proposed course of action.

In the case of Kosovo, the Clinton administration failed on three of four of these points. Senior officials understood that an interest was at stake in Kosovo, though there was disagreement about the relative importance of the interest. But then the President and his advisers did not prepare to implement and determine to carry out a military plan that could succeed if diplomacy failed. Partly as a result of this lack of planning and determination, diplomacy did fail. The administration then did not use or credibly threaten military action in the early stages of the crisis, before President Milosevic had amassed forces capable of carrying out his offensive against the Kosovar Albanians. And finally the President did not begin to prepare the nation for war until war was imminent. He was unwilling to expend political capital marshalling support for a war before the need for war became obvious.

Instead, the administration was driven chiefly by the desire to avoid going to war. Unfortunately, as is so often the case, this had the perverse effect of making the war inevitable.

One can trace this failure from at least the beginning of 1998. But I would like to focus specifically on the moment when I believe the most critical errors were made and when the awful conflict in Kosovo became just about inevitable.

We all recall the brewing crisis of late summer and early fall of 1998. Serb forces in Kosovo were carrying out another offensive, leading to the massive dislocation of the Kosovo Albanian population. American and allied officials faced the prospect that this displaced population might starve or freeze in the winter months. The crisis came to a head in October, when the administration sent Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade. This was the moment to achieve a resolution to the crisis, to force Milosevic to withdraw all his forces from Kosovo and accept political autonomy for Kosovo. This was not a time for a negotiation but for an ultimatum: either Milosevic would comply fully with NATO's demands or the air campaign against him and his forces would begin.

I believe that if the United States and its allies had carried out an air campaign in October, and been prepared to use ground forces, as well, Milosevic might well have backed down after a few days—just as administration officials hoped he would later at the end of March 1999. In October 1998 Milosevic did not have the forces in place to carry out what later came to be known as Operation Horseshoe. Had he attempted in the early stages of an air campaign to bring those forces into Kosovo, they would have been easy targets for allied bombers. The situation in Kosovo would have been even more difficult for Serb forces had the United States at that time begun to arm the KLA, as some in Congress recommended. If Milosevic had rejected

the ultimatum, his smaller forces in Kosovo would have been cut off and subject to attack both by NATO aircraft and by the KLA. He might have launched an offensive against the Kosovo Albanian population anyway, but the amount of destruction he could have wreaked would have been much less and the duration of the offensive much shorter than it later proved to be. His ability to present the United States and its allies with a fait accompli in Kosovo—which was his main objective in Operation Horseshoe—would have been highly questionable in October 1998. And that fact alone might have convinced him that a settlement was preferable to war.

Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons with which we are all familiar, President Clinton was not ready for a war over Kosovo in October 1998. The NATO allies, with the exception of Great Britain, were also not ready for war. Ambassador Holbrooke's negotiation with Milosevic reflected this basic reality, and so did the deal which emerged. Instead of forcing Serb forces out of Kosovo, the deal Holbrooke negotiated permitted up to 20,000 Serb military and police forces to remain. These forces, later augmented by an approximately 20,000 more heavily armed troops, would commit the atrocities of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovo Albanian population.

In addition, because there was no will among the NATO allies, except, again, Great Britain, to deploy ground forces to police the October settlement, Holbrooke agreed to the deployment of 2,000 unarmed OSCE monitors—what Holbrooke regrettably referred to as a "civilian army." These monitors would later uncover the atrocity at Racak, but were powerless to enforce any agreement and, in the end, proved to be obstacles to the start of any air campaign. As many predicted at the time of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, the monitors quickly became "hostages."

There were other flaws in the October 1998 agreement, but these two were by far the most significant. The agreement left Milosevic with forces in Kosovo to carry out an offensive, and no NATO forces to compel his compliance with the other terms of the agreement.

From the moment the agreement was signed, therefore, Milosevic began to violate it. He continued to carry out attacks on Kosovo Albanians. More importantly, rather than reducing his forces in Kosovo even to the generous levels permitted by the October agreement, Milosevic began to augment his forces on both sides of the Serb-Kosovo border. By March 1998, General Wes Clark reported that there were between 14,000 and 16,000 heavily armed Serbian policemen in Kosovo along with between 17,000 and 20,000 Yugoslav Army troops. Another 5,000 to 10,000 were positioned just across the border, armed with hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces. This was the full force Milosevic and his military commanders believed necessary to carry out Operation Horseshoe—the complete ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians.

There has been much discussion about how the Clinton administration could have so miscalculated the effect of their bombing campaign in March 1998. Why did officials believe that a brief air campaign would force Milosevic to back down? I believe the answer may lie in the administration's failure to alter its calculations in light of the enormous buildup of Serb troops in and around Kosovo between October and March. In October, as I have suggested, Milosevic might well have backed down in the face of a brief, punishing air attack. His options at that time were limited and not attractive. By March, however, Milosevic had fundamentally changed the military equation. Now his answer to a brief air campaign was a rapid destruction of the Kosovo Albanian population. Convinced that the U.S. and NATO would never send in ground troops to save Kosovo Albanians, Milosevic believed he could weather an air attack and present the world with a fait accompli in Kosovo. (Saddam Hussein had made almost exactly this calculation in 1990.)

What U.S. officials did not realize was that between October 1998 and March 1999, Milosevic had figured out a way to defeat their strategy. The administration's strategy was to use an air campaign to force Milosevic to accept a resolution of the Kosovo crisis. In October, when Serb forces in Kosovo were smaller than Milosevic obviously believed were necessary to carry out Operation Horseshoe, this strategy might have succeeded. But by March, Milosevic believed he had acquired the capacity to settle the Kosovo problem on his own terms, regardless of whether NATO carried out an air attack.

Unfortunately, administration officials and NATO military planners when they initiated the air campaign in March 1999 were still operating based on the assumptions of October. This was clear in the early days of the campaign, when the plans for the air campaign still emphasized "signaling" and gradual escalation and contained no answer to the huge offensive which Serb forces had launched against the Kosovo Albanian population. It would be weeks before the air campaign adjusted, and weeks more before the U.S. and NATO came to the realization that it might be necessary to commit ground forces in Kosovo. When word reached Milosevic that

NATO was preparing for the introduction of ground forces, he capitulated. For only then did he believe that the U.S. and NATO had come up with a way of defeating his strategy.

The errors of the Clinton administration in October and in the months that followed had the most tragic consequences. Had the United States employed force in October to enforce an ultimatum to Milosevic, the full extent of the catastrophe of the spring of 1999 might well have been avoided. Had the United States responded to Milosevic's gradual buildup of Serb forces after October, it could have blunted and perhaps prevented the later offensive. It is possible in both instances that air power alone would have succeeded, though it would have been a mistake then as it was later to rule out the use of ground troops. It is an old cliche that if you want to preserve peace you must prepare for war. Unfortunately, old and hackneyed though that wisdom may be, it was not followed by the Clinton administration in Kosovo.

I wish I could say that the Clinton administration was unique in this respect. But it is not. Many Members of Congress were no better than the Clinton administration in recognizing what had to be done to prevent catastrophe in Kosovo. Many, in fact, were considerably worse. Had Clinton done what was necessary in October, I wonder whether he would have had the full support of Congress. Even in March and April 1999, many Members of Congress voted against the air campaign, voted against the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, and generally opposed NATO efforts to defeat Milosevic. Few had the wisdom or the political courage to insist that the U.S. employ all necessary means to achieve victory.

When the next crisis comes, when the moment next arrives when the United States will have to deter an aggressor, and to do so in time actually to prevent the aggression, I hope we will all do a lot better. I am absolutely confident that we will be tested again. I wish I were more confident that we will pass the test.

Senator SMITH. Thank you both, gentlemen. We'll go 7 minutes a round on questions. I wonder if either of you would agree with me that what we have in Kosovo right now is a success, not yet a victory? At least that is my reading of it. We have been successful, at least in a limited objective, of getting Mr. Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. But I am wondering what either of you think our policy should be now going forward toward Kosovo? I agree with your evaluation of mistakes we made and frankly, correct decisions we did also make in the past, but what should our policy be toward Kosovo and Mr. Milosevic?

Mr. KAGAN. I'll answer the Milosevic question then you can answer the Kosovo question.

Mr. DAALDER. Thanks.

Mr. KAGAN. On Milosevic, I do not think—even though the war was a success, I do not think we will fairly be able to call it a victory, and the name is unimportant. The question is whether it is a lasting success or not. I do not think we will be able to call it a lasting success as long as Milosevic is empowering Belgrade. And, therefore, it seems to me that moving beyond Kosovo means moving toward Milosevic's ouster.

Senator SMITH. Are we elevating him as being too important to this or are the feelings shared that Mr. Milosevic sort of embodied, are those shared very broadly in Serbia?

Mr. KAGAN. I have to say you can never be sure, but I am willing to take my chances. I think that Milosevic like some other world leaders, and in his context, lesser than many of these world leaders who have caused us so much trouble in the past has unique abilities. He has some unique abilities to inflame nationalism and draw it into a force for power for himself, and he is a riverboat gambler and he has played it very well.

I do not want to try to cure Serb nationalism. I do not think we can cure Serb nationalism. Just as I think it was a mistake to leave Saddam Hussein in power at the end of the gulf war, I would

have been willing to see what came after Saddam, I would be willing to bank. I would be willing to take the risk.

Senator SMITH. We never, whether in the gulf war or in this war, that has never been one of our objectives. An allied stated mission beforehand is always short of that. And I have always, at least from my view, I think that ought to be one of the objectives is it is a political removal as well, but whatever. Do you think that our policy toward Serbia now is going to work? What is your evaluation? Is he weaker today than before, or is he——

Mr. KAGAN. Now I am really going to say I do not have enough knowledge to know. I read the papers 1 day and the headline says Milosevic is getting more powerful. I read the papers the next day it says, no, looks like the opposition is rallying again. I do not know what the answer is. I think I would defer to Ivo on that matter.

Mr. DAALDER. Just before you—let me answer your previous question because I sort of half agree with Bob and half disagree. I think it would be wonderful to get rid of Mr. Milosevic, but I have very little confidence that that will solve our problem. I do think that this is something that goes deeper than just Mr. Milosevic and his inability to manipulate Serb nationalism.

I was disturbed by a wonderful New York Times magazine piece that Blaine Harden did about a month ago called "The Milosevic Generation" in which he had two pertinent facts. One is that the way to get ahead in Milosevic's Serbia today for young people is either to leave the country, so that of the 600,000 people in Serbia who have a post-high school education, only 100,000 remain. It is an astonishing figure.

Senator SMITH. That's 100,000 out of how many?

Mr. DAALDER. Out of 600,000 with a post-high school education, only 100,000 remain, and they are mostly elderly. The young are all leaving. They are here studying and they are staying here or in Europe. They are not coming back.

Senator SMITH. Those that are staying are——

Mr. DAALDER. Those that are staying are finding their new careers in prostitution and crime. That is the Milosevic generation. This is a bleak picture that the removal of this one man is not going to resolve in and of itself.

Senator SMITH. So the demonstrations against him and the tens of thousands of people.

Mr. DAALDER. Let us put these demonstrations in context. Let us say you have in 1 day in the whole of Serbia, a country of 10 million people, 8 million Serbs, maybe 40,000 protesting. We had 35,000 people doing an AIDS March here in Washington on Sunday. This is not the Nation rallying in opposition to Mr. Milosevic. We had 500,000 to a million people in 1996–1997 hitting the streets. Those were demonstrations. When you have 10,000 people in the square in Belgrade, that is less than a football match.

People are sick and tired of Milosevic, they are sick and tired of this regime, they would love to get rid of him, but that is not going to lead to a newfound democracy in Serbia. They are also sick and tired of having lost the war in Kosovo, quite frankly. They remain deeply committed to their own sense of victimhood. This is not every Serb everywhere, but it is a more general feeling than just the leadership and just the regime.

Senator SMITH. Where does that lead you on autonomy versus independence for Kosovo?

Mr. DAALDER. I think that issue has been settled for all practical purposes. And I think our current policy which says do not do anything that reaffirms Serb or Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo is exactly right. Do not close the door to independence. Do not become the obstacle to independence. But at the same time, it is much too early to raise the final issue of whether we can find an autonomy as part of a new Serbia which may or may not emerge. It is too early to make that decision.

The key is do not make decisions now that reaffirm Yugoslav sovereignty. Do not insist on the dinar, as we haven't, as the currency. Do not insist on having Yugoslav customs on the border, as we haven't, and do not insist on having Yugoslav flags flying everywhere, as we have not. All these are right decisions, which by the way our allies have opposed all along because they have made a decision. They do not want an independent Kosovo. And this is going to be a major difference between us and them. Not that we want it. We just want to be absolutely sure that the international community does not do anything that prevents that from happening if and when that eventually becomes a reality because we do not want to fight the Kosovars over the question of independence. We do not want to be the obstacle. It is not the situation you want to put U.S. troops or any other troops in.

Senator SMITH. Do you feel like the European fears on independence are overblown?

Mr. DAALDER. I understand the fears, but I think we therefore have to manage the consequences of independence, dealing with Macedonia and above all, dealing with Albania. It is a completely utterly failed state that needs to be brought up to par. The Macedonians in fact are doing a quite good job of inviting the Albanians into their own government. There are few Albanians in the elite at least in Macedonia that look to either Kosovo independence or a greater Albania as their salvation. They look toward their salvation in Skopje and in their own country. That is a good sign. But I am worried about what is happening inside of Albania, the drug running and everything else that is going on in that noncountry, nonentity is troubling for figuring out what we are going to do in Kosovo.

Senator SMITH. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I, as a young student, could never fully understand—not even fully, I could not understand, period—how men of consequence could sit at the table that we sit at over in S–116, whatever it is, our Foreign Relations committee room, the beautiful, old historic room, how they could sit around that table in 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940 and not have acted.

Some of them were great men. It all of a sudden dawned on me one day about a year and a half ago: We had a meeting, and I do not know whether you were there, Senator, but some of the Armed Services members were there. And there was just Senators. I think there were Senators. Some staff. And I made a push for what I thought should be a very aggressive policy. And I guess it is almost 2 years now, because Bosnia was just—it just ended and I thought

there were certain lessons to learn from Bosnia and we were about to repeat the mistakes in Kosovo.

And I'll never forget one of our colleagues, a man with more experience than I have, who knows a great deal about the military, who was, unlike me, a war hero. He looked at me and he asked me the question: he said, but can you guarantee me no American will be killed? And it was a little bit as if I had been in for my annual physical with that little triangular rubber hammer the doctor uses to check your reflexes, and taking that hammer and going "boing." Hit me right in the middle of the head. And all of a sudden it became absolutely clear to me why no one acted in 1934 and 1935, and 1936, and 1937.

Mr. Daalder, why I chose, instead of a history professor, I chose to be a Senator, was because foreign policy, history and political science seldom ever lend themselves to reality in terms of what happens. What happened then.

I realized for the first time in my political career that the single most difficult thing to do for a President was to take a nation to war where you had to assume you were going to lose some American lives, maybe 2, 5, 10, 20, 100, 300, when the Congress clearly, Democrat and Republican, did not believe that there was a crisis that warranted it, where allies were opposed to it and where NATO had never conducted war. And if you won then, if they had moved in June when I was talking about it because I think you are wrong. We waited, October; it is too late, I think June. What would have happened if it succeeded. We would have been told there was no threat; that it was not really the problem you thought it was; you spent all that money, you waste our money, it is a political campaign. If you go in and you are wrong and you "lose," they have taken the Nation to war over something that no one thought was worth doing it anyway and why did you get us involved in this?

And I cannot think, Mr. Daalder, of a single event in American, modern American, foreign policy, from 1890 to now, where the United States ever subscribed to your lesson. Ever. Maybe Panama or maybe Grenada, saving the medical students. You know. Can you think of one? What one?

Mr. DAALDER. In 1949, we signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Senator BIDEN. We signed it.

Mr. DAALDER. We signed it and we put a lot of troops on the ground in Europe. We had brought them home. We put them back in. We spent a lot of money in terms of——

Senator BIDEN. That is true. But no one was saying in 1949 that we are sending them to attack. No one. The promise made was one that this will prevent something from happening. Fundamentally different. If we had been saying in Kosovo, by the way, if we send 10,000 troops, reposition 10,000 troops out of Germany to Hungary and they are just going to be in position and sit there, that is what they are going to do, then that is a different deal. And then even in Greece what we did, we said, we are going to prevent something from happening. We are not going to take any proactive, in terms of physical, use of force, striking first, proactive action. So it always fascinates me when scholars come and tell us about these formulae.

I can think of not a single time, including the one you have said, Panama, maybe, because Panama, Reagan said boom, go. Grenada, boom, go. You know, they went in, out, gave everybody six million ribbons, and we declared a victory and the medical students were safe. I am being obviously facetious. It literally was that way. It was a clear objective. It was never discussed and it was done. I do not know how a democracy—I do not know how in a democracy—the prescription can be, that you propose, can be met, I mean can be filled.

Now, the one thing I do agree with you both on, and I was very outspoken privately beforehand and after with the President: I thought he should have been going to, as the Chairman did, to those meetings at the White House. Mr. President, you have got to speak up. You have got to talk about this. Literally, this is not fiction. This is not anything we have read in a history book. We were there. We said speak, go, talk about it.

But at the same time, what was going on is, you know, the military plan had to be clear. Well, the military plan that had to be clear was, one that our NATO allies said they do not want any part of. Now, my prescription for that was, just like it was in Bosnia, go. Go it alone because they will follow. They cannot afford not to. And I wish they were not private—I would like to—I mean, I wish I had not sent them to the President. I would like to give you the memos I sent to him. I do not know, scores of them, to the President. Go. But the truth was, at the time, that was an incredible risk.

I think I am right. I think the Europeans, including the French, could not have stood it that we were taking initiative on our own in Europe. They would have been like that old joke about the French Revolution where the general walks out and said which way do my troops go so I can run ahead of the column and lead them. I think that is what would have happened.

But do we not all have to admit that that is, I mean, that is—there were not 2 percent of the foreign policy community. There were not 2 percent of the elected community who shared that view at the time. And so, I say this not in defense or criticism of this President and the last, but the next President, and my 7 minutes is up. And the second round I'll come back and pursue this. Here we are about to—I just spoke with the National Security Advisor today. The issue I raised with him after he was coming back from the region was that my colleagues are anxious to know where we are on the stability pact, and what portion of that we are going to contribute to, and what our role is going to be in that. I guess I am making news here and I shouldn't, but the response was, we have that pretty well worked out, Joe. If you want to come down, I'll show it to you, but we do not want to go up to the Congress with it now, because the Europeans have not signed on their deal, and you know what will happen. They will get ripped apart. And they will. They absolutely get dismembered.

Now, here we are in peace, quote, unquote, and by the way, there is relative peace over there. I mean, you can walk the streets, people are out at night, it is as you have pointed out, Mr. Daalder, it is incredible to me there have been so few revenge killings. I find

it incredible. And yet, we cannot even get a consensus up here, I think it is fair to say.

Let me put it this way. Whenever the plan comes up, I'll lay you 8 to 5 it is a donnybrook getting it passed. The Wye Accords, you know what we just did? The government in the foreign appropriations markup can send the President a bill that does not meet our obligations financial. Do you want to hear what he said, we cannot even get this outfit—Democratic—I am not making it up—We cannot even get this outfit to agree to fund the Wye Accords. This is not speculation on my part. I get a call at 10 this morning. You probably did. Your staff probably told you, hey, they finished the markup, $3 billion short, no money for Wye. So I do not—I guess I am going much too long.

I think there is an underlying debate here which we really, really, really, really need you guys and your colleagues to jump on. And as I think there is a debate to be that is over 300 years old, before we were a nation, about isolation and intervention, I think there is a fundamental struggle going on up here in the Congress about whether we are going to engage in war or we are not. I think at the root of this is this strong and historic pull for nonintervention. And so I am really, you know, if you read most of your colleagues, they are saying well, based on what we have done in Bosnia and based on what we have done in Kosovo, we are unlikely to have any President who is going to pick a third area which is equally as compelling to get involved in.

In fairness, I think, to President Bush, I do not know anybody who knew the former Yugoslavia better than Larry Eagleburger. He was Secretary of State. The only guy I know that occupied that position who spoke Serbo-Croation, not that that makes him qualified—but he is totally qualified.

Mr. DAALDER. The current one does, too.

Senator BIDEN. I guess you are right. She can. Obviously. Thank you. That is two in a row. But—not in a row, but two. And one of the things, when I talked to him about why are not we involved in Bosnia, why are we not getting engaged, the answer was in part, was much more than this, was, look, we just did Iraq. We cannot do another one. We cannot do another one. I am not sure the horse is strong enough to carry the sleigh here, you know, as my grandpop used to say. I mean, the sleigh is a foreign policy commitment that has worldwide significant involvement down the road, and I think we are so incremental about it, and I do not know whether we are going to find a President who is going to be strong enough in terms of his or her will or their relative position at the moment to be willing to take the risk and get that far out ahead of the Congress. Get that far ahead out of the American people. And I think the only way to do it is to argue for it and go to the wall.

My argument to the President was, Mr. President, in the next meeting or in the principals meeting, say this is what we are going to do now. If you want to be with this fine, if you do not, we are out. It is all your problem. We are not going. We are out. You solve it.

Anyway, I rambled more than I asked questions, but I really find this hard to figure out what lessons learned. After him taking two

rounds to make up for mine, I would like to ask you questions about specific aspects of implementing the peace, early elections, and matters that I would like to speak to.

Senator SMITH. I would just frankly echo some of the—we do appreciate your insights on that. But it was not just impeachment. There is just sort of an opposition of all things structured to our foreign policy and the United States, and I wonder if you have a comment to Senator Biden's——

Mr. DAALDER. Just to start off, I think you are right. This is tough business, and it is—it is difficult to expend political capital on these kinds of issues for any President under any circumstances. The best one can hope is to have people up here tell the President and people on the outside and on the inside telling them, well, you know, sir, on this one you really got to do it.

Senator BIDEN. Did it surprise you that not many of your colleagues—and I mean the intellectuals—and I am not being smart, I mean this sincerely—none of the academics, foreign policy experts, foreign policy community were not telling you to do it? It was deafening the silence, absolutely deafening.

Mr. DAALDER. I agree completely.

Mr. KAGAN. Who do you think we are fighting with all the time?

Mr. DAALDER. We are just two people.

Senator BIDEN. Maybe the four of us should go off and feel sorry for one another for a while. I don't know.

Mr. DAALDER. I would go a little further. I worked in the first term of this administration on that wonderful issue of Bosnia, and there came a time, it took a while, but there came a time when people on the inside said we have had enough. We cannot go on this way. And that, the summer of 1995, when horrible things were happening, led to people saying it does not matter what the Hill says, it does not matter what the allies say. We are just going to do this. This is what we are going to do. And they—and they marched on.

But with Kosovo, what I saw in the first year, and well into the war, the first 4 weeks of the war, was a decisionmaking climate in which people were anticipating the negative reactions in Brussels and on the Hill and saying, no, we cannot go there.

On the issue of ground forces, whether to deploy ground forces in October, whether to deploy them, if they are happy to agree to them, when the issue was raised, the question was, well, the Hill would not buy it so let us not even look at it. When you asked him, well, who did you talk to? Did you go up, did you talk to Senator Smith, Senator Biden, Senator Hagle, did you try to make a case? No. They would not buy it. And the same is true with the allies.

Senator BIDEN. The administration was split. There were people in the administration who thought ground troops were a very bad idea.

Mr. DAALDER. Absolutely. And that makes it even more difficult to make that case. But the same was true with the allies. Well into April and May, there were senior administration officials saying, using their own hesitation and blaming it on the allies. And my argument is that those who argue differently, as there were people in the administration, keep on fighting, keep on slugging away, it is hard going, and sometimes you win, and in fact in the end, I

think those people did win. They won on the question of the ultimatum and they won—they were about to win on the question of ground forces.

But that means you usually are later rather than early.

Senator BIDEN. That is the only point I was making.

Mr. DAALDER. You keep pushing. And you just hope that at one point somebody breaks and sometimes you get a real break. You get earlier rather than later. It's tough, but it's tough slugging.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Daalder, during the confirmation hearing of Richard Holbrooke, I took occasion to use your article to question him, and he took issue with your article. I wonder if you can elaborate any further. Have you thought anew or differently about what you wrote for the Standard or do you think it was a fair shot? Would you modify anything?

Mr. DAALDER. I would do this. I would modify it in the following ways. There is no doubt in my mind that what was moving everybody, including Dick Holbrooke, was to find a way to end the possibility of massive suffering of people who were in the mountains and did not want to come back. I have my doubts whether the agreement triggered those people to come back, as I do not believe that Milosevic had any interest in having 30,000 people dying in the mountains that winter. So having the framework that allowed the people to come back from the mountains was important.

However, and in fact I spent more time looking into this, I would say that the focus on the verification mechanism, which is what for 9 days preoccupied the negotiations, and then ending up with what we got was a disaster. In two ways. If you insist on a verification mechanism, do not confuse that with an enforcement mechanism. The fact that we knew that he was not compliant is useless if you are not then willing or able to do something about it. And the biggest problem I had at the time and I continue to have now is when we put 2,000 unarmed civilians in, we were giving him 2,000 unarmed hostages that prevented us from using air power to enforce the agreement.

And in confusing verification with enforcement, we in fact put in place a system that was extremely good at verifying his noncompliance, but also ensured that we would not be able to enforce the agreement if and when we decided that that was necessary. If you want to have proof that this thing did not work, it was the fact that Madeleine Albright decided and then the administration went along saying the October agreement is the wrong way to go. We have to have a new framework, which is what Rambouillet was about. And I do think it was a major mistake to put in unarmed observers at the time. I do not think we bought much of value, and we lost something.

Senator BIDEN. Rambouillet. One of the things that at the time—I would be interested in both your comments on this. I apologize, Chairman Gilman and Mr. Gejdenson and Chairman Helms and I are supposed to meet at 4:30 over in the other room about the State Department bill, but let me just ask you this question. I thought the single biggest mistake of Rambouillet—and I am a great admirer of the French, I do not mean this as a cut—was letting the French take charge and the decision not to have NATO in uniform at the table. I was convinced that without NATO phys-

ically there as a major presence at getting the KLA or the Kosovars in any way to go along with any agreement in a timely fashion was virtually impossible and may not have worked even, even with them there. But my sense was there was a need for these guys to be able to look in the eye of General Clark and Klaus Naumann and others and say, you guys, is this a deal here? You are going to enforce it? Is this the deal, as opposed to looking at other diplomats around the table.

And one of the things I—I am going to be presumptuous not to send you a speech I delivered, which is very presumptuous, but laying out my view of the lessons we should learn from Bosnia in applying them to Kosovo. I am going to ask you about one of them that I think is a lesson. I think early elections in Bosnia was a serious mistake. I think all it does when you have early elections in a circumstance like exists now in Kosovo and existed now in Bosnia is guarantee that the nationalist factions, the most extreme elements of whatever that faction is, are going to be the ones that prevail.

In Kosovo, the idea that you can have a free election before the television towers are back up, where people ask you to go out and debate and argue the issue, make cases known, is going to be essentially a coronation of a group of people who are very well equipped and very brave to fight a war and may not at all be equipped to run a country. And so I wonder.

I met with Dr. Haltzel behind me, at length with Kouchner and with the KFOR folks, and they are talking about early implementation of municipal elections, and my argument is "hold off." The response was, look, we do not want to be viewed as a colonial power, a colonial force, an occupying force. And I said, wrong, you should be. This is a time when you should impose a civilian government. What is the author's name? Eric Roy, we went to see him, and I think he is one of the most knowledgeable guys I spoke with there, and he is saying, look, the people out in the street are saying impose order here. Do not wait. Do not go through this charade of getting RFPs about whether or not you can put up a building or do this; get it down, lay it out. He said you did not have any trouble writing Japan's constitution for them. You did not have any trouble laying this out. I know I sound facetious, but I am serious.

So I'd like you to comment on two points. One, early elections, good or bad, and, two, is there a worry in your view how the Kosovars will view interim civilian government imposed? I mean, not imposed in the sense of ordered, but set in place, absent elections, as being tantamount to making a colonial state, that the U.N. is being—will be denying their, I do not know what phrase I would use, but you understand the issue? Could you give me some sense?

Mr. DAALDER. Before that, can I add also to the point on NATO not beeing at the table at Rambouillet I think is right, but NATO was not at the table at Dayton either. The fact that NATO was not at the table at Rambouillet should not have excused the fact that we only sent a colonel. We did not send a general to Rambouillet. There was no reason why we could not have had a four star sitting next to Madeleine Albright to make that reassurance.

Senator BIDEN. Well, the only point I would make about Dayton: we had already bombed them in Dayton. We had not gotten there yet in Rambouillet. But I understand your point.

Mr. DAALDER. I think just because the French vetoed one thing, did not mean—we should noy have sent more senior people to the negotiations.

Senator BIDEN. We could have. There is no question about that.

Mr. DAALDER. I agree with you. On the two issues, I think you are dead right on the early elections. Inside the government, I fought against early elections in Bosnia. I thought it was a major mistake not only because of the notion that you would in fact empower nationalism by doing so, but also because it was tied to this notion of an exit strategy. We equated early elections with an exit strategy. If you only had elections you could leave.

Senator BIDEN. That is exactly what the U.N. is doing right now. That is exactly what Kouchner is doing.

Mr. DAALDER. And I think therefore, we should not have elections for a long time because as I think Madeleine Albright has rightly and the President has rightly said, we do not need an exit strategy, we need an integration strategy. That means we are going to be there for a while, quite a while yet.

To your second point, the key to being a good colonial government, which is what you need in this place which has not had a government in any real sense for at least 10 years, but in many ways much longer, is to make sure that you do not do anything that reaffirms Yugoslav or Serb sovereignty.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with both of those points.

Mr. DAALDER. As long as you maintain that you are doing this in order to help them become self-sustaining, self-governing. Which is what we are doing. So in that sense, I think we are doing exactly the right thing, and my biggest worry is that we are not in fact taking enough control and instead handing over control too quickly to other people. But the goal here is to run this place for a while.

Senator BIDEN. When you are President, maybe you can make one of us your Secretary of State.

Mr. KAGAN. I do not want to keep the Senator. We are always halfway imperialists in these situations, but that is sort of the worst of both worlds. But back to your grander thoughts about the U.S., that also runs deep in our character. After we finish telling everybody what to do our position is, hey, we are not telling you what to do.

Senator BIDEN. It is going to be a very, very difficult time. I mean, this is—there are so many people who have a vested interest in seeing this not work. I mean, there are so many intellectuals who have invested in this being a bad idea. I do not ever recall, Mr. Chairman, where a major foreign policy initiative was declared a failure within 24 hours of it being initiated. And I can—I do not remember that happening. I am sure it has, but I cannot remember that happening. And I think part, much, of it is the administration's failure to make its case and I am not excusing their failure to do that, but we really—it is amazing to me and what we all kind of forget is that there is a big argument here among people we respect, between us and others saying, look, we have no right. This is a sovereign nation. We have no right to be involved at all. I

mean, serious leaders, more in your party than mine, but nonetheless both. But this is a—anyway. Like you said, Mr. Daalder, I think this is a matter of just keeping on, just keep punching through, and, I mean, but I would like very much to have the day when we have the ability to put that formula of, you know, move quickly. I mean, I hope I live to see that day. Thank you very much. I apologize for having to leave, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing on American diplomacy on Kosovo during the thirteen months before we launched air strikes against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999.

As we all should know—but often seem to forget—diplomacy is this country's first line of defense.

If diplomacy is unable to resolve policy differences with adversaries, resort to military action may be necessary. This is what happened in Kosovo.

And make no mistake about it: not even considering the irreplaceable loss of human life that war brings, prosecuting a war is more expensive than conducting diplomacy by a factor somewhere in the millions.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, I find the unwillingness of this Congress adequately to fund the so-called 150 account, which provides money for our State Department to operate around the world, to be incredibly short-sighted.

"Penny-wise and pound-foolish" doesn't even begin to describe our folly.

With regard to the diplomacy leading up to the air war against Yugoslavia, there is, I believe, much to question.

By February 1998, should we, for example, still have regarded Slobodan Milosevic as potentially part of the solution for the Balkans, rather than as the problem? I think not, and this isn't a case of "hindsight being 20–20. I am on record dozens of times as calling Milosevic a war criminal, a designation which the Hague Tribunal got around to making only last spring.

Should we have had better intelligence on the Kosovo Liberation Army?

I think so, although I do not underestimate the difficulty of that task.

Once the Contact Group proved to be hopelessly ineffectual in the early spring of 1998, should we have ceased using it as our vehicle for diplomacy?

I think so, although we definitely had to find some way to build international support for our policy. Perhaps an earlier reliance on NATO, rather than the Contact Group, would have been more effective.

Because we were ultimately forced to use force, one might be tempted to call our Kosovo diplomacy a failure.

In the real world, however, such evaluations are rarely clear-cut. For example, a diplomatic solution that left Milosevic in control in Kosovo would have been a colossal failure, even worse than what actually occurred.

Moreover, the thirteen-month tortured effort to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem undoubtedly convinced public opinion in Western Europe of our good faith, thereby making support in the war possible.

I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses today, particularly that of Senator Dole. He and I stood virtually alone at the beginning of the war in Bosnia in 1992 as we advocated forcefully halting Milosevic's aggression.

It took 3 years—and a quarter-million dead and more than 2 million homeless persons in Bosnia—to change the opinion of a majority of our colleagues.

That example of slow reaction was one lesson we learned not to repeat. Horrible as the attempted genocide in Kosovo was, at least the likely number killed was only one-twenty-fifth that of Bosnia.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, we thank you for your participation today. It has been very helpful and with that, this committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

THE CONDUCT OF THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN IN YUGOSLAVIA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H. Smith presiding.

Present: Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I apologize for the delay in convening this hearing. We now will open. We have had a vote on, and Senator Biden is occupied as we speak with the CTBT treaty, and so we will go ahead, and we thank you all for coming.

Today, our subject is the way in which the NATO alliance conducted the war in Yugoslavia. Last week, the committee heard from Senator Bob Dole and other distinguished witnesses about the diplomatic failures that led to the war. We are very honored and pleased to have Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski with us. Dr. Brzezinski, as you all know, needs no introduction. He has so much experience and no doubt will share great wisdom with us today, and insight.

Our second panel after Dr. Brzezinski will be composed of Dr. Eliot Cohen from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, and Mr. William Howard Taft, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO. I appreciate also their willingness to share their views with us.

As a preface to these panels, let me just simply say that during the 78 days of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia I was particularly concerned about the impact the war would have on the NATO alliance. When speaking to many Americans I sensed that their feeling was that but for NATO we would not be in the war, and that because of NATO we would not be able to win the war.

I was troubled, along with other Americans, over the degree to which political considerations affected NATO's military strategy, even to the point where politicians from NATO member States questioned and sometimes vetoed targets that had been selected by the military.

I firmly believe in the need for civilian control of the military in a democratic society, but I also believe we can effectively adhere to this critical principle by clearly outlining political objectives and then, within the boundaries of those objectives, allowing military commanders to design a strategy in order to assure the achievement of those objectives.

General Clark and other NATO commanders were not given that opportunity, but instead were subject to excessive political interference.

In addition, the Clinton administration's mistaken assumption that Milosevich would capitulate after just a few days of bombing had implications on the military process itself, and reports indicate that NATO planners were forced to scramble to identify and select appropriate targets that met with political approval after their initial list was exhausted. Until internal NATO documents are made available for close review, I cannot speak to the accuracy of those reports, but if true, it seems to be another example of politics placing constraints on effective military strategy.

Furthermore, the decision to escalate gradually the bombing campaign as opposed to the immediate use of overwhelming force may have maintained allied unity, but it was at a tragic cost to the people of Kosovo who were killed or forced to flee their homes during the prolonged period of the NATO buildup and bombing.

I am also distressed at the excessive considerations the administration showed to Russia's position during the war. Now, I do not suggest for a minute we should ignore the feelings of the Russian people or their Government, but lest we forget, the Russians publicly denounced NATO for its "illegal aggression against Serbia." They supported Slobodan Milosevic even as his army and police forces were murdering innocent ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. They were alleged to have provided military weaponry to Serbia during the conflict itself. Those actions do not indicate to me that Russia was a true partner in helping NATO search for a peaceful solution.

Finally, the debate in this country over the use of American ground troops in Kosovo was of great concern to me. I must confess, I was puzzled by President Clinton's public announcement the first day of the war that he had no intention of sending American ground forces to Kosovo. To take that option off the table certainly provided aid and comfort to Mr. Milosevic, and likely contributed to the lengthening of the war itself.

I traveled to the Balkans in mid-May, and while in Tirana I spent some time with the American pilots of the Apache helicopter unit. These pilots were well-trained and prepared to do their part to achieve NATO's goals in Kosovo. They wanted to be able to do their job, and I supported them in that effort. In fact, I contend that NATO did have a ground force in Kosovo. They were simply the KLA.

In a briefing to Senators immediately after the war ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed a slide that points to the significance of the offensive launch by the KLA against Yugoslav and Serbian forces in late May. You can see it right over there. You can see how ineffective the bombing was until the KLA began their organized offensive. On day 68, the Serb positions were rooted out, and as a consequence for 10 days there were significant—to the degree there were any significant military targets hit, they were at that point.

It makes my point, which was frankly while we did not want ground troops, in the end it took ground troops. They simply were someone else's ground troops, namely the KLA, that brought about the speedy resolution to that conflict.

In sum, the end result of a NATO war in Kosovo should be entitled a success, but in my view, not yet a victory.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and, Dr. Brzezinski, it is wonderful to greet you here. I regard you as a friend, and I deeply admire your career and appreciate so much your sharing your views with us whenever called upon. Thank you, sir. The mike is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all commend you for the leadership you have taken in examining this important issue, and for the sense of direction you have provided to that effort.

In my testimony, I plan to focus on one specific aspect of our Kosovo experience, namely our relationship with Russia. My bottom line is that cooperation with Russia is desirable. It can be quite useful, but that the Kosovo experience shows that the current Russian Government is not trustworthy.

Let me speak to this issue in more detail, noting particularly some compelling circumstantial evidence indicating Russian-Serbian collusion. Generally speaking, Russian policy during the crisis can be seen in three phases, and I will compress what I have in my testimony regarding the first two phases. The testimony goes into more detail.

The first phase was largely the vitriolic and visceral support for the Serbs, hostility toward NATO, and an attitude which is best described by a Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta, which stated, and I quote, "the collapse of the U.S. global empire is being initiated by the action by NATO, and it is in Russia's interest," quote, "to let the United States and NATO, with its demented West and East European members, bogged down as deep as possible in a Balkan war," end of quote.

Once Russia realized that NATO would neither quit nor split, it decided to join the diplomatic effort, and it concentrated on being a partner in the G–8 discussions on how to deal with the issue, seeking to formulate what might be called a political solution. It is at this stage that Russian engagement became more visible, and former Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin joined the Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari in taking the lead on behalf of the G–8 in discussions with Milosevic. I want to draw your attention to the fact that in operating jointly with Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin would at times meet with Milosevic alone, and there is some significance to that.

As Moscow realized that NATO would neither split nor quit, its tone became more hysterical. On May 28 the Washington Post published a chilly, hysterical statement by Chernomyrdin warning that the American-Russian relationship will come apart if the war continued and the bombing was not stopped, and demanding reparations for Yugoslavia.

On the next day, May 28, Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic alone. Two days after that, Chernomyrdin let it be known publicly that his discussions with Milosevic were productive. On June 2,

Russian TV reported that the discussions conducted by Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin with Milosevic involved not one single proposal formulated by the G–8, but two different plans, and that Russia, "is talking about a virtual partition of Kosovo" with a "Russian contingent," under its own command in a separate Russian zone in Northeast Kosovo. The very next day, on June 3, Milosevic all of a sudden accepted NATO's demands for the withdrawal of Serb forces while Chernomyrdin at the same time stated on Russian TV that, and I quote, "at Yugoslavia's special request, Russia will also be represented" in the occupying force. Events then unfolded quite rapidly.

On June 4, the Russian foreign and defense ministers held a closed meeting with the Duma to reassure it that Yugoslavia had not been betrayed.

On June 5, Russian officers did not show up as scheduled at the first meeting between NATO and Yugoslav officers, and that meeting was supposed to coordinate the Serb withdrawal.

Between June 5 and 7, Serbian officers continued stalling in the negotiations. The Russians never appeared, and on June 10, NATO agreed to a delay in the Serbian withdrawal, which, starting with June 3, should have been completed in 1 week.

The very same day, June 10, a Russian military contingent left Bosnia. We now enter the third and critical phase in the Russian role in the Kosovo crisis. That Russian contingent left Bosnia and with full, complete Serbian cooperation and assistance, and rapidly moved through Serbia toward Kosovo. At the same time, the Russian Government reassured Vice President Gore that the contingent would not enter Kosovo.

This presupposes an occupation of Pristina, but the White House disallows that. On June 12, at 1:30 a.m., the Russian forces entered Pristina, and again with Serbian military assistance took up defensive positions at the airport, barring the later-arriving NATO forces. Some intelligence reports suggest that the Russians secured at that airport some military equipment previously delivered to the Serbs.

I want to draw your attention to a detailed account in the Moskovskiy Komsomolets, a Moscow newspaper, of June 14, which tells us the rest of the story of what happened, and also of what did not happen. A crowing over the fact that there was a Russian coup, with Russian troops being greeted by Yugoslav crowds in Pristina.

The paper says that as of June 12 a contingent of 2,500 Russian paratroopers is now ready to move immediately into Pristina and "it has already been decided that Russia will have its own sector in Kosovo." Decided by whom?

The report also notes that Hungary denied Russia access to its air space, but, and I quote, "This is not a problem. Bulgaria, for example, gave the go-ahead our planes could make a detour from the Russian coast over the Black Sea and Bulgaria straight to Kosovo."

In effect, this means that Kosovo would be partitioned by a unilateral fiat whether NATO liked it or not. Indeed, on June 12, the Bulgarian Government was confronted by a Russian demand for overflight rights, allegedly to deliver supplies to the Russian forces

in Pristina. The Bulgarians were even informed that the first plane was to take off at 0600 hours, several hours prior to the notification. However, things did not work out as planned. Not only Hungary, a NATO member, but also Romania and Bulgaria refused Russia access to their air space. The Kremlin prudently decided that it could not run the risk of having its own air transports forced down. As a result, the Russian contingent in Pristina was left stranded.

In the meantime, the Serbian forces were already in full retreat on exposed roads, and therefore could not stop without becoming vulnerable to really massive and destructive air attacks.

For a week, the Russian Government insisted on a separate sector. Only on June 18, faced with the NATO denial, did it accede to the idea of having its troops dispersed within the U.S., French, and German zones.

Mr. Chairman, in the light of this, it appears to me that Milosevic's acquiescence on June 3 was part of a desperate attempt engineered jointly by Belgrade and Moscow. Once Moscow realized it could not sway the West, it used its role as the West's comediator to fashion secretly with Milosevic a preemptive maneuver masked as accommodation.

The collusion was contrived to outwit NATO by salvaging de facto for Serbia, under Russia's protection, the northeastern part of partitioned Kosovo. The attempt faltered because three small European countries had the gumption to say no, and because NATO remained firm in not agreeing to a separate zone.

In conclusion, therefore, let me make a more general comment. Russia today is in the midst of a political, economic, and social crisis. The Russian people want security, stability, and eventually prosperity, to each of which they are fully entitled. They do not share their political elite's preoccupation with international prestige and they do not support its military adventurism, be it now in Chechnya, or earlier in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the present Russian leadership, every member of which would feel quite at home in a Soviet Government—if the Soviet Union still existed, quite literally, every single member of the present Russian leadership would feel at home in the Soviet Government—is driven by nostalgia for great power status and by resentment against America's special international standing.

That motivation not only explains the Russian conduct in Kosovo, but it provides a key lesson that should be drawn from that particular experience, a lesson, incidentally, that you already drew in your opening comment. Namely, that Russia is not yet a reliable partner.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THE LESSONS OF KOSOVO

One of the important lessons of Kosovo pertains to our relationship with Russia. The bottom line is that cooperation with Russia is desirable, can be quite useful, but that the current Russian government is not trustworthy.

Let me speak to this issue in more detail, specifically reviewing the Russian conduct during the Kosovo conflict, and noting particularly some compelling circumstantial evidence indicating Russian-Serbian collusion.

Russia's policy toward the Kosovo crisis can best be understood in reference to three phases. The first was largely visceral and vitriolic. It involved an emotional and almost instinctive solidarity with Milosevic, violent denunciations of the bombing, and promises of support for the Serbs. Even prior to the bombing, on February 3, the Duma called for aid to Yugoslavia if NATO strikes. When the air attack began, Russia sought a UN condemnation, and then Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov attempted to split off the Germans with a peace proposal that was much more favorable to Milosevic than NATO's.

During this initial phase there were persistent rumors that a "volunteer" Russian contingent had gone to fight on the Serb side. Western intelligence sources also reported that some Russian military equipment was delivered to the Serbs, and that Russian military advice was provided. The overall Russian approach was well surrimarized on March 25 by a leading Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta. The paper hopefully declared that the Kosovo action was initiating "the collapse of the U.S. global empire," and that it was in Russia's interest to let "the United States and NATO with its demented West and East European members bog down as deep as possible in a Balkan war."

The second phase came into play once it dawned on the Kremlin that the NATO alliance would neither split nor quit. Russia then somewhat shifted its stand and sought to be part of the Western decision-making process. The chosen avenue was the G–8 foreign ministers' consultations, where former Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, as his country's special envoy on the Balkans, assumed a highly visible role in seeking to convince NATO that it should soften its stand if it wished a "political" solution. By late May this process assumed the form of a two-headed effort:

Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari took the lead on behalf of the G–8 in discussions with Milosevic. However, Chernomyrdin at times also met with Milosevic alone while Russia's public pronouncements became increasingly strident.

On May 27 Chernomyrdin published an altogether hysterical op-ed piece in The Washington Post. He asserted that "the United States lost its moral right to be regarded as the leader of the free democratic world when its bombs shattered the ideals of liberty and democracy in Yugoslavia," called for the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia, and warned that he would urge President Boris N. Yeltsin to freeze all American-Russian relations unless the bombing stopped. The next day he met alone with Milosevic.

Two days after that extraordinary outburst the third and critical phase of Russia's policy was set in motion. Chernomyrdin let it be known that he was pleased with his discussions with Milosevic. On June 2 Russian TV reported that Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin "have brought not one but *two different plans* to Belgrade," (italics added) and added that "Moscow is . . . talking about a virtual partition of Kosovo," with "a Russian contingent" under separate Russian command in control of northeast Kosovo.

The very next day, June 3, Milosevic accepted NATO's demand for the withdrawal of all Serb forces, while Chernomyrdin in an interview with Russian TV stated that "at Yugoslavia's special request, Russia will also be represented" in the occupying peacekeeping force.

Events then unfolded quite rapidly. On June 4 the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers held a closed meeting with the Duma to reassure it that Yugoslavia had not been betrayed. On June 5 Russian officers did not show up at the first scheduled encounter between NATO and Serbian officers, held to coordinate the Serb withdrawal that was to take place promptly within a week. Between June 5 and 7, Serbian officers continued stalling in the negotiations, and on June 10 NATO agreed to a delay in the Serb withdrawal.

The same day, June 10, a Russian military contingent left its position in Bosnia, and—benefiting from full Serbian cooperation—moved swiftly through Serbia toward Kosovo. As this was happening, the Russian Government reassured U.S. Vice President Al Gore that the Russian contingent would not enter Kosovo. The White House then disallowed the NATO commander's plan to execute a pre-emptive seizure of Pristina, Kosovo's capital. On June 12 at 1:30 a.m. the Russian forces entered Pristina and, with Serbian military assistance, took up defensive positions at the airport, barring the later arriving NATO forces. (According to some intelligence reports, the Russians secured some military equipment there that they had previously provided to the Serbs.)

A detailed account in the Moskovskiy Komsomolets of June 14 tells the rest of the story—both what happened and what did not happen. Crowing over the Russian military coup and over Serbian crowds in Pristina burning U.S. and British flags,

the paper said that as of June 12 a contingent of 2,500 Russian paratroopers was ready to be flown into Pristina, and that "it has already been decided that Russia will have its own sector" in Kosovo. The report noted that although Hungary had denied Russia its air space, "this is not a problem—Bulgaria, for example, gave the go-ahead. Our planes could make a detour—from the Russian coast over the Black Sea and Bulgaria straight to Kosovo." In other words, Kosovo would be partitioned by a unilateral fiat, whether NATO liked it or not.

Indeed, on June 12, the Bulgarian Government was confronted with a request from Moscow for overflight rights for six Russian planes, allegedly to deliver supplies to the Russian force in Pristina. The Bulgarians were even informed that the first plane was to take off at dawn, hours before the delivery of the request.

Alas for the Kremlin, things did not turn out so. Not only Hungary, a NATO member, but Bulgaria and Romania refused access to their air space, and the Kremlin prudently decided that it could not run the risk of having its air transports forced down. As a result, the Russian contingent in Pristina was left stranded. In the meantime the Serbian forces, by then in full retreat on exposed roads, could not reverse course without facing enormous vulnerability to resumed air attacks. For a week the Kremlin continued to insist on a separate sector, but on June 18 Russia reluctantly agreed to have its troops dispersed within the U.S., French and German zones.

It thus appears that Milosevic's sudden acquiescence was part of a desperate double-cross attempt engineered jointly by Belgrade and Moscow. Once Moscow realized that it could not sway the West, it used its role as the West's co-mediator to secretly fashion, with Milosevic, a pre-emptive maneuver masked as an accommodation. The collusion was contrived to outwit NATO by salvaging for Serbia—under Russia's protection—the northeastern part of partitioned Kosovo, and to gain for frustrated Russia a significant boost in international prestige. The attempt faltered because three small European countries had the gumption to defy Moscow, and NATO remained firm in not agreeing to a separate Russian sector. Under these circumstances, the double-cross did not work.

In conclusion, let me make a more general comment. Russia today is in the midst of political, economic, and social crisis. The Russian people want security, stability, and eventually prosperity. They do not share their political elite's preoccupation with international prestige and they do not support its military adventurism, be it now in Chechnya or earlier in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the present Russian leadership—every member of which would feel quite at home in a Soviet government if the Soviet Union still existed—is driven by nostalgia for global power status and by resentment against America's special international standing. That motivation not only explains the Russian conduct in Kosovo but it provides a key lesson that should be drawn from that particular experience: namely, that Russia is not yet a reliable partner.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. I think it is fair to say we share the same view, as my opening statement made clear. I disagree with the administration's claims that Russia's role was a minor irritation, that it was a price worth paying to bring them into the international community. It seemed to me they were doing everything they could to frustrate the international community.

Going forward, what do you see with their presence in Pristina and involved in this NATO force? What implications do you draw for the future?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The implication I draw is the very obvious one that we have to be very cautious in our dealings in order to make certain that our interests are fully safeguarded, and that our actions are based on a careful analysis of what needs to be done. In this particular case, I think General Clark was quite correct in arguing that we should preempt in Pristina.

We did not, and as a consequence of that we could have had quite a serious crisis. If either the Hungarians or the Romanians or the Bulgarians had bowed under pressure we could have been faced with a large Russian paratroop force in Pristina, seriously attempting to carve out a partitioned northeastern Kosovo with very

negative consequences for the outcome of what we had been trying to do for the preceding 3 months, and perhaps even with some risk of a confrontation.

To the extent possible, we should engage Russia in international cooperation, but without too many illusions regarding shared objectives, shared aims, and joint values. I think cooperation based on skepticism is probably less likely to lead us astray than cooperation based on premature illusions.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Brzezinski, you wrote in the middle of the conflict in Kosovo against Serbia that during the first 3 weeks, NATO's air campaign against Serbia was timid and morally irresponsible. Based on my opening comment, I think you know I agree with that. Why do you think the Clinton administration pursued this sort of piecemeal buildup to this conflict?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I suppose it was a combination of domestic and international factors. First of all, the administration has a view of conflict that is to some extent colored by the experience of a number of its individual participants, namely some sense of hesitation about the use of power.

This is not true of all of them. There are some very notable exceptions to that, but I would say, by and large, if you look at the personal inclinations of a number of people in the administration, they come from a perspective which has been historically skeptical about the application of force in order to deal with international problems.

Second, in all fairness to it, one has to note that a number of NATO allies were very wary about the use of strong, tough application of military power against Milosevic. There were hesitations about casualties, and there were hesitations about the level of damage. There was a tendency to feel that a gradually escalating conflict might be more effective in inducing Milosevic to compromise, and there was a combination of these factors.

Senator SMITH. Do you think those factors carried over to—inappropriately would carry over to any other conflict in the future? I mean, are you comfortable with the way the NATO command worked in this endeavor?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. We all learn from experience, and my guess is the administration itself learned from experience, and I think there are some indications of that in the later conduct of the war. The bombing became somewhat more intense, and somewhat more punishing in the latter weeks of the war. I would hope that this shows that there was a learning process involved.

Insofar as NATO is concerned, there is I think a problem that in an alliance of this sort, allegedly integrated, there is too much of an overlap between the decision that is political to conduct, in effect, a war, and the military decisions necessary to conduct it decisively. The overlap produces ambiguities and uncertainties.

From what we have learned about the conduct of the war at critical stages, military decisions were second-guessed, and were second-guessed on political grounds. We even have that case arising in relationship to what I was talking about, namely the desire to preempt in Pristina, which apparently was expressed by General Clark, and was questioned by his immediate subordinate, the Brit-

ish field commander. His reluctance to do what General Clark wanted to do was backed by the British Government and then approved by the U.S. Government, thereby disallowing the NATO commander's initial decision.

Senator SMITH. Now, we have always thought of NATO as a defensive alliance. It is now proven it can go on the offense. Do you think that this manner of operation, excessively political, would be the case if NATO were responding to an attack upon it, in other words in a defensive posture? Would we be able to leave politics at the door and then function more effectively as a military alliance?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would hope it would be more effective, and I think there is an element of common sense and human nature involved here. The war we were waging against Serbia, basically we could not lose. The only question was, could we win it, and could we win it soon enough? So we had this margin of comfort to make political decisions to hold back and so forth, because we are never at risk of losing the war.

If we are attacked, that presumes that someone has attacked us. We think he might win, which then implies that we will probably be beleaguered. I think if attacked, then the sheer instinct of survival would compel us to act more decisively, and certainly we would be under pressure from those who are the most vulnerable to that attack to be more decisive, and I assume that would be the Germans if there was a war in Europe.

And then if Germany was not defended effectively, it would be the French, and so I would not be at all surprised if it was the Germans and the French who would be saying to us, let us be more decisive, and maybe there is the risk that we would not be sufficiently decisive being over here and not over there.

Senator SMITH. When you were in the Carter administration, NATO certainly had more decisive plans in place in its defense, isn't that fair to say?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. When we were confronting the risk inherent in those days, we were dealing with a much more powerful adversary than we now have, a Soviet Union which controlled half of Europe, a Soviet Union which politically felt it was riding the crest of history, which on the strategic level was beginning to think that it not only had nuclear superiority, but maybe even the capacity to decapitate us and prevent us from responding, and which was confident that it had the capacity to win a conventional war on the ground in Europe.

So in that sense the situation was more ominous, and it also meant that we had to respond in a way which left no doubt as to what we would do, including the commitment to credible escalation, and we tried to do that by changing our strategic doctrine and by making it very clear that we would be prepared to fight a strategic war very early on, a strategic war involving concentration, counterforce attacks, and if necessary—if necessary, the early use of nuclear weapons.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Brzezinski, in conclusion, I wonder if there is some lessons you would have NATO learn, or you could think ahead as to NATO's role in the defense of the United States and

Europe in going into the future, given its history as a defensive alliance, but its recent history of going on offense.

What do you see NATO being for the United States and for Europe in the years to come? Does it have an increased or enhanced role, or a diminished role for our defensive purposes?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would hope two things would happen. One, that NATO would continue to expand, because there is no doubt in my mind that expansion of NATO enlarges the zone of stability and peace and security in Europe.

It eliminates areas of ambiguity, so the continued credible expansion of NATO I think is very important. We should not be mechanically bound to the year 2002 as the date for the next enlargement, something that was spelled out at the April summit here, and which in my view unnecessarily binds the hands of the next U.S. President.

I think we should be flexible regarding that date, and move on further expansion sooner if it is objectively feasible and if some countries qualify sooner, and in my judgment two or three might, specifically Slovenia, Lithuania, maybe Slovakia.

Second, I would hope that the European members of NATO would draw lessons from the purely military aspect of what happened, and particularly from the fact that even though they spent together about 60 percent of what we spend on defense, they obtained thereby only about 10 percent of the military clout, and the reason for that is the lack of cooperation and integration among them.

I do believe that in the longer run it is in their interest and in our interest that NATO be truly a joint American-European partnership and not an alliance that binds the United States in a reciprocal relationship with 18 other States with an integrated military command, somewhat integrated military forces, but that is largely reliant on the American military capability.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that NATO's star is rising or falling among Europeans, among aspirant nations, among old allies? How is NATO now viewed?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If we had failed in Kosovo or had been outmaneuvered, as I believe we came close to having been outmaneuvered in the waning days of the war through Russian-Serbian collusion, I think NATO would have been profoundly discredited.

I think the fact that ultimately we prevailed, even though it took longer than it should have, I think that has been profoundly reassuring, and it has already had the effect of making the Europeans look more seriously about the need to cooperate closely. And it certainly has in my view sustained the hope of those nations which are not in NATO that they will be in NATO.

And here again, let me refer to my testimony. I think the Romanians and the Bulgarians deserve a lot of credit for standing up together with the Hungarians, who are already in NATO, at a moment in which they were tested, and we have to bear that in mind as we think about the future of Europe.

Senator SMITH. Thank you so much, Dr. Brzezinski.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. You have been very helpful. We wish you a good afternoon.

Now I will call the next panel up, Mr. Taft and Mr. Cohen. Thank you for your presence here today and your willingness to testify. Will Taft, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT IV, PARTNER, FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before the committee, and I commend you for conducting these hearings on this important subject.

The objectives of the allied military campaign in Kosovo earlier this year, and the strategy that was employed to achieve them may be simply stated. The objectives were to assure that ethnic Albanians could live safely in Kosovo in the full enjoyment of basic political and human rights, to bring about the withdrawal of Serbian military and special police forces from the province, and to bring in NATO as part of an international security force.

The strategy employed to achieve these objectives was to use air power. This was directed in this order: against Serbian forces in Kosovo, installations in Serbia that supported them, critical transportation routes and junctions, including roads, railways, and bridges, civilian infrastructure in Serbia, and ultimately certain facilities in Serbia that were less directly connected with the war effort, such as broadcast facilities, military and police headquarters, and other leadership and Government buildings.

The strategy called for air attacks to increase gradually in intensity to an expanding target list until the Belgrade regime agreed to allied terms. We were trying to get Milosevic to change his policy, to change his mind. Allied ground forces were declared to be unnecessary at the outset of the campaign, and were not used.

It appears, however, that in the closing weeks of the campaign, and you referred to this in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, the use of our ground troops was considered and, at the same time, KLA ground forces in Kosovo received some support from allied air power and perhaps other kinds of support as well.

The decision to rely on air power exclusively, to intensify the campaign only gradually, and expand the target list slowly was the key feature of allied strategy. From a military point of view, its chief advantage over other options was in limiting casualties to allied forces. This, in turn, facilitated the task of maintaining public support for the campaign within the alliance.

Obviously, these considerations, reducing casualties and maintaining public support, are of great importance, and a strategy that achieves them should not be casually criticized. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that the declared air-only policy involved substantial risks and significant costs.

That the risks did not materialize, and that the heaviest costs were borne by others, especially the ethnic Albanian people of Kosovo, does not mean that we should ignore them in reviewing the conduct of the campaign. Whatever the military considerations that went into the decision to conduct a slowly escalating air-only campaign, it is evident that political factors were dominant.

As I understand it, General Clark and his military colleagues favored attacking more targets sooner as the most effective way of achieving the objectives that had been set for them, and they wanted to prepare for the use of allied ground forces. Political considerations restrained them. Chief among these were the need to maintain unity in the alliance, and a desire not to overstress the allies' fragile relationship with Russia, which was supporting the Belgrade regime.

Again, we should not underestimate the importance of satisfying these political requirements. It is hard to see, however, why skillful diplomacy could not have managed them; distorting the military strategy, putting its success at risk and permitting the Serbian campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing to be carried out in Kosovo over a period of many weeks, were high prices to pay.

Moreover, the allies seem to have been badly surprised by the large-scale flow of refugees that their politically constrained military strategy enabled the Serbian forces to generate. While a number of allied governments wanted to limit the military effort, or even adjust our objectives in the course of the campaign, the relatively inexperienced coalition in Germany leading—or was it following?—a public yet uncertain how best to fulfill its responsibilities in the field of security was the main difficulty.

I expect that another time will find Germany less embarrassed about using force in a cause of vital importance, and less inclined to feel that the form and degree in which force is applied, at least in the levels that were being considered in the Kosovo conflict, have moral significance.

My guess is that a more forceful and consistent approach in the United States, which had some divisions in its own counsels, could have produced a more responsible policy in Germany last time. That is to say, in Kosovo.

With regard to Russia, I believe the allies unwisely invited Moscow to play a role in the Kosovo crisis and constrained their military strategy at several points out of a concern for Russian sensitivities. Our relationship with Russia is complex and, it seems, increasingly susceptible to short-term shocks. Regrettably, this vulnerability is likely to grow in coming years, as Russia struggles to establish its new identity and set its course in the world.

Over the long term, however, I do not believe our relationship with Moscow is ever improved by encouraging its involvement in matters where it has no genuine national interest at stake, and this is especially true where its views are likely to be influenced by ethnic and nationalistic sentiments. Nor do we help ourselves when we suggest that our policies in defense of vital interests can be moderated to take into account wrongheaded Russian views.

Russia had a choice in Kosovo. It could have joined NATO in opposing Milosevic's ethnic cleansing, making clear that it stood in the right place on human rights. It chose instead, early on, to support the Belgrade regime, largely out of sympathy for fellow Slavs, and doubtless, in some instances, allegiances to an ideological soul mate.

The consequences of this choice should have been that Russia was given no role in the crisis. Certainly, concern for its views should not have influenced our military strategy. Taken together,

these political considerations seem to me to have had an unfortunate influence on the strategy for the military campaign in Kosovo. They slowed it down, permitted the ethnic cleansing campaign to continue for weeks, and increased the risk of ultimate failure.

Any strategy based on persuading someone, in this case Milosevic, to change his mind is inherently more risky than one which undertakes to change the situation on the ground, whether that person changes his mind or not. It is worth trying, of course, but it should never be all you have got where vital interests are at stake.

The allies evidently wanted to bring the military action to a swift conclusion, but the strategy they adopted practically assured that this would not happen. In the end, however, the campaign did achieve its objectives and, in recalling that, we should perhaps give credit to a final political factor—one that helped rather than hindered.

The allies' credibility was at stake in the Kosovo conflict. There was no backing away from the objectives that had been set. Even if a less-than-optimal military strategy was being used to achieve them, it became clear that they were not going to change, and that the alliance would adapt its military strategy if necessary.

So if some political considerations delayed success, this one made it eventually inevitable. It was, I think, when he realized this, and it is unfortunately a realization that can come only with time, that Milosevic threw in the towel. Regrettably, he was left standing, which was at least in part a result of the way NATO conducted the campaign. While it is understood Milosevic's removal was not a specific allied objective, it certainly would have been welcome.

The conduct and the conclusion of the conflict, however, gave him time to rally political support, and it failed to discredit him in the eyes of enough of his countrymen. A different strategy I think could have made his survival much less likely.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taft follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TAFT IV

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The objectives of the allied military campaign in Kosovo earlier this year and the strategy that was employed to achieve them may be simply stated. The objectives were to assure that ethnic Albanians could live safely in Kosovo in the full enjoyment of basic political and human rights; to bring about the withdrawal of Serbian military and special police forces from the province; and to introduce an international security force with NATO in command of it.

The strategy employed was to use air power. This was directed, in this order, against Serbian forces in Kosovo; installations in Serbia that supported them; critical transportation routes and junctions including roads, rails and bridges; civilian infrastructure in Serbia; and ultimately certain facilities in Serbia less directly connected with the war effort, such as broadcast facilities, military and police headquarters, and government buildings. The strategy called for air attacks to increase gradually in intensity to an expanding target list until the Belgrade regime agreed to allied terms. We were trying to get Milosevic to change his policy, to change his mind. Allied ground forces were declared to be unnecessary at the outset of the campaign, and were not used. It appears, however, that in the closing weeks of the conflict their use was being considered, and at the same time KLA ground forces in Kosovo received some support from allied air power and perhaps in other ways.

The decision to rely on air power exclusively, to intensify the campaign only gradually and expand the target list slowly was the key feature of allied strategy. From a military point of view, its chief advantage over other options was in limiting casualties to allied forces. This, in turn, facilitated the task of maintaining public

support for the campaign within the alliance. Obviously, these considerations are of great importance, and a strategy that achieves them should not be casually criticized. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that the declared air-only policy involved substantial risks and significant costs. That the risks did not materialize and that the heaviest costs were borne by others—especially the ethnic Albanian people of Kosovo—does not mean we should ignore them in reviewing the conduct of the campaign.

Whatever the military considerations that went into the decision to conduct a slowly escalating air-only campaign, it is evident that political factors were dominant. As I understand it, General Clark and his military colleagues favored attacking more targets sooner as the most effective way of achieving the objectives that had been set for them, and they wanted to prepare for the use of allied ground forces. Political considerations restrained them. Chief among these were the need to maintain unity in the alliance and a desire not to overstress the allies' fragile relationship with Russia, which was supporting the Belgrade regime.

Again, we should not underestimate the importance of satisfying these political requirements. It is hard to see, however, why skillful diplomacy could not have managed them. Distorting the military strategy, putting its success at risk, and permitting the Serbian campaign of genocide and "ethnic cleansing" to be carried out in Kosovo over a period of many weeks were high prices to pay. Moreover, the allies seem to have been badly surprised by the large-scale flow of refugees that their politically constrained military strategy enabled the Serbian forces to generate.

While a number of allied governments wanted to limit the military effort or even adjust our objectives in the course of the campaign, the relatively inexperienced coalition in Germany leading—or was it following?—a public yet uncertain how best to fulfill its responsibilities in the field of security was the main difficulty. I expect that another time will find Germany less embarrassed about using force in a cause of vital importance and less inclined to feel that the form and degree in which force is applied—at least at the levels involved in the Kosovo conflict—have moral significance. My guess is that a more forceful and consistent approach in the United States could have produced a more responsible policy in Germany in Kosovo.

With regard to Russia, I believe the allies unwisely invited Moscow to play a role in the Kosovo crisis and constrained their military strategy out of concern for Russian sensitivities. Our relationship with Russia is complex, and it seems increasingly susceptible to short-term shocks. Regrettably, this vulnerability is likely to grow in coming years as Russia struggles to establish its new national identity and set its course in the world. Over the long term, however, I do not believe our relationship with Moscow is ever improved by encouraging its involvement in matters where it has no genuine national interest at stake, and this is especially true where its views are likely to be influenced by ethnic and nationalistic sentiments. Nor do we help ourselves when we suggest that our policies in defense of vital interests can be moderated to take into account wrong-headed Russian views. Russia had a choice in Kosovo. It could have joined NATO in opposing Milosevic's "ethnic cleansing," making clear where it stands on human rights. It chose, instead, early on to support the Belgrade regime—largely out of sympathy for fellow slavs and, doubtless in some instances, allegiance to an ideological soul-mate. The consequences of this choice should have been that Russia was given no role in the crisis. Certainly, concern for its views should not have influenced our military strategy.

Taken together, these political considerations seem to me to have had an unfortunate influence on the strategy for the military campaign in Kosovo. They slowed it down, permitted the "ethnic cleansing" campaign to continue for weeks, and increased the risk of ultimate failure. Any strategy based on persuading someone—in this case Milosevic—to change his mind is inherently more risky than one which undertakes to change the situation on the ground whether he changes his mind or not. It's worth trying, of course, but it should never be all you've got where vital interests are at stake. The allies evidently wanted to bring the military action to a swift conclusion, but the strategy they adopted practically assured that this would not happen.

In the end, however, the campaign did achieve its objectives, and in recalling that we should perhaps give credit to a final political factor that helped rather than hindered. The allies' credibility was at state in the Kosovo conflict. There was no backing away from the objectives that had been set. Even if a less than optimal military strategy was being used to achieve them, it became clear that they weren't going to change and that the alliance would adapt its military strategy if necessary. So, if some political considerations delayed success, this one made it eventually inevitable. It was, I think, when he realized this—and it is unfortunately a realization that can only come with time—that Milosevic threw in the towel. Regrettably, he was left standing, which was at least in part a result of the way NATO conducted

its campaign. While, it is understood, Milosevic's removal was not a specific allied objective, it would have been welcome. The conduct and the conclusion of the conflict gave him time to rally political support and failed to discredit him in the eyes of enough of his countrymen. A different strategy could have made his survival less likely.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Taft. Very excellent observations, which I think really do come in your case from time in the saddle in NATO, and so we thank you for that.

Dr. Cohen.

STATEMENT OF DR. ELIOT COHEN, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a particular honor to be here in the company of two very distinguished public servants.

Let me give you a somewhat different perspective, if I might, a perspective of an academic, but who has spent his career with military people. I should say at the outset that, although I very much share your concern and, in large measure, your disappointment, about the way this war was fought, I am not sure that I would entirely define it the way that you have in terms of political interference in the conduct of military activity.

There are two issues here, one, how the United States exercises world leadership and, second, the state of American civil-military relations. I would like to talk about three areas where warfare and politics intersected, the first, war aims, the second, coalition management, the third, civil-military relations.

Let me begin by saying one of my most rewarding professional experiences was teaching for 4 years at the Naval War College in the company of many of this country's future senior military leaders.

I was very struck by the way in which they had absorbed the idea that war is a continuation of politics by other means, by which they understood that war really had to serve the ends of policies. The issue was not simply civilian control as a result of our democratic institutions, but civilian control as something also required by the nature of war itself.

With that as a preparatory remark, and I will come back to it in a moment, let me begin by talking about war aims. Did we achieve our stated objectives? I think one has to say that we did not achieve our objectives as they were stated at the beginning of the campaign. Remember, in the President's and Secretary Cohen's initial set of remarks, there were three objectives that were set forth. The first was to deter Serb ethnic cleansing. That was clearly a failure.

The second was to stop the ethnic cleansing. It was eventually stopped at the end of 78 days of war, but it is also quite clear in retrospect we thought we would be able to do that in much less time and, indeed, it is even possible we may have accelerated the pace of ethnic cleansing by the way the war was conducted.

Third, and finally, our stated objective was and to some extent still remains the creation of a political arrangement in Kosovo pretty much along the lines of the Rambouillet Accords, which envisions a multiethnic Kosovo that is still part of the Yugoslav Federation, and I think most observers at the Yugoslav scene would say that is not the most likely outcome of the situation as it now stands, that we are far more likely to see a Kosovo that becomes, in effect, a single-ethnic-group-dominated independent State.

There were unintended and unanticipated events, perhaps accelerated ethnic cleansing, perhaps this outcome of an independent Kosovo, certainly a dramatic worsening of our relations with China following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, and even the way in which we won the war I would argue was unexpected.

It seems to me, insofar as one can judge at a distance, that we expected our success to come through pressure on the Serb military, and whatever the damage that was done, and there can be and will be a great deal of haggling about the numbers, the fact is, it took 11 days for a largely intact Serb army to leave Kosovo.

Rather, we won the war by the pressure we exerted on Serb society through bombing of targets which had in large measure importance for Serbs society and the Serb economy, and more importance than it did for the Serb military, so both the outcomes and to some extent the means were unanticipated.

The main point I would make here is that this is in fact entirely in accord with everything we know about the history of war. There are a lot of things that are unanticipated, and perhaps the lesson to learn is not to expect too much, because at the end of the day we did finally bring to an end a reign of terror in Kosovo and a pattern of ethnic cleansing which I suspect would have been even worse than the eventual outcome, but it does seem to me that there is a lesson here about the limits of our ability to foresee what can happen when we go to war.

What about coalition management? Well, again, there are many important questions, many of which will be unanswerable until we have more data. For example, the role of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark. To what extent did he act and consider himself to be acting as an American General, or as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a NATO figure?

To whom was he really responsible? Was he responsible to the Secretary-General of NATO, to the governments of NATO, to the American Government? It would be particularly important to find out how he defined his role and how he exercised it in practice.

I should point out the issues that we are raising here are very longstanding, and one can trace them back to the First World War and beyond, to what extent a general officer remains attached to his nation, and to what extent he begins to represent an entire coalition, but I would like to highlight a different aspect of the way the war was won.

Depending on how one would like to measure it, it is fair to say the United States exerted, say, somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of the real military effort in this war. That is to say, if one looks at the sorties that were dropping weapons, if one looks at the intelligence support, at the command and control and logistics, this

was overwhelmingly an American operation. It is pretty clear that we did not exercise 75 to 80 percent of the control. The war was not fought the way that we would prefer.

Senator SMITH. Can you put that in a percentage?

Dr. COHEN. I am not sure that I could, but I would probably say 50 minus, but that is a very rough guess.

Senator SMITH. And the purpose of that was to keep everybody unified?

Dr. COHEN. In response, Senator, allow me to introduce what has struck me as the central piece of wisdom about coalition warfare by the greatest war statesman of this century and perhaps of all time, Winston Churchill. In a speech on January 27, 1942, shortly after the United States had entered the war, when it was clear that there would be a grand coalition against the Axis powers, Churchill told the House of Commons the following:

"To hear some people talk, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is represented on all the councils and organizations which have to be set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is, in fact, the most sure way to lose a war."

Now, as has already been pointed out, there was no way we were going to lose this war, but it does seem to me that that reflects a central piece of wisdom about the conduct of coalition war, and it is a piece of wisdom that we lost sight of.

The central issue here was American leadership. To what extent were we leaning hard on our European allies to follow General Clark's lead, to conduct the kinds of policy, to fight the kind of war that we wanted to fight? As we know from the experience of successful coalition wars like World War II, that is not always a pretty process. That sometimes involves a certain amount of persuasion, and indeed, twisting of arms. It is not at all clear that that actually occurred, but again, the evidence is murky.

The third point, civil-military relations. The word interference has been used a number of times, and I must say that I am somewhat doubtful of it, or at least I think there is more to it than that, that there is a more complex set of relationships which cry out for careful examination, and particularly examination by Congress.

For example, we know that very early on in the campaign the President ruled out the use of ground troops. Almost everyone agrees that this was a foolish thing to do, that even if there was no intention to send ground troops into combat, there was no reason to give the Serbs the comfort of knowing that. There was nothing to be gained by that declaration.

Senator SMITH. Was there something to be gained at home, at least for European consumption, that was necessary?

Dr. COHEN. I am not sure that there necessarily was.

Senator SMITH. I was hoping that there was something, that it would be that, but I am not even sure of that myself.

Dr. COHEN. Senator, I have no idea myself why the President said that. I think there is something to be said for what Dr. Brzezinski said earlier, that this administration has a number of people in it with a particular set of outlooks on the use of force,

and they may simply not have thought through what the consequences of this kind of declaration were.

But let me make a point about this. This was pretty clearly the President's initiative and it is also, I think, pretty clear that General Clark was unhappy with it, and we know the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deeply unhappy with it. There was really only one large piece of evidence that we have about the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning this issue, and that is Bradley Graham's piece in the Washington Post on April 5, 1999, about 10 days or so into the war, which was the main window that we have into the thinking of the JCS, in which the account of JCS dissent, pretty clearly based on leaks from the Joint Staff and perhaps even from the Chiefs themselves, is all about whether this thing is in the American national interest.

We do not know, although I think it would be important and useful to know, whether the military advice that the President was getting from his most immediate military advisors was either to retract that statement or not to make it at all or, indeed, to seriously consider the use of ground forces. It is important to remember that, after all, the President in some ways was dealing with two sets of military advisors here, one around General Clark, and one located in the Pentagon.

Take another example, our extreme scruples about risking casualties. Early on in the air campaign planes were flying at 15,000 feet. That is about 5,000 feet higher than they were flying in the Gulf war early on. That is a height at which it is extremely difficult to conduct any kind of precision bombing, save with some very special kinds of munitions.

Was that civilian interference in military affairs, or did it, perhaps, reflect in part a certain degree of consensus? I would call your attention once again to a Washington Post article. That is yesterday's article about Camp Bondshell in Kosovo, where the first mission is force protection, and I am not sure that this really reflects this extreme scrupulousness about risking casualties, even at the expense of dragging out a war. Nor is this merely a result of the civilians injecting themselves into military affairs. I think it is more complex than that.

Or third, consider target lists. I do not think there are any hard and fast rules about how to manage the politics of an air campaign. It is one of this country's most brilliant air war planners, Colonel John Warden, who said that in the world as it is today, every bomb is a political bomb, and surely one bomb going astray, hitting the Chinese Embassy because of an intelligence error, can have very, very large political consequences, and we saw that demonstrated. It would be as interesting to know what targets were ruled out by military planners as well as by civilian planners.

So it seems to me that the central point here, there may have been interference, although the question is how we define that in an age where every bomb is a political bomb. There is also an issue of strategic culture, of what kind of advice is given, and how that advice is given, how frank the discussions are between military leaders and their civilian superiors.

Let me make my final observation and perhaps something of a plea. Another tremendously rewarding professional experience of mine was directing something called the Gulf War Air Power Survey, which was an independent study commissioned by the Air Force of air operations in the Gulf war, and so it is with particular interest, having had that experience behind me, that I watch the "lessons learned," industry go into high gear following this war, to include a variety of initiatives both from the Pentagon and also in Europe.

Let me say, at the risk of sounding cynical, that I do not believe that it is possible for the executive branch to do a study that is comprehensive, candid, and unclassified. It can do two of the three, but to ask it to do all three is to expect too much. That really requires something that is outside, independent, in some cases mandated by Congress, in some cases commissioned by the executive branch, but done by people outside the executive branch.

I think there is a tremendously important role for Congress here. There are a lot of unanswered questions, even about this war, conducted, as it was, in the light of publicity, and I would very much hope that you and your colleagues on the Armed Services Committee will consider and press forward the possibility of exploring in greater detail what actually happened.

Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. I wondered if either of you had a comment on the chart over here, where we try to figure out what happened. If you see that hockey stick of a red line there, that is when we started to get effective, apparently, and so my question is, were ground forces necessary, even if they were somebody else's?

Dr. COHEN. If I could address that on the basis of what I know about numbers, from having done so much similar work in Iraq. The first point to make, it is very difficult to trust any numbers.

The truth of the matter is that in General Clark's briefing about equipment destroyed, it was clearly stated that we recovered 26 destroyed tanks. That is the number we actually put our hands on when the troops went in. Those numbers are based on various estimates, looking at film, looking at footage, intelligence reports and so on. Although I have a lot of respect for the people who do that work, it is still art as much as science.

Second, there is a lot to be said for looking at the bottom bar, which is the weather bar. When the weather is good, you can do more.

The third point is, there is the KLA. There may also have been Western special forces operating with the KLA, calling in air strikes. It seems to me that is another ground component that is important to be thinking about.

Fourth, there is the importance in terms of the final decision to withdraw, of the virtual ground campaign. That is to say, if you recall that when the Serbs finally gave in, it was just at a point when there was beginning to be a lot of press discussion of the fact that there is serious consideration of ground operations going on. In fact, I think the President was having a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on that very day, and I suspect that the Serbs knew something about this.

But the fifth and final point I would make is that the Serb Army in the field, although it lost some equipment, was still an organized force responding to orders and doing what it intended to do to the Kosovar Albanians.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Taft, did you have any comment?

Mr. TAFT. Well, it does seem to me that more activity on the part of the KLA was a factor in this, and certainly, reading about it at the time, you could see that it played a role in bringing the Serbs out into more visible places. There were also other factors at work. The weather is important, but I do not think the weather alone would account for that enormous spike in this graph.

Senator SMITH. I think you both probably heard my question to Dr. Brzezinski, and I think you have both sort of come at this from different directions, but it seems to me, maybe there are just a very unique set of circumstances in this conflict that should not color our entire perception of NATO's ability to operate. Is that a fair conclusion?

Mr. TAFT. I think that you should bear in mind a couple of points about the interaction between the political level of NATO and the military. The line is never clean—and I think Mr. Cohen has made this point very well—between what is political and what is military. You get political advice from the military, and you get military decisions from the politicians, and it is sometimes hard to tell the difference between the uniforms they have. This was NATO's first extended outing in running a campaign.

Senator SMITH. Did that discourage you, considering how much we leaned on NATO in years gone by?

Mr. TAFT. Well, I think we were unfortunate in that our policy of deterrence was no more effective than it was in the case of Bosnia, where we did not deter Milosevic by yelling at him. The reasons for that, I think you went into them last time. Our signals were so unconstant over the year that he was not deterred from doing what he in the end did, but there is no question that that coordination between politics and military could be better.

The Europeans did not have the same experiences that we have had in the Gulf war. The recovery from the Vietnam syndrome, I would call it. Our pattern now is to give the political instruction to set the objectives, and then we really do, in the United States, have a tradition of relying on the military to tell us what they need to achieve those objectives, give them twice as much as they say they need, and tell them to get it done. That is the Weinberger approach, which I learned from him. But do not tell them how to do it once you have told them what you want done.

The Europeans do not have that tradition. I think we got it through painful experience over the years, and I think the Europeans probably have a better understanding of why that is a good approach now, and I would think that we would not have as much difficulty another time. But this was the first time out. I hope there will not be another time, but if there is, I would look for a better performance.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Cohen, do you have any comment?

Dr. COHEN. I guess two comments. One is, I very much agree with Dr. Brzezinski that if this had been a failure it would have

been a serious blow to NATO. I am not sure whether this paves the way for a leap forward in terms of NATO's effectiveness, but had it been a failure, it would have been a real disaster.

And what is impressive about it as an accomplishment is the fact that some of the governments stuck with it even though domestically it was very difficult for them, and the two governments I have in mind in particular were Germany and Greece, the Germans with a green foreign minister, of all things, leading the charge, and Greece with all of its historical ties to Serbia, that they were kept in the fold is really quite impressive, all things considered.

The second point I would make is, I think it is very important simply to have reasonable expectations for what NATO can do, and I hope we are not going to march into the future thinking that NATO is now this cohesive military instrument which we can bring to bear to solve all kinds of difficult strategic issues.

It is first and foremost a set of political undertakings. I think secondarily it is a whole set of arrangements to harmonize military forces so that when we do go to war we can integrate those forces. We sometimes forget, NATO actually made a huge contribution to the Gulf war that was invisible, because people were using NATO procedures, and the fact that we were so used to operating in a coalition framework in NATO made our task infinitely easier in the Gulf.

So NATO has all kinds of pay-offs like that, but to expect it to be a smoothly running fighting machine, now or at any time in the foreseeable future, particularly as it expands, I think would be unrealistic.

Senator SMITH. Do either of you have enough familiarity with what lessons Europeans are drawing from this conflict that are different from the lessons you hear us trying to draw? Are there any real stark differences in interpretation of what went on?

Dr. COHEN. Well, the only thing that one hears of is the Europeans talking more about, we need a more independent military capability. They are somewhat abashed by the extent to which they are relying on the Americans for support for all kinds of operations that are, after all, being conducted really not at all that far from the heart of Europe.

I must say I am somewhat skeptical that that will turn from talk into Euros.

Senator SMITH. Is your skepticism born out of this condition of their governments' budgets? I mean, to achieve what we brought to the table in Kosovo would take a whole lot more than the 2 or 3 percent that most of them contribute to military spending.

Dr. COHEN. It is partly a question of the economy and budgets, and that sort of thing, but it is, I would say, more largely a matter of culture. They expect us to take the lead, and they find it very difficult to agree among themselves what to do.

There is something absurd about the idea of the United States having to take the lead in sorting out Yugoslavia, which is very, very far away from where we live, and I must say there is a certain contrast. It is a difficult situation, but in some ways a simpler situation in East Timor right now, where the Australians, a country of

20 million, maybe a population a third the size of that of a major European power, are taking the lead.

Now, East Timor is a lot easier than Yugoslavia. I would not deny that for a moment, but it also reflects a difference in culture. It is a difference in political culture and in strategic culture, and that in some ways is the root of the problem. That is in some ways much more difficult to deal with than budgets.

Senator SMITH. It is nice to see the Australians doing that, though.

Mr. TAFT. I would just, Mr. Chairman, add, I think on the Germans, which is a key element of this, their performance in Kosovo was a great deal better than the performance that I saw when I was in NATO in 1990 on Turkey and Iraq. You might have thought it unlikely with the new government that they would be as good, but actually I do not think that the Christian Democrats would have been any different in this case.

Germans are, for very good reasons, extremely cautious about getting involved in these things, and they have all sorts of reasons that bear on them and affect them very mightily, and that is not all bad. But in the Gulf, where the issue was absolutely crystal clear that they had an obligation under the treaty to defend Turkey against Iraq, for several weeks they raised extreme difficulties about sending their airplanes to Turkey just to do that. That would not have been a problem 10 years on. They would have done that overnight.

They are really coming to be part of the team. They are not where we are, they are not where the British are, but I was encouraged by the performance here, and I really think if we had let John Kornblum—given him his head and told him to go to work he probably could have done even better than he was doing, but there was division back here and actually, frankly, not just in the administration. There was division in the Congress, some terrible votes, disgraceful, as to where we stood, and so the Germans were getting complicated signals from this side of the water as well.

Senator SMITH. They were indeed.

Just a final thought or question. I asked Dr. Brzezinski, are you optimistic or pessimistic about NATO's future, and how do you think it ought to evolve at this point, or should it dissolve.

Mr. TAFT. I am optimistic about it. I think the Europeans have had their memories about it refreshed, and have seen what it can do for them and what they cannot do without it. I think the American side has seen that it does rally when told to do so.

There was a lot of concern that the Europeans might not be with us. They were not exactly on the same page as we were all the time, but a lot of them were ahead of us, the British in particular, and some not, but we have gone through that. I think the spirit for NATO, for using it for the things that it is well-used for is there in Europe and it is there in the United States.

Now NATO is not a thing for everywhere. It is not for the Middle East. It is not for Africa. But to keep the peace in Europe and keep stability there, it has done a great job this year. It has had a good year, and I think it will be making a good contribution.

Dr. COHEN. I guess I would pretty much share those views. I would say I am mildly optimistic, as long as we do not expect too much of it. It seems to me that it fills the roles I outlined earlier of a set of political agreements and undertakings and creating a certain kind of forum and it allows us to harmonize our militaries.

It would be a mistake to think of it as a really effective war-fighting machine, but that does not seem to be what it is likely to be called upon to do.

Senator SMITH. Gentlemen, we thank you both. You have been very helpful, and we appreciate it, and ladies and gentlemen, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]